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Foreword 
his second volume of Readings in European Security vividly reflects 
the continuing changes that profoundly affect the factors shaping the 
security of the European continent. For a historian in the future, the 
work undertaken by the CEPS-IISS European Security Forum since 2001 
will appear in sharp contrast to the sort of issues that were at the heart of 
security concerns during the 1970s and 1980s, dominated by East-West 
confrontation. 
Where neutron bombs and Pershing missiles reigned supreme alongside 
‘approximate parity’ and ‘launch-on-warning’ policies (against the backdrop 
of the scholastics of deterrence theory), we now have an incredibly broad 
spectrum not only of issues – from the Greater Middle East to the defence 
industrial base – but also of levels of analysis. For example, the legitimacy of 
the use of force, in the form of preventive action, is not precisely of the same 
make as the specialist questioning of Turkey’s strategic position after the 
attacks of 11 September 2001. It isn’t so much that the issues presented in 
the Readings in European Security volumes are intrinsically ‘new’ in the 
sense that they never existed before; rather, they simply weren’t seen as first-
order strategic questions to some extent. The current salience of the issues 
selected for discussion by the European Security Forum is the mechanical 
consequence of the disappearance of the overarching East-West conflict with 
the cold war, which leads to the (re)discovery of so-called ‘new’ problems. 
This discovery is notably the case with nuclear proliferation and the spread 
of ballistic missiles. Such quintessential ‘emerging threats’ are as old as the 
Manhattan Project and Operation Paper Clip.1  
Much more fundamentally, however, two of the terms in the European 
Security Forum’s title have changed profoundly. First, the nature of the 
threats to international security have changed in their content, not simply by 
virtue of the disappearance of a set of state actors (the USSR, the Warsaw 
Pact and the Yugoslavian federation) or the changes involving another set of 
states (the democratisation of America’s East Asian allies, the runaway 
economic growth of China, etc.). More basically, the empowerment of non-
state actors along with the other facets of the broad array of phenomena 
characterising ‘globalisation’ forces us to think anew about traditional issues, 
not least about those concerning proliferation, but also about the pre-emptive 
use of force and indeed (albeit from a very different point of view) the 
Greater Middle East. Although, in the latter case, there is little that is new 
about the topic as such – this is the region Zbigniew Brzezinski dubbed the 
                                                          
1 Operation Paper Clip was the American code name for the transfer of Nazi-era 
scientists from Germany to the US, France, the USSR and Britain after World 
War II. 
T 
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‘arc of crisis’ a quarter of a century ago – the challenges prevailing in, and 
posed by, that region are now directly linked to the fraught interaction 
between the forces of globalisation on the one hand, and the reaction to it on 
the other, with empowerment of non-state actors (civil society sometimes, 
and alas, al Qaeda no less) as a common factor. Even a topic such as the 
European defence industrial base has to be approached in a manner that 
would have been difficult to conceive 15 or 20 years ago. Not only do 
military requirements no longer drive technological innovation, but the future 
of the defence industry is increasingly tied to its ability – and the ability of its 
customers – to benefit from the galloping pace of the information revolution. 
Here too, the forces of globalisation tear away at the statist and national 
protections of Europe’s cold war-era defence industrial base. Indeed, the way 
in which we have to think about security is changing, because of the way the 
international system is changing. The rules of the game are being rewritten in 
a manner that can only be compared with the definitions in 16th and 17th 
century Europe of the extent and limits of state sovereignty. 
Second, while the conditions of security have been undergoing dramatic 
change, Europe has transformed itself no less radically, which has in turn 
raised new questions. Some of these European transformations are common 
to all societies, with Europe feeling the impact of globalisation no less than 
other parts of the world; and although Europe is an important actor of 
globalisation, the process of globalisation itself is not an intrinsically 
European product. Many of the changes are the result of an outside event, 
such as the collapse of the Soviet Union’s will to exist. Europe played a 
contributing role to undermining the Soviet Union’s ability and desire to 
function as an imperial power in the satellite nations of the Warsaw Pact as 
within its own borders. But ultimately, the processes undermining the Soviet 
empire, and notably the resistance of the captive nations, affected Europe 
more than Europe affected them. 
Conversely, the countries and the peoples of what is called the European 
Union were the prime movers of the gradual establishment of the quite 
unique multilateral construct arising from the European integration process – 
or, more precisely in its French formulation, la construction européenne. 
Through thick and thin, 25 European states are now part of an entity that is 
neither a superstate nor a superpower on the world scene (except in the area 
of foreign trade), yet the EU is much more than an international organisation. 
It is a sort of hybrid: the EU generates possibly more than 50% of the laws 
and rules under which its members are governed; however, it has not 
federalised traditional attributes of sovereignty such as diplomacy or an 
armed force – though it has created a single currency. It is not surprising that 
our Russian and American friends sometimes have difficulty in taking stock 
of this ‘neither fish nor fowl’ entity. Europeans themselves have trouble 
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enough figuring it out – and no little trouble agreeing about its future 
direction. Nevertheless, eppur si muove, it not only exists but also moves, 
even if in an occasionally sideways fashion. The decrypting of the evolving 
European scene and its place in the international system is possibly one of 
the most useful roles the European Security Forum can have: these ‘readings’ 
will convey some flavour of this particular quality, using its now well-
established formula of having each topic introduced for discussion by a 
European, an American and a Russian analyst. 
 
François Heisbourg 
Paris 
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Introduction 
Klaus Becher 
he meeting of the European Security Forum on 25 November 2002 
was devoted to the analysis of European and transatlantic defence-
industrial strategies. The main question was if and how an intensified 
transatlantic approach to defence research and development (R&D) and 
procurement would develop or not, and if not, what such a failure to gain 
some access to US defence dollars for their business would mean for hard-
pressed European defence industries. 
The overwhelming size of the US defence market and the fragmentation of 
markets in Europe add aggravating structural dimensions to the difficult 
business prospects in this sector after years of shrinking or stagnating 
defence spending in Europe that increasingly leaves European players 
without the necessary critical mass. 
In his presentation, Gordon Adams underlined that the transatlantic gaps in 
military strategy, capabilities and defence spending are getting wider. In this 
situation, he was critical of the fact that US attitudes to defence-industrial 
cooperation are still dominated by the traditional buy-American preference. 
Adams made the case for more transatlantic cooperation but warned that it 
was not clear yet if the US or the Europeans would be prepared to draw the 
consequences from this compelling situation and create the necessary 
conditions for such cooperation to evolve. 
He claimed that not just European nations but even the US, in spite of its 
huge defence budget, would not in the future be able to afford the required 
rapid military transformation and modernisation on their own. The desired 
supply-side competition and multitude of technological approaches would 
fade away unless it was recreated on the transatlantic level. In addition, both 
European defence spending and the chance to sell defence-industrial 
products and services to Europe would shrink even more if European defence 
firms were not to survive. This required giving them more market access to 
the US and favouring transatlantic industrial partnerships. 
The idea underlying NATO’s new Transformation Command conflicted with 
the existing restrictive technology-transfer rules. The joint response force 
will depend on interoperable C4ISR (control, command, computers, 
communications, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance). This can 
only be achieved with greater US willingness to share such technologies with 
European partners, including reforming some of the ‘black box’ restrictions 
that have plagued transatlantic technology cooperation for decades.  
T 
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The allied transformation command will fail in its mission of integrating 
transformational technologies into European forces if its US staff cannot 
exchange views and data on key transformational capabilities, owing to US 
technology-transfer restrictions. 
Burkard Schmitt explained that there was no ‘European defence industry’ as 
such. We were instead talking about several different sectors with different 
structures. Therefore the question of whether Europe’s defence industry 
would survive had to be posed differently: in which of these sectors would 
there be survivors and who? While in the aerospace sector there were some 
cash-generating programmes in the shorter term, it remained unclear where 
the money for R&D would come from in the mid- and long term. 
Clearly, the low level of defence spending in most European countries was at 
the heart of the problem, with Germany playing the key role. It was not so 
much the overall spending level that was to blame but the way in which the 
available funds were spent. Gordon Adams added that above all, properly 
coordinated and strategically targeted R&D programmes would be important 
to halt the demise of European defence industries. 
Burkard Schmitt and Gordon Adams both found that after the end of the cold 
war, the transatlantic defence-industrial scene was driven by industry-led 
cooperation under the pressure of globalisation toward transnational 
industrial consolidation; meanwhile governments remained ‘behind the 
curve’ and failed to grasp and match this trend, especially by removing 
bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles. Reasons cited included the lack of 
harmonisation of national armaments requirements, the persistence of 
national defence market-protection rules and the traditional desire to 
minimise reliance on foreign supplies. 
In this situation, European defence investment does not render enough value 
for money. European nations continue to disagree, however, on the strategy 
to address the problem. On the one side, the UK is determined to always buy 
the most appropriate equipment even if this often means going to the US, and 
tries to exploit efficiencies from deregulation, flexibility, smart procurement 
and public-private partnership models while preserving competition on a 
transnational level. On the other side, in France and also Germany, to 
varying degrees, the desire to preserve a national defence-industrial base is 
still dominant.  
The Letter of Intent process in Europe, geared at creating the proper legal 
and administrative framework for a successful European defence industry 
after its transnational restructuring, had at first looked encouraging but it 
does not make up for the absence of actual programmes. In Burkard 
Schmitt’s judgment, the intergovernmental cooperation process in Europe 
was bound to fail and an institutional quantum-leap was needed. The defence 
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market should be governed by EU Commission rules but the procurement 
system should be kept flexible, avoiding a large management agency that 
would be counterproductive. 
Some nations hoped that armaments cooperation with the US, even in a 
junior partner or mere customer role could help to gain respect and influence 
in Washington. It was lamentable, though, that such transatlantic cooperation 
was pursued on a bilateral basis (inherently weak) and not through European 
institutions. In this context, Gordon Adams’s observation was relevant that 
even under the novel approach to industrial return, taken by the joint defence 
acquisition organisation OCCAR, there was still no incentive for including 
additional countries in cooperative projects. 
Recent US initiatives that would allow more transatlantic defence-industrial 
cooperation, including the relaxation of export-control obstacles to defence 
trade with close allies, equal treatment of qualified foreign-controlled 
defence firms and harmonisation of related regulations continue to face 
strong political resistance within the US, both for proliferation fears and 
national industrial interests. As Gordon Adams stressed, the engagement of 
the British firm BAE Systems by the US was important as an effort to 
establish bona fides for overseas defence firms in the US with Congress and 
the Pentagon. 
It remained to be seen whether the Bush administration would show political 
leadership on this issue vis-à-vis opposing forces in Congress and elsewhere. 
The US tendency to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘better’ allies was bound 
to create problems for Europe as France and Germany would probably be 
treated differently than the UK, undermining the basis for multilateralism 
and transnational companies. 
For Europeans, access to US technology is desirable. For European 
companies, access to a share of the US defence-spending cake is vital. This 
situation raises the crucial question of whether the US has an interest in 
preserving and strengthening European defence-industrial capacities through 
more intense transatlantic cooperation that benefits Europe. Further, would 
Washington actually be willing to sustain the continued existence of a 
European defence research and development base in Europe? 
In assessing the strength of possible political and military motivations on the 
part of the US in favour of transatlantic defence cooperation, one obvious 
argument for such a US interest remains that the cohesion of the North-
Atlantic alliance would otherwise suffer. Nevertheless, the need for 
interoperability as such would not require the nourishing of a European 
defence industry if the US were willing to sell its cutting-edge products and 
the Europeans were willing to bankroll such purchases – in spite of the lack 
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of technological spin-offs, job gains or the political autonomy that are 
usually associated with those defence products made closer to home. 
Burkard Schmitt believed that there was no need for the US to cooperate for 
industrial, budgetary or technological reasons; Gordon Adams, however, 
suggested that there were actually some, though not many network-centric 
warfare technologies in Europe that would indeed provide attractive 
opportunities for partnering. But the existing mistrust of Europe and 
European technology in the US defence establishment would have to be 
overcome and Europeans would have to show enough flexibility to take 
advantage of the chances offered in the process of network-centric 
transformation. The US offer to cooperate on missile defence, however, was 
purely driven by the political desire to offer incentives for allied political 
support. 
The Russian speaker, Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre 
for Analyses of Strategies and Technologies, did not submit a written paper. 
In his oral remarks, he underlined that Russia had inherited 80% of the 
Soviet Union’s defence industry while 20% was now outside the country. 
This inheritance provided Russia with a full, autonomous spectrum of R&D 
and production capacities. The sector was characterised, however, by 
pervasive duplication and redundancy and until two years ago the traditional 
preference for state-run enterprises over more competitive private ones had 
still been dominant. 
After ten years of rather plan-less restructuring and privatisation, there was 
still no encompassing vision. The government had decided, though, that in 
the further course of restructuring it would want to create 10-20 defence 
holding firms as stock companies with 51% state ownership. The war in 
Chechnya had not only determined the priorities for production but also 
given new impulses for research and development owing to increased 
demand for new equipment such as UAVs, night-vision equipment and joint 
C3I assets. 
With regard to international arms cooperation, Russia had a choice between 
East and West, and it was likely that both orientations would continue to co-
exist. In the past, Russia’s international defence-cooperation projects had 
been failures, mainly because they had been driven by political and not 
economic rationales. There was now noticeable Indian and Chinese influence 
based on their desire to use the existing, still superior Russian design and 
development capabilities, e.g. in the Su-30 and Su-27 programmes. For 
example, India would pay for the R&D in such programmes, while Russia 
would keep the intellectual property and buy the resulting products for itself. 
There was also cooperation with the European Aeronautic Defence and 
Space Company (EADS), mainly for the manufacturing of spare parts and 
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fuselage components. The experience was that more ambitious programmes 
such as the Russian/Ukrainian alternative to the A-400M did not go though. 
This experience had created the feeling in Russia that cooperation in areas 
more sensitive than transport, such as missile defence, would also be unlikely 
to materialise. European cooperation partners, in particular, were seen as no 
help to Russia in the defence-industrial sector since they had insufficient 
budgets. 
For Russia’s defence trade, the most attractive niche was to sell to customers 
who could or would not buy US or European products, such as the Chinese. 
Only a few such customers however, provided economically rewarding 
markets. Iran, where Russia was risking US ire, was also not paying well. In 
airlift services, Russians and Ukrainians now hold 50% of the world market 
with the old An-124, good for another 15 years. Thus there would be no new 
Russian heavy transport plane. 
The discussion that followed the introductory speakers’ remarks touched on a 
number of interesting issues with participation of officials from the EU 
Commission, EU Military Staff and NATO International Staff. One US 
participant asked why there was not more of an effort among Europeans to 
“just do it” and concentrate on important niches where the US wasn’t ready 
to share its technology even with close allies, such as Joint Direct Attack 
Munitions (JDAMs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle systems (UAVs). One 
reason cited why this strategy wasn’t being pursued was that the big 
European firms were above all focusing their efforts on keeping their role as 
systems integrators. 
There was also some discussion about the motivations behind US companies’ 
purchases of smaller European firms. Opinions differed whether this was just 
‘cherry-picking’ made easy by the strong US market power or whether it was 
part of a deliberate strategic approach for global control of certain strategic 
technologies. While in many cases, good business opportunities were simply 
taken, in others, including the purchase of German cutting-edge submarine 
manufacturer HDW, there were most likely more strategic considerations 
involved. 
On the main questions raised during the meeting in the context of 
transatlantic defence cooperation, a certain degree of consensus was forming: 
• It was obvious that Europe’s approach to the issue had so far lacked 
adequate top-level political guidance and sustained political will based 
on a defined set of priorities. Gordon Adams suggested that the choices 
the UK had made in its defence-industrial policy went in the right 
direction. But doubts remained about whether the matter stood a chance 
of recognition by politicians and the public in other European countries 
as important enough to generate sufficient attention and determination. 
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• It also was apparent that in the future there would be a stronger EU 
Commission role in this field, including export controls and trade policy. 
This dimension was not captured by the ‘dumb’ bilateral approach so far 
pursued by the US in its negotiations with European governments.  
• Much could be gained through a coherent European approach to 
negotiations with the US. First, the task would be to influence the 
ongoing US review and debate on defence trade and technology-transfer 
policies, especially in Congress.  
• Essentially, however, the problem would boil down to the need for 
maintaining a sufficient level of well-directed European spending for 
defence R&D and procurement.  
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Transatlantic Defence-Industrial 
Cooperation and American Policy: 
An American View 
Gordon Adams 
Introduction 
Defence industrial cooperation across the Atlantic has fallen on bad days in 
recent years. 
The number of official transatlantic defence programmes has dwindled to a 
handful, of which the frequently-threatened MEADS air defence system is 
the most notable.1 Increasingly, for major defence acquisition programmes, 
such as air transport and missiles, European governments are showing an 
inclination to ‘buy European’, while the US tradition of ‘buy American’ 
remains as hardy as ever. 
Industry joint ventures such as Thales-Raytheon Systems have yet to 
generate business growth. Strategic partnerships, such as that between EADS 
and Northrop Grumman, have yet to bear significant fruit in the form of 
access for firms on one side of the Atlantic to the defence market on the 
other side. The most successful transatlantic market access has gone to the 
few, largely British defence companies (especially BAE Systems and Rolls-
Royce) that have established themselves in the only growing defence 
acquisition market in the transatlantic region – the United States. 
Nor is transatlantic defence cooperation being encouraged by growth in the 
European defence acquisition market. Although the substantial market 
shrinkage of the past decade has been largely halted, only the French defence 
acquisition market seems poised to grow; cuts continue in the UK, Germany, 
Italy, Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands.2 A reversal of this trend seems 
unlikely in the near future. 
                                                          
1 Although the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has a number of European 
participants, it does not qualify as an official transatlantic programme. It is, 
rather, a US programme with European participants, of which the UK is by far 
the most important. JSF is, however, a harbinger of things to come – a dominant 
US programme, whose growth could gradually drive European producers out of 
the airframe business. 
2 The British defence budget is slated to grow 1.2% a year after inflation through 
2005–06; French equipment budgets are expected to grow just below 1.0% a 
year, after inflation through 2008. German defence budgets will remain flat, 
which will mean decline in constant euros, though a German budget review is 
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There are significant and growing obstacles to achieving a more open and 
flexible transatlantic regime for industrial and technological defence 
cooperation. Most of these obstacles are the result of government policies, 
principally in the United States, but increasingly in Europe as well. Despite 
these negative signs for the transatlantic industrial relationship, the logic of 
stronger industrial and technological defence cooperation remains 
compelling. For this logic to prevail, however, the transatlantic obstacles will 
need to be overcome. Although it is not yet clear that policy-makers are 
prepared to take the necessary steps, the policy options themselves are 
relatively clear.  
The case for transatlantic cooperation 
Strategic divergence and convergence 
Over the 1990s, the strategic visions of Europe and the United States began 
to diverge sharply. The US emerged as the dominant global power and has 
become a less and less reluctant sheriff in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001. A new, initially hesitant administration is now fully 
engaged, with forces operating against terrorists on a global basis and a full-
scale attack in Iraq is waiting in the wings. In service of this engagement, US 
forces are being transformed for even more global operations, acquiring 
network-centric technology that puts them years, if not decades, ahead of any 
other country’s capabilities. 
In Europe, with Britain and France each deciding to abandon defence 
autonomy and fully commit to the EU Headline Goal, there has been more 
dramatic progress towards a common European security policy and defence 
capability than in the preceding four decades. Nevertheless, there is still no 
European strategic vision to accompany the Headline Goal forces. For 50 
years the strategic attention of Europe has been focused on European security 
issues, with declining attention to global security concerns. This focus has 
left a large ‘vision gap’ with the United States, which has significant impact 
on comparative capabilities.3 
                                                                                                                                   
currently under way. The Italian defence budget is projected to grow 
significantly, but much of the additional funding will be dedicated to personnel 
as a transition takes place to a smaller, all-volunteer force. See IISS, “NATO and 
non-NATO Europe”, The Military Balance, 2002–2003, pp. 248–49 and 
Ministere de la Defence, Programmation Militaire 2003–2008: Project de Loi de 
Programmation, Ministere de la Defence, Paris, September 2002. 
3 See Gordon Adams (2001), “Seeking Strength in Numbers: The European 
Allies and US Defense Planning”, in Cindy Williams (2001) (ed.), Holding the 
Line: US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
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While French and British forces have undergone significant changes – 
conventional force personnel reductions, reforms, and in the French case, 
professionalisation – few other major European countries, especially 
Germany, have set out on the road of trading personnel for real capability. 
Shrunken European defence budgets remain heavily focused on personnel 
spending. Acquisition euros are in short supply and research and 
development budgets fall very short both of US funding (roughly four times 
as great) and of a level that would produce network-centric or 
transformational technologies in Europe.  
After the events of 11 September and the emergence of proliferation and 
terrorism as major security concerns, however, a new common strategic 
interest is emerging across the Atlantic. The old NATO rationale is gone, but 
the Prague summit will reflect a new concern, beyond ensuring the continued 
stability of troubled European regions. Proliferation and the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction delivered by multiple means concerns Europe 
as much as it does the United States. And the terrorist threat, while not new, 
now poses a danger of an asymmetrical nature and a significant magnitude 
both to Europe and to the United States. Confronting these threats together is 
clearly preferable to diverging policies across the Atlantic. Even, in fact, 
especially in coalitions of the willing, the partners continue to need 
interoperability, particularly as network-centric technologies become central 
to military operations. 
The logic of cooperation is having an impact on governments in the NATO 
region, as reflected at the Prague summit. The US Missile Defense Agency is 
explicitly encouraging allied participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) programme, a goal underpinned by NATO-funded research efforts in 
missile defence. The NATO summit has endorsed a reframing of the 1999 
Defence Capabilities Initiative that focuses on interoperability investments, 
especially those that support network-centric warfare, such as secure 
command, communications and information. The US has proposed creating a 
NATO Rapid Reaction Force, capable of conducting out-of-area operations, 
which is likely to be adopted by the Alliance.4 Such a force will require 
dedicated funding and interoperable technologies, increasing the incentive 
                                                                                                                                   
Press, pp. 79–117, and Robert Kagan (2002), “Power and Weakness”, Policy 
Review 113 (June–July). 
4 A prototype of such a force has been described as “a small, elite, mobile 
expeditionary force…maintained at high readiness, capable of swiftly projecting 
power to distant areas outside Europe and then conducting demanding combat 
operations with US forces in a wide spectrum of contingencies”. See Hans 
Binnendijk and Richard Kugler (2002), “Transforming European Forces”, 
Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Autumn), p. 118. 
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for transatlantic collaboration in these areas. Finally, NATO may, once 
again, endorse a common air-ground surveillance system (AGS), with a 
possible transatlantic technological solution that requires transatlantic 
industry collaboration. 
Budgetary pressures 
The limited European defence budgets provide a particularly compelling 
rationale for Europeans to seek a flexible transatlantic industry and 
technology regime. Limited budgets for defence investment, in particular, 
could prove to be the Achilles’ heel of the EU effort to create a Headline 
Goal force with effective transportation, air power, precision-guided 
munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and C4ISR (control, command, 
computers, communications, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance). 
The NATO summit decisions could add to this budgetary pressure. 
Europeans will want to be certain that investment dedicated to a new NATO 
RRF does not compete with investments required for the Headline Goal 
force.5 Yet the new joint force and the AGS programme constitute clear 
incentives to transatlantic industrial cooperation. Access to US defence 
technologies through transatlantic cooperation could provide substantial cost 
savings to the Europeans. Combined with reprioritisation of European 
budgets to focus on transformational technologies, resources could be 
focused on the most compelling capability needs.  
Despite rapid defence budget growth, the US could share this interest. Even 
projected US acquisition budgets are inadequate, given the dual requirements 
for equipment modernisation and transformational technologies, combined 
with growing personnel and operational costs. As the US budget deficit 
grows, future defence budgets will come under further pressure. Stronger, 
competitive transatlantic options for defence equipment could be part of the 
answer to this budget dilemma. 
For the US and Europe, a more integrated industry and technology regime 
that encourages industry collaboration would provide defence policy-makers 
with enhanced choices, competition and flexibility in defence acquisition. As 
the industry has consolidated, the number of providers of defence platforms 
has declined, constraining defence ministry options in Europe and for the 
DOD. The advantages of competition in pricing, technical capability and 
timing are slowly being lost. A broader array of technical options could be 
                                                          
5 Binnendijk and Kugler argue that the NATO force will require minimal 
resources – perhaps 2% of current European NATO defence spending – and  will 
draw largely on existing capabilities (ibid., p. 129). 
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available for defence planners and costs could be better controlled, 
representing a significant advantage within constrained investment budgets. 
Technology advantages 
The communications, information, networking, sensor and satellite 
technologies that are critical to network-centric warfare and combined 
operations are widely dispersed and commercial in origin. The capacity to 
integrate these technologies into military applications is less dispersed, 
limited largely to American and a very few European companies. European 
firms, particularly Thales, BAE Systems and EADS, possess the commercial 
technologies in abundance and are increasingly capable of integrating these 
technologies in defence systems.6 There are clearly advantages to greater 
flexibility in the technology-transfer regimes between these two continents 
and significant downsides to either side shutting itself off from the 
technologies available to the other side. A flexible regime across the Atlantic 
for such technology transfers, combined with more common barriers to its 
dispersal elsewhere, could be in the interests of both. 
An industrial logic 
As developments in the European shipbuilding, ground systems and aircraft 
industries suggest, it is increasingly difficult for European industry to sustain 
itself on European acquisition spending alone. Given such limits, the 
incentive for European defence industries to gain access to the US market is 
growing. Major US defence firms, while less dependent on the international 
market, are losing their historic access to the European market. Traditional 
access to Europe through direct sales is no longer acceptable. Only 
partnerships with European firms will provide future access and these are 
viable only if there is reciprocity in the policies governments pursue on both 
sides.7  
                                                          
6 See Frost and Sullivan (2001), “European Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) Market”, Report B055-16, 2002, and the panel reports of the European 
Institutes’ Interoperability Project. 
7 There is a growing tendency among US prime contractors to focus on the short-
term growth in US defence acquisition and to set aside, for now, this transatlantic 
interest. Changes in European acquisition practices could, however, further 
constrain access to the European market. 
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US and European policies create obstacles 
The defence industry on both sides of the Atlantic has recognised and 
responded to these incentives for greater cooperation for a number of years 
now. The same cannot be said for government policies, which create growing 
obstacles to a more flexible transatlantic regime. 
The United States 
The barriers to entry into the American defence market are major obstacles to 
a more transparent, open and flexible transatlantic defence-industrial 
relationship. They are largely based on government policies, many of which 
have existed for decades and are difficult to change. US Defense Department 
acquisition and defence trade policies are major obstacles. They include a 
strong and understandable DOD preference for buying US defence 
technologies, which are seen as significantly more advanced than comparable 
European technologies. There is also a strong DOD preference to protect US 
defence technological leadership and carefully restrict European access to 
US technical know-how. These preferences are reinforced by a guarded 
DOD approach to technology transfer and direct foreign investment by non-
US defence suppliers in R&D and production facilities in the United States.  
Beyond the DOD, the State Department, which administers the review of 
more than 45,000 export licence requests a year, takes a generally 
conservative view of the export of technologies on their Munitions List to 
any other country, including members of the EU. Export control rules written 
during the cold war have been extended since then, with the policy 
bureaucracies remaining concerned about the risk of the loss of technological 
superiority and the proliferation of capabilities that could be used one day 
against the United States.  
There are also substantial hurdles in the way of direct non-US investment in 
the US market. While some firms, notably BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce 
have succeeded in overcoming these barriers, few other European firms have 
done so. The system used by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) for screening non-US direct investment in the US 
economy can be a deterrent to entry. The security rules surrounding such 
investment, controlled by the US Defense Department, essentially cut US 
operations off from their non-US parents and are a further deterrent.  
Executive branch policies in Washington are mirrored by political concern in 
the US Congress, where defence technology export-licensing and technology 
transfer issues and direct investment by European firms in the American 
defence economy have been hotly debated over the past decade.  
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Substantial effort was invested in the late 1990s in trying to overcome some 
of the more frustrating obstacles to transatlantic defence industry 
collaboration.8 The US Defense Department’s system for reviewing export 
licences was substantially streamlined and a more flexible special security 
arrangement was negotiated with Rolls Royce’s US operations. Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen negotiated the Declarations of Principle (DOP) on 
reforms in defence trade relationships with the governments of Australia and 
the United Kingdom. After considerable struggle, broader export licensing 
regimes were introduced. In particular, following the May 2000 
announcement of the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI), other 
countries may be eligible to negotiate a waiver for certain trade under the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which govern the process 
for export licences, provided those negotiations lead to a compatible export 
control regime in that country. 
The US reforms of the late 1990s largely ground to a halt with the arrival of a 
new administration in Washington, D.C. The Defense Department has not 
continued the previous administration’s effort to further reform its internal 
licensing process and no new special security arrangements have been 
negotiated with non-American subsidiaries in the United States. The DOD 
has been reluctant to release technologies that may tie into weapons of mass 
destruction or the means of delivering WMD. Although a DOP has been 
negotiated with Sweden, there appear to be no plans to initiate such talks 
with other governments. With respect to specific technology transfers, the 
DOD (and State) has allowed German access to UAV technology, 
particularly the Global Hawk airframe, and access for Italy with respect to 
the Predator UAV, but there has been no broader policy decision. In general, 
the tone of DOD policy with respect to transatlantic defence-industry 
cooperation has been less forward-leaning than in the prior administration.  
The Department of State (DOS) has continued negotiations with the UK and 
Australia on an ITAR exemption as described in the DTSI, but those talks 
continue to proceed very slowly. The greatest obstacle continues to be a 
cautious State Department view about whether the UK must legally enforce 
US third-country transfer rules and regulations or whether a British 
government policy with the same effect is adequate. The agreements may 
come to a conclusion in the next few months, but will face implementation 
obstacles in the US, given Congressional resistance to any ITAR exemptions. 
There has been no consideration given to opening a multilateral dialogue on 
                                                          
8 For a discussion of the US reform process between 1996 and 2000, see Gordon 
Adams (2001), “Fortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defence Market”, 
in Burkhard Schmitt (2001) (ed.), Between Cooperation and Competition: The 
Transatlantic Defence Market (Chaillot Paper No. 44), Institute for Strategic 
Studies of the Western European Union, Paris, January. 
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export controls or technology transfer questions with the leading European 
arms producers. A part of the State Department Munitions List, which 
itemises controlled products and technologies, has been reviewed, but there 
has been little attempt to actually reduce the size of the list itself. Investment 
rules have not been changed. The DOS bureaucracy that processes export 
licences has been streamlined and connected electronically to other agencies 
with equities in the licence decision and has received an increase in 
personnel. The shape of its underlying task however, has not been changed.  
Until late 2002, there has been little attention paid by the new administration 
to questions of transatlantic defence industrial and technological cooperation. 
Policy-makers were preoccupied with the war on terrorism, which actually 
increased concern over the possible release of technology that may be used 
for weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles. In October 2002, the 
National Security Council finally began a long-delayed review process, 
issuing instructions to agencies to review the broad agenda of defence trade, 
technology transfer, transatlantic technology cooperation and US arms 
transfer policies, export controls and advocacy. Details of the review are not 
publicly available, though it is said to cover the definition of options for 
closer cooperation, the changes in policy, regulation and law that may be 
necessary for such cooperation, and the risks that may accompany 
cooperation with specific countries. 
Western Europe 
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to examine European policy 
closely, it is worth noting that the historically open European defence market 
may be in the process of closing substantially, as part of the 
‘Europeanisation’ of overall defence policies and defence industrial policies 
in particular. The EU commitment to the Headline Goal, declining European 
defence budgets and the consolidation of the European defence industry are 
having an impact on European defence acquisition decisions and the 
developing defence industrial and technology base. Gradually, a tendency 
may be emerging to protect the European defence industrial and technology 
base from American domination, and to sustain a European industrial and 
technological capability to support the broader security goals of a uniting 
Europe. 
The ‘buy-European’ preference may be indicated by the European 
commitment to the meteor missile and the A-400M transport aircraft. These 
two decisions could signal a future in which EU members buy major 
hardware platforms from European suppliers, with smaller procurements 
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being more transatlantic.9 European governments have encouraged the 
creation of European counterparts and competitors to US defence industrial 
giants to meet these needs and, as the Headline Goals of the European 
security and defence policy (ESDP) have been more sharply defined, these 
capabilities are being looked to for the necessary equipment and 
technologies, including air transport, sealift, precision-guided munitions and 
unmanned aerial vehicles.10 
There is also a growing cross-national trend to create European-level 
institutions and policies to provide the legal setting and road map for 
European defence acquisition policies and defence-industry behaviour. Such 
harmonisation is seen as necessary for a healthy, cross-national industrial 
base, as well as to ensure that this industry does not escape governmental 
scrutiny and controls.11 Under the July 2000 Framework Agreement, six 
countries (the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain) have 
undertaken to harmonise practices and regulations on export controls, the 
security of supply, the security of classified information and industrial 
security, defence research and development, the treatment of technical 
information, and defence requirements.12 
Four of these nations – France, Germany, the UK and Italy – have also 
created a joint defence acquisition organisation in 1996 – known as OCCAR 
for its French name (Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en Matière 
                                                          
9 These decisions are also consistent with a longer European history of creating 
and subsidising cross-border defence platforms, including the Eurofighter, the 
NH-90 and Tiger helicopter programmes, and a large number of MBDA missile 
programmes. 
10 See Gordon Adams (2000), “Convergence or Divergence? The Future of the 
Transatlantic Defence Industry”, in Simon Duke (ed.), Between Vision and 
Reality: CFSP’s Progress on the Path to Maturity, European Institute for Public 
Administration, Maastricht, pp. 161–208. 
11 Author’s interviews with government officials in France, Germany and the 
UK, summer 2001. 
12 The intent of this process is to “create the political and legal framework 
necessary to facilitate industrial restructuring in order to promote a more 
competitive and robust European defence technological and industrial base in the 
global defence market and thus to contribute to the construction of a common 
European security and defence policy”. Preamble to the Framework Agreement 
between the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning Measures to 
Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry, 
signed at Farnborough, United Kingdom, 27 July 2000. 
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d’Armement) to manage the growing number of collaborative projects 
among these countries, including, ultimately, the A-400M. OCCAR is 
increasingly seen as the prototype of a European defence acquisition agency, 
which may emerge sometime in the future in the EU framework with 
expanded membership.13 
As the EU member states protect employment in the defence industry and 
move to stimulate a European R&D technology base in advanced defence 
technologies, two tendencies may appear. First, European-level institutions 
will be increasingly tasked with regulatory responsibilities for this activity.14 
As one EU official has put it: “You cannot have a defence policy for 15 and 
an industrial base harmonised at six”.15 Second, this emerging European 
industrial and technology base will be protected from the United States. 
European governments will be willing to pay a premium for defence 
equipment and acquire slightly less-advanced technology, more slowly, in 
order to support this base.  
What is the alternative to the ‘two fortresses’? 
The goal of a more flexible transatlantic regime would be an industrial and 
technological relationship that is more reciprocal, integrated and transparent, 
while ensuring that critical defence technologies leak as little as possible to 
potentially threatening states. It should be based first on principles including:  
                                                          
13 Interviews in Brussels, Paris, Berlin and London, summer 2001. See also 
Christophe Cornu (2001), “Fortress Europe: Real or Virtual?”, in Adams, Cornu, 
James and Schmitt (2001), Between Cooperation and Competition: The 
Transatlantic Defence Market, (Chaillot Paper No. 44), Institute for Security 
Studies of the Western European Union, Paris, January, pp. 77–80. 
14 The European Union does not yet have a coherent defence industrial and 
technology policy, but there is considerable interest in the Commission in having 
such a policy and an emerging interest in the Council of Ministers, as well. 
Current Commission responsibilities for industrial policy, dual-use research and 
development, public procurement, customs policies and dual-use technology 
exports controls will inevitably lead to greater involvement in the defence 
industrial and technology arena. The Council, through its Armaments Policy 
committee, currently has what responsibility exists at the EU level. See 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Implementing European Union 
Strategy on Defence-Related Industries, COM(97)583 final, Brussels, 4 
December 1997, Annex I, p. 2. 
15 Interview in Brussels, summer 2001. 
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• A multilateral approach. Given the evolution of the European market, 
industries and institutions, it is increasingly important that this 
relationship take on a multilateral, as opposed to a bilateral character. 
The days of serial bilateral negotiations on defence industrial and 
technology issues are numbered; a chain of bilateral agreements will be 
broken by the reality that the Europeans are rapidly evolving a 
multilateral process for such issues. NATO is not the best forum for such 
negotiations; the European process will eventually be institutionalised in 
the European Union. Negotiations should take place directly between the 
North Americans and a European grouping of four or six member states 
or the EU, as appropriate.  
• A broad strategic agenda. The issues in such a negotiation should be 
approached as a strategic agenda, not as discrete parts. All are important 
to creating the new transatlantic regime; treating them together will 
provide opportunities for trade offs in negotiations that can lead to a 
successful outcome.  
• A search for best practices. The participants will need to check their 
superiority at the door. One key reason for the slowness of the US/UK 
ITAR negotiations has been the US insistence that the Europeans level-
up their export control regimes by incorporating US statutes and 
practices into British law. Yet there are areas in which the Europeans 
may have best practices. The parties need to research best practice with 
each other, not seek extraterritorial enforcement of national legislation.  
The negotiations themselves should address a number of issues including:  
• Strategy. The United States and its European allies should invest in a 
common discussion of the elements of global strategy that they share – 
such as shared responsibilities for stability operations in Europe, 
common approaches to combating terrorism and joint policies on the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This dialogue needs to take 
place within NATO, but also needs to be engaged between NATO and 
the EU as the latter shapes the Headline Goal force and its equipment 
needs.  
• Military planning. Strategy review processes on both sides of the 
Atlantic need to draw the others into their national discussions, with 
more joint conversations over defence requirements, force planning and 
hardware objectives to define equipment needs that could be met by 
consortia or partnerships among industrial suppliers and technology 
companies on both sides of the Atlantic.  
• Budgets. European defence acquisition resources need to be increased or 
seriously reallocated. British and French decisions have already 
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refocused budgets towards acquisition; further force tradeoffs may not be 
possible. To ensure continued leadership in the EU and to focus on the 
technological target, Germany, in particular, needs to make a greater 
budgetary effort overall and a major internal reallocation. Budget 
planning cycles among key countries should also incorporate 
participation from the other countries.  
• Research and development. R&D will be the heart of the solution to 
the capability gap. The Europeans need to grow their R&D budgets and 
undertake much more significant harmonisation than they have to date, if 
R&D investments are to be cost-effective. There is a need for a more 
serious transatlantic defence R&D dialogue as well. Today, there is 
scepticism in the US that the Europeans have much to offer 
technologically. Among the Europeans there is a sense that the US does 
not appreciate the technological assets the Europeans bring to the table. 
A dialogue is urgently needed to identify key technologies on both sides 
that are advantageous to the other and shape ways by which those 
advantages can be harvested.  
• Export controls, technology transfers and industrial security. The 
American export control system is broken, its technology-transfer rules 
are increasingly self-defeating, and industrial security is systematically 
compromised and strained by emerging transnational defence 
companies. Export control reforms in the United States are imperative, 
including shrinking the Munitions List to critical items, instituting 
greater corporate self-governance with government audits of 
performance and creating a stronger appeals process for disagreements. 
The European system of controls is going multilateral, a negotiation into 
which the United States has no input. Bilateral negotiations cannot work 
without a multilateral level of discussion between the US and the six 
countries of the Framework Agreement.  
• Direct foreign investment. There are distinct advantages to the DOD 
from greater transatlantic defence investment and industry advantage in 
access to the European market, for partnerships, investments and 
government sales. There is a clear win/win to be had from shaping 
multilateral rules of the road. The American process needs streamlining, 
with more supple rules for firms and countries that do a respectable job 
of protecting technology flows. The defence security arrangements 
surrounding non-US-owned assets in the United States need review and 
reform, building trust, rather than separation, across the Atlantic. 
Europeans need to be drawn into this dialogue in order to ensure national 
and EU policies on direct foreign investment and competition do not 
inhibit reciprocal access to the European market.  
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• Dual-use technologies. US acquisition rules that overburden 
commercial firms with contracting and reporting requirements currently 
imposed on defence contractors will ultimately deny DOD access to the 
technologies it needs. The DOD needs to undertake a ‘forced march’ 
through the undergrowth of rules and regulations it still has in place. 
European rules on dual-use technology appear more flexible and should 
be part of a dialogue on this subject. That dialogue will inevitably 
involve the EU, since dual-use rules are within the Commission’s 
competence, as related both to research and development and to export 
controls.  
• Acquisition rules. It will be difficult to reshape acquisition regimes 
among the Europeans, let alone across the Atlantic. This effort should 
begin, however, as acquisition practices and rules make cross-border 
procurement difficult and can discriminate against non-national 
suppliers. No defence contractor will happily engage in a partnership bid 
if the rules are complex, overwritten or unclear. The US should engage 
the member countries of OCCAR in a common review of acquisition 
practices, recognising that no country’s system provides a perfect 
guarantee of on-time, within cost, on-performance military hardware. 
The OCCAR members need to ensure that OCCAR rules and practices 
are non-discriminatory with regard to non-member firms; US acquisition 
regulations need review to ensure the same is true in the DOD.  
• Industry consolidation. Both Europe and the United States face further 
rationalisation of a defence industry that is largely consolidated at the 
system-integrator level. Industry recognises that further rationalisation of 
capacity will be important in order to procure systems cost-effectively 
within budgetary constraints. The acquisition systems on both continents 
should not create incentives for contractors to retain excess capacity, but 
should encourage capacity shrinkage by allowing some contractor 
retention of the savings gained by doing so. A transatlantic dialogue 
would facilitate the exchange of lessons learned in this process.  
• Industry’s role. More than ever before, the transatlantic regime will be 
shaped by company initiatives and behaviours. Governments are 
currently behind the curve on industry discussions of joint ventures, 
strategic partnerships and acquisition opportunities. Rather than 
discourage such conversations by political intervention or the 
enforcement of restrictive rules on exports and technology transfers, the 
governments should be ahead of the curve, stimulating such discussions 
and encouraging transatlantic initiatives to provide hardware and system 
options meeting defence requirements. The American industry has a 
major responsibility here, to take the initiative, lobby for changes in the 
US rules and processes already discussed and provide transparent 
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expertise on how a transatlantic regime should be shaped. European 
industry has a similar responsibility to make certain that the Framework 
Agreement, OCCAR and EU processes ensure reciprocal access for 
Americans to the European market. Industry is generally reluctant to step 
ahead of government willingness to change; in this case, government 
policies will benefit from industry initiative and can create a multilateral, 
transatlantic environment in which industry thrives, governments benefit 
and security is enhanced.  
This agenda is daunting. The alternative, however, is the gradual shrinkage 
of the transatlantic defence market, under political and bureaucratic pressure, 
the loss of interoperability and a growing technology gap between US and 
European militaries, and a loss of technological opportunity for the militaries 
of both sides. 
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European and Transatlantic 
Defence-Industrial Strategies: 
A European View 
Burkard Schmitt 
he history of transatlantic armaments cooperation goes back to the 
beginning of the cold war. Since then, however, the nature of 
cooperation has changed considerably, from the simple licensing of 
US systems to Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to co-production 
arrangements in the 1970s, followed by government-to-government joint 
development in the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, industry-led 
cooperation has become the most prominent feature. 
The changing nature of cooperation reflects the changing motivation of the 
two sides. During the first decades after World War II, the US helped to 
rebuild an exhausted or destroyed Western European defence industry in the 
face of the Soviet threat. The more that European NATO allies recovered 
economically, the more they sought a balanced partnership with the US. 
After the end of the cold war, interoperability became a major argument for 
enhanced cooperation. Since the late 1990s, the technological and financial 
consequences of globalisation have pushed industry towards transnational 
consolidation and closer transatlantic ties, whereas governments have had 
difficulties matching industry-led initiatives. 
In spite of many good reasons for more transatlantic cooperation and 
numerous initiatives to achieve that objective, the record is rather poor. Arms 
trade across the Atlantic has remained primarily a one-way street from the 
US to Europe, with few cooperative projects having actually been set up and 
even fewer having been considered as a success. There are several reasons 
for such failure: 
• Since the strategic and force-planning processes are conducted 
independently, harmonisation of military requirements is almost 
impossible.  
• Market access for foreign companies remains difficult: whereas the 
openness of European defence markets differs greatly from country to 
country, the US market is well-protected against both foreign 
investments and sales. Moreover, complex rules and procedures for 
defence exports represent major hurdles for industrial cooperation.  
• In the US, both the political leadership and the armed forces are 
extremely reluctant to rely to any extent on foreign suppliers. In Europe 
there is widespread anxiety in many arms-producing countries about the 
T 
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possibility of US market hegemony. Both attitudes make it very hard to 
create a positive political climate for transatlantic armaments 
cooperation.  
Even more importantly, transatlantic cooperation is hindered by a 
fundamental imbalance of power between the US and Europe:  
• The US is by far the biggest defence market of the world. In 2001, the 
DOD spent more than twice as much on defence as all EU members 
combined. With an increase in US defence spending of $48 billion for 
FY 2003 and further increases planned from $396.8 billion in 2003 to 
$469.8 billion in 2007, the transatlantic financing and procurement gap 
will continue to grow over the next few years.  
• There are also fundamental structural market differences. Because of 
fragmented defence markets and disparate procurement policies, 
European countries pay a high price for costly duplications and face 
great difficulties in efficiently combining their resources. As a 
consequence, the EU as a whole receives less value for its money than 
the US. Moreover, the investment profiles are different, as the US spends 
not only in absolute, but also in relative terms more on procurement and 
R&D than Europeans.  
• The US has such enormous financial resources, defence-industrial assets 
and military capabilities that they simply do not need armaments 
cooperation or arms imports. From the US perspective, the potential 
benefit of transatlantic cooperation is, at best, the cohesion of the 
Alliance. This argument, however, is hardly sufficient to overcome 
bureaucratic and political resistance. The same is true for 
interoperability: for many in the US, interoperability within the Alliance 
could best be achieved if Europeans simply bought US products. The 
fact that the US can conduct the whole spectrum of military operations 
without any allied contribution does not help to convince the US 
administration, Congress or the armed forces that they need to suffer the 
trials and tribulations of transatlantic cooperation.  
• In Europe, the situation is, again, completely different: even the most 
important arms-producing countries cannot afford to maintain a purely 
national Defence Industrial Base (DIB). With the exception of certain 
technological niches, they need international cooperation to develop and 
produce high-tech weaponry. In this context, access to US technology is 
in general considered highly attractive. Moreover, there is a strong 
European interest in interoperability as the prerequisite for coalition-
building and therefore for political influence in Washington. 
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Nevertheless, the lack of financial resources, national industrial interests 
and the difficulties involved in transatlantic ventures greatly reduces 
European interest in cooperating with the US.  
• Finally yet importantly, the US pursues an explicit and coherent strategy 
for defence-related industries, aimed at technological superiority in all 
relevant sectors. European countries, in contrast, do not have the means 
to implement such a strategy individually and lack the political 
consensus to develop one collectively. As a consequence, Europeans 
have difficulties in developing common positions towards the US on 
armaments issues.  
The imbalance between the US and Europe can also be seen at the corporate 
level. The enormous consolidation process that took place from 1993 to 1997 
within US industry reinforced European anxieties about the threat of US 
market hegemony. Facing competition from giants such as Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon, Europe’s national 
champions and their respective governments (finally) began to accept cross-
border integration as the only way to avoid being squeezed out of the market 
or being forced into unbalanced subordinate partnerships or both. The main 
result of the restructuring process that followed was the creation of three big 
groups, EADS, BAE Systems and Thales, each of them linked to each other 
and to the remaining groups by numerous international joint ventures. 
This industrial movement, in turn, triggered the so-called ‘Letter of Intent’ 
(LOI) process among the governments of the major European arms-
producing countries (France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain and Sweden). In 
July 2000, the six partners signed a Framework Agreement covering 1) 
Security of Supply, 2) Transfer and Export Procedures, 3) Security of 
Classified Information, 4) Research and Technology, 5) Treatment of 
Technical Information and 6) Harmonisation of Military Requirements. In 
these six areas, the partners committed themselves to create a more 
homogeneous regulatory framework to improve market conditions for an 
increasingly transnational industry. 
In spite of all its potential virtues, however, the Framework Agreement does 
not actually establish a common armaments policy. On the contrary, 
armaments remain in the national domain, with defence industrial interests 
and strategies still diverging.  
• Among the six LOI countries, France is traditionally the most ambitious 
about Europe becoming an autonomous political actor (although its 
partners often suspect the real objective is simply to use Europe as a 
means to achieve national ends). In the 1990s, France accepted both 
privatisation and internationalisation of its defence industry as 
indispensable, combining the market orientation of companies with the 
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politico-strategic objectives of the government. Therefore, France has 
been a driving force behind the restructuring of Europe’s aerospace and 
defence electronics sectors. Aérospatiale-Matra was brought into EADS 
and Thales (formerly Thomson-CSF) transformed into an international 
player with strong links to the UK (through the acquisition of Racal). In 
the future, the French government will probably try – again – to bring 
Dassault into a wider European structure and to find a new reference 
shareholder for Thales. The main challenge, however, will be land 
armaments and naval shipbuilding, where the privatisation of GIAT and 
DCN is still pending. The poor shape of the two former arsenals 
represents not only an important financial burden upon the French 
government, it is also a major obstacle to greater openness of the French 
defence market and makes it de facto impossible for Paris to push for 
European mergers (since both companies are rather unattractive as 
potential partners).  
• The UK’s industrial policy is characterised by a ‘value for money’ 
policy, which includes the relative openness of its defence market for 
foreign competitors. This openness also compensates for a growing lack 
of competition in the national market. In fact, after the takeover of GEC 
Marconi by British Aerospace and the recent acquisition of Vickers by 
Alvis, there are only two national firms left, which distorts the market-
led approach that the British claim to champion. To counterbalance this 
dominance and to create a second ‘national’ defence electronics supplier 
competing with BAE Systems, London accepted, for example, the 
takeover of Racal by Thales. Competition may also come from American 
companies that regularly team-up with British firms for bids in the UK. 
Transatlantic cooperation in general is welcomed not only for political 
reasons, but also as a means to benefit from US technology.  
• In Germany, the largest part of the aerospace industry is now integrated 
into EADS. The government has failed, by contrast, to convince land 
armament and naval shipbuilding industries to follow the same approach 
– first national consolidation, then European integration. Germany’s 
leading land systems companies – Krauss-Maffei and Rheinmetall – 
continue to resist any political pressure to merge. In naval shipbuilding, 
government plans have also failed. Instead of joining forces with 
Thyssen Krupp Industries, Babcock Borsig sold its 75% share in HDW 
to the US investment fund Equity One Partners. Since HDW is a world 
leader in conventional submarines, this deal has stimulated a debate 
about a sell-out of German key technologies. Many observers now fear 
that Krauss-Maffei could become the next candidate for a politically 
incorrect takeover.  
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• Italy, Spain and Sweden have all tried to integrate their defence 
industrial assets into wider international structures, without pursuing a 
clear European preference. The Spanish government has integrated Casa 
into EADS, but preferred General Dynamic’s bid for Santa Barbara over 
Rheinmetall’s offer; the Italian government has pushed Finmeccanica – 
with more or less success – to integrate its units into European joint 
ventures, but left the A-400M programme and joined the F-35 
programme. In Sweden, certain industrial elements have been linked to 
European networks (see Saab), while others have been sold to US 
investors (Bofors).  
Industrial policy is only one aspect of largely divergent armament policies in 
Europe. Another example is the somewhat uncoordinated way in which the 
LOI countries have embarked on bilateral negotiations with the US on 
regulatory issues. In fact, industrial consolidation in Europe, together with 
the LOI process and the development of ESDP, alarmed Washington about 
the possibility of an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’. The perceived threat of a 
closed European market, combined with the risk of the lack of any true 
competition in the US market, pushed the Clinton administration to launch 
two initiatives: a) the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) aimed at 
streamlining the US export control system, and b) bilateral negotiations with 
certain allies on a ‘Declaration of Principles’ on defence equipment and 
industrial cooperation (DOP). 
Whereas the DOP is de facto a bilateral version of the European LOI, 
covering a broad range of defence trade issues, the DTSI is comprised of 16 
procedural reforms to the US export-control regime. Moreover, it includes 
the possibility for certain qualified countries to enter into negotiations aimed 
at granting ITAR-license exemptions for unclassified exports to the 
governments and companies identified as reliable. 
Up until now, the DOPs have been signed with the UK, Australia, Norway, 
Spain and the Netherlands, whilst negotiations with Italy seem to be well-
advanced, whereas discussions with Germany and France are, at best, at an 
early stage. So far, the UK is the only LOI-country with whom the US has 
begun to negotiate a binding export-control agreement. ITAR-talks with 
additional partners are envisaged only after negotiations with the UK have 
been completed. But under the Bush administration, these transatlantic 
discussions have apparently lost momentum, their future therefore being 
unclear. Even with the UK, negotiations on export controls seem to be 
experiencing difficulties. In general, however, the different stages of 
negotiations with the partners suggest that Washington still makes a 
distinction between ‘reliable’ and ‘less reliable’ allies.  
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Sooner or later, this distinction may create problems for the compatibility of 
the multilateral LOI system and the bilateral DOP-approach. It remains to be 
seen how transatlantic arrangements would interact in practice with the LOI 
Framework Agreement. Nevertheless, at least in certain areas, bilateral 
agreements with the US may complicate a system whose purpose is precisely 
to simplify and facilitate European cooperation. For example, could a 
European transnational defence company qualify for an ITAR exemption if 
only one of its home countries has an export control agreement with the US? 
Or would such a company be obliged to create new Chinese walls between 
its different sites, thereby limiting its internal integration and acting against 
the philosophy of the LOI process? 
To operate in such an uncertain and fluid environment is certainly not easy 
for European industries. As has been seen, a European armaments policy and 
a common defence market are still a long way off, and defence budgets in 
Europe remain flat. The enormous difference between budgets in Europe and 
the US represents an irresistible incentive for European companies to attempt 
penetration of the US market. Indeed, access to the US has become a major 
strategic goal for all big industrial players in Europe.  
There are different ways to achieve that objective: 
• Given the predominant buy-American policy, direct sales of European 
products to the US armed forces will probably remain extremely rare 
exceptions. 
• Jointly developed defence systems under a government-to-government 
agreement will remain exceptions as well; European budget constraints 
on the one hand, and difficulties to harmonise the military requirements 
across the Atlantic on the other, will continue to limit the possibilities for 
intergovernmental projects.  
• Teaming arrangements with US prime contractors will be politically 
easier, in particular if the European contribution is limited to sub-
systems and components. Yet the cost-effectiveness of these industrial 
arrangements depends to a considerable degree on the regulatory 
framework that governments agree on.  
Another possibility to penetrate the US market is to buy an American 
company and to become a ‘national’ supplier to the Pentagon. British 
companies, in particular BAE Systems, have pursued this strategy 
extensively and with a lot of success. For continental European companies, 
however, this option has been politically unrealistic so far, and there are no 
signs that this may change in the near future. What we have seen, by 
contrast, is a multiplication of joint ventures (Raytheon-Thales) and strategic 
alliances (EADS-Northrop Grumman).  
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In land armaments and shipbuilding, the situation is different. By contrast to 
aerospace and defence electronics, trans-European consolidation has failed in 
these sectors, leaving European companies in a rather weak position vis-à-vis 
their US counterparts. As the Santa Barbara and the HDW takeovers have 
demonstrated, US investors therefore have a good chance simply to ‘cherry-
pick’ the European defence industrial base.  
To conclude, there are not many reasons to be over-optimistic about the 
future of transatlantic armaments cooperation. Cooperation will certainly 
continue, but its intensity will probably remain limited by persistent political 
obstacles. Moreover, cooperation will be mainly industry driven. If they have 
a commercial and a technological interest or both, companies can be quite 
innovative in dealing with bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles. In particular, 
at the less visible – and therefore politically less sensitive – subsystem and 
component level, closer ties are indeed probable. Nevertheless, even the big 
European companies will only be able to cooperate on an equal footing with 
their US counterparts if they maintain their capacities as system-integrators 
and if they remain at the cutting edge of technology – not in all, but in 
specific key areas. These developments, in turn, will only be possible if 
European governments keep at least a certain level of R&D funding and if 
they – finally – come to a common European strategy for their defence-
related industries. 
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Introduction 
François Heisbourg 
he eleventh meeting of the European Security Forum focused on what 
is becoming known as the Bush doctrine. The proceedings were 
underpinned by three particularly penetrating papers, which should be 
read at leisure, as a brief summing-up will not suffice to convey their full 
scope. 
Walter Slocombe, in his oral presentation, emphasised the need to handle the 
prevention/pre-emption debate as distinct from the 
unilateralism/multilateralism discussion: although they intersect, they are 
analytically separate. Conversely, he tied the prevention/pre-emption debate 
to the specific requirements of non-proliferation, while noting that 
prevention/pre-emption tend to be a limited element of non-proliferation 
policy given the inherent difficulties of implementation: it is easier to assert a 
policy of pre-emption than to execute it effectively. Mr Slocombe also 
underscored the elements of continuity of the US National Security Strategy 
(NSS) with US and international law. 
Carl Bildt recalled that prevention/pre-emption could be tied to contingencies 
other than those mentioned by President George W. Bush, such as heading 
off a genocide. In his statements, he also made a distinction that turned out to 
be one of the key elements of whatever conclusion can be drawn from the 
discussion: the possible war in Iraq should not be considered as prevention or 
pre-emption but as an enforcement operation. He also questioned the premise 
that deterrence doesn’t work against a rogue state, a premise on which much 
of the new US doctrine is based. Like Mr Slocombe, he emphasised the 
difficulties of implementation. Indeed, there was no example where countries 
had been forcefully deprived of their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
without regime change; the only successes in terms of eliminating WMD had 
implied regime change (as in South Africa). In other words, pre-
emption/prevention without regime change would probably not work and 
even then, it is possible to wonder about the attitude of a post-Saddam 
regime in Baghdad towards the renunciation of WMD in the face of 
persisting efforts by Iran and their possession by Israel. Mr Bildt recalled that 
one of the favourite examples of the fans of pre-emption/prevention, i.e. the 
Cuban missile crisis, had not witnessed a forceful pre-emptive strike. This 
option had deliberately been discarded at the time. In conclusion, he 
underlined the danger of the pre-emption rhetoric, which could be seen as a 
licence by others to do the same – or to go nuclear. 
Vladimir Nikitin reminded us, inter alia, of the Kosovo precedent, which was 
presented at the time as an operation destined to prevent human rights 
T 
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violations, regional destabilisation, etc. and not requiring a specific mandate 
legitimising the use of force. But Kosovo also demonstrated the importance 
of regional organisations in legitimising such forceful operations, with 
NATO in Kosovo (1999) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 
Grenada (1983). Mr Nikitin also underlined the Russian reluctance to 
‘doctrinalise’ prevention/pre-emption, with Moscow preferring to use it de 
facto without formalising it since formalisation could reduce strategic 
freedom of manoeuvre. 
Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group (ICG), who had been asked to 
respond to the three paper-givers, kicked off by confirming the Chairman’s 
suggestion that greater care needed to be made in distinguishing between 
pre-emption (with its elements of time pressure and imminence) and 
prevention (with the Osirak bombing as a case of prevention and the Six-Day 
War as an example of pre-emption). He also noted that the anticipatory use 
of force – a notion covering both prevention and pre-emption does not 
necessarily imply imminence, notably when the risk of genocide is involved. 
He concurred with Mr Slocombe’s and Mr Bildt’s analysis of the difficulties 
of using force against WMD successfully while stopping short of regime 
change. As head of the International Crisis Group, he underscored the 
importance of the notion of consent as a legitimiser. Consent figures in the 
work of the ICG on the legitimisation of the use of force on the basis of ‘just 
war’ principles (although any explicit reference to St. Thomas of Aquinas is 
avoided, out of deference to Muslim sensitivity). 
In the general debate, the Israeli attack against the Osirak reactor in June 
1981 was discussed. The view was widely expressed that although the attack 
may have had the perverse effect of driving the Iraqi nuclear programme 
deeper underground, it did lead to a substantial gain in the time available 
before Iraq could go nuclear. Prevention was also mentioned by a Russian 
participant, who indicated that Russian officials had considered preventive 
action against the Taliban regime in May 2000. He confirmed the Russian 
aversion towards making a principle out of what is a strategic option for use 
in the near-abroad. 
Mr Bildt made the point that pre-emption (tied as it is to imminent threat in 
international law) should not be considered as being somehow more readily 
acceptable than prevention: there are all too many wars in which the first 
country to open fire has claimed a right to pre-emption. Anticipatory action 
thus requires rules and calls were made for its codification. In this respect, 
humanitarian intervention was yet again cited as an area where anticipatory 
action could be called for. 
On the question of deterrence, the point was made by a number of 
participants that this continued to be viable vis-à-vis state actors, and that 
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there was a questionable trend in the US of presenting deterrence, if not as a 
dirty word, but at least as a poor second best against the Soviet threat. This 
point drew the caveat that deterrence can discourage nuclear attacks, but 
probably not proliferation; indeed, it was highly unlikely that deterrence 
would play against the sale by North Korea of its WMD wares on the 
international market. Furthermore, in the case of North Korea, it isn’t only, 
or maybe not even primarily, Pyongyang’s nuclear capability that inhibits us 
from acting forcefully, but the huge conventional firepower threatening the 
Seoul metropolitan area. 
Indeed, in some ways, the state of reflection for criteria (e.g. in the ICG) on 
the use of anticipatory force in humanitarian contingencies seemed to be 
more advanced than its application to non-proliferation, notably in current 
US thinking. On the reactions outside the US to doctrines based on 
prevention and pre-emption, the point was made by a European participant 
that in the EU, the real contention vis-à-vis the NSS was not the mention of 
prevention, but the fact that it was considered to be the basis for a national 
and not a multilateral strategy. 
The use of force for enforcement of international obligations was also 
discussed, with reference being made to the illegal reoccupation of the 
Rhineland by the Wehrmacht in 1935. This contingency was one in which 
the use of force could have paid off handsomely. As the discussion went into 
historical analogies – with Mr Slocombe drawing a parallel between the 
Rhineland case and the Iraqi situation – a reminder was made by a 
participant that it is fine to have criteria for legitimising a military operation, 
but one still had to ask the question: ‘Is it wise?’ 
In his concluding remarks, Mr Nikitin indicated that there was no clear 
confirmation in history that the preventive/pre-emptive use of force was the 
better option, citing in this regard the counterfactual question: what if 
Kennedy had retained the strike option against Cuba? 
Mr Bildt, harking back to the Guns of August 1914, emphasised the need to 
be careful about making pre-emption a popular concept. Enforcement, 
including its use in the Iraqi case, is a more fruitful approach. He did not 
discard the option of prevention, with the building up of an international 
regime. Mr Slocombe reaffirmed the link between the use of force and WMD 
proliferation. The non-proliferation regime is in crisis and will collapse if we 
do not resolve the issue of enforcement. 
Mr Evans reminded us that the credibility of the UN system was the 
strongest case that could be made for war against Iraq – but that is a matter 
for the UN system to decide upon, not a single member. The question then 
becomes: what is the evidence and how big is the threat? 
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Pre-emptive Military Action and 
the Legitimate Use of Force: 
A European View 
Carl Bildt 
he present debate about the legitimacy of pre-emptive military action 
was triggered by the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the 
United States and it has been fuelled by the discussion concerning the 
legitimacy of taking armed action against Iraq. This paper will focus 
primarily on the questions of the pre-emptive use of military force that were 
brought to the forefront of the international debate.1 
But it can be debated whether Iraq should really be part of this discussion. It 
can be argued that the present dispute over Iraq is more a case of securing the 
implementation of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council under 
Chapter 7 of the UN Treaty. 
UN Security Resolution 1441 – adopted unanimously – decided that “Iraq 
has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant 
resolutions, including resolution 687”. It also recalled that “In its resolution 
687 the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on the acceptance 
by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq 
contained therein”. In spite of this, Iraq was given “a final opportunity” to 
comply, and the Council stated that the country “will face serious 
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations”. 
These are tough words. The first serious assessments of whether the country 
has taken this ‘last chance’ or not will occur when the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report to the Security Council 
at the end of this month. Since the resolutions that Iraq could then be 
declared to be in additional material breach of are resolutions under Chapter 
7 of the Charter of the UN, it cannot be described as inappropriate if armed 
action is then considered to rectify the situation. 
Although rhetoric has often sounded different, it remains a fact that in the 
case of Iraq, the United States so far has acted through and within the 
framework of the United Nations. It has certainly presented its case with 
considerable assertiveness, not shying away from saying that the issue is a 
test for the UN as much as it is for Iraq, but there is nothing that prevents 
other nations from stating the views they may have with equal assertiveness. 
                                                          
1 “The National Security Strategy of the United States”, September 2002. 
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From the European point of view, there are strong arguments in favour of 
securing the continued handling of the Iraq issue within the framework of the 
United Nations. With four major EU members on the Security Council – 
Germany and Spain in addition to the UK and France – there should be the 
possibility of establishing a European consensus at the very least on this 
important point. But it should be recognised that keeping the issue within the 
United Nations system requires accommodating the very strong views and 
interests expressed by the US. 
European inclination to support an approach through multilateral institutions 
such as the UN is based on the recognition that neither the European Union, 
nor any other international actor has the broad-based power or the strategic 
patience to sort out major and difficult international issues all by itself. Thus, 
an amount of coalition-building is always called for, and the broader the 
international consensus that can be established, the greater are the 
possibilities of bringing the endeavour in question to a successful 
conclusion.2 
From the US point of view this is sometimes less obvious. With unrivalled 
military power and increased relative economic strength, the temptation to 
think that one can sort out all issues only with US power is strong. 
Multilateralism and coalition-building can be portrayed as fettering the 
power of the US in chains and preventing it from taking the action needed to 
reorder the world in accordance with its values. If the aim is set, coalitions 
are welcome to assist in their execution. But it’s the purpose that defines the 
coalition – not the other way around. 
Although Europeans in most cases are in basic sympathy with the motives 
driving US actions, there is a fear that if the tentative international regime 
that exists is jeopardised, the resulting uncertainty may also be used by 
powers and for purposes with which most Europeans would feel far less 
sympathy. The short-term advantages of breaking the established order could 
then rapidly be outweighed by the long-term disorder resulting in other areas 
and on other issues. 
Prior to 11 September 2001 and the renewed attention given to the situation 
in Iraq, issues of state sovereignty and pre-emptive military action were 
debated primarily from other points of view. The concept of state sovereignty 
is generally seen to have been established as the basis of the international 
order by the Treaty of Westphalia. Orderly states were to be the building 
                                                          
2 In the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, the declaration on 
Iraq stressed that “the role of the Security Council in maintaining peace and 
security must be respected”. While an urge to respect the resolutions of the 
Security Council would be aimed at Baghdad, it is difficult to read an urge to 
respect the role of the Security Council as not aimed at Washington. 
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blocks of the international order. The United Nations isn’t really built on 
nations coming together, but on states doing it. State sovereignty remains the 
most important building block of the modern international system. 
But increasingly state sovereignty had come to be questioned. The debate 
prior to the events of 11 September centred almost exclusively on the 
question of when state sovereignty should be set aside in the interest of 
protecting human rights, preventing humanitarian disasters or, at worst, 
stopping or preventing genocide. In the wake of the non-intervention in 
Rwanda and the intervention in Kosovo, a large debate started on which 
principles to apply and the consequences this would have for the 
international system as a whole. 
This debate had hardly reached any conclusions when the events of 11 
September transformed the international scene, and subsequently the issues 
associated with WMD and terrorism have overtaken the debate. 
The action against the non-recognised Taliban regime of Afghanistan was an 
example of the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. Under the relevant Security Council resolutions, there also 
seems to be room for military action against other states if these are clearly 
supporting or protecting the structures of terrorism responsible for the 11 
September attacks. 
No European government has been able to detect any sign of any clear or 
even likely link between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist networks. During 
recent months, occasional US attempts to do so have become increasingly 
feeble. The link between the issues of terrorism post-11 September and Iraq 
is thus a highly indirect one. 
In more general terms, the link between international terrorism and WMD is 
described by the US as strong, and it is this that has led to the new 
prominence given to the possibility of pre-emptive military action. In the 
words of the National Security Strategy: 
It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true 
nature of the threat. Given the goals of rogue states and 
terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a 
reactive posture as we have done in the past. The inability to 
deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and 
the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our 
adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We 
cannot let our enemies strike first. 
Each of the three arguments advanced in favour of this position can be 
debated. Although a terrorist organisation such as al-Qaeda can hardly be 
dealt with primarily through a classical posture of deterrence, there is far less 
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to support the notion that so-called ‘rogue states’ can not be deterred to a 
significant degree. Even the regimes of the so-called ‘axis of evil’ have been 
deterred from pursuing policies of overt external aggression. 
In terms of the immediacy of these threats, there is no doubting this when it 
comes to the threat of international terrorism, nor is there any reason to doubt 
that these organisations are actively seeking different weapons of mass 
destruction. Whether there is an immediacy to threats coming from state 
actors is more doubtful, and again, the issue of whether deterrence works or 
doesn’t needs to be addressed. 
As to the magnitude of the harm that could be done by these weapons, there 
is no doubting the potential of WMD. But the only country capable of 
destroying most of the US within 30 minutes remains the Russian Federation. 
It will take decades until even China will acquire a nuclear arsenal with the 
destructive power and global reach of even the much reduced Strategic 
Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation of today. As for chemical weapons, 
their potential for mass destruction remains more limited. Biological 
weapons have, on the other hand, a potential for mass terror that should in no 
way be discounted. 
Thus, one can see how the doctrine of pre-emption – “we cannot let our 
enemies strike first” – has developed, although a discussion on the basis for it 
reveals that the arguments are not always as clear-cut as they are presented. 
The real difficulties start with how such a doctrine can be implemented in the 
messy reality of handling the day-to-day challenges of an evolving 
international situation. Here, it is instructive to look at the different occasions 
when the issue has been confronted in the past. 
The Cuban missile crisis illustrated most of the issues of this debate in 1962. 
At the time, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a policy of pre-emption 
both when it came to dealing with the concrete issue of the deployment of 
Soviet missiles such as MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba and, particularly in the 
case of the Strategic Air Command, overall in its approach versus the Soviet 
Union and its evolving ICBM force. But the conflict was defused by a more 
graduated use of a blockade in combination with direct as well as back-
channel diplomacy. Although ‘regime change’ was certainly also a goal of 
US policy at the time, it had to be downgraded in order to achieve the 
withdrawal of the Soviet nuclear missiles.3 
It is highly likely that serious consideration has also been given in the Soviet 
Union at different times to the possibility of pre-emptive military strikes in 
                                                          
3 The most comprehensive description of the debates over these issues then is to 
be found in Lawrence Freedman’s Kennedy’s Wars – Berlin, Cuba, Laos and 
Vietnam, Oxford: Oxford Press, 2000. 
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order to neutralise perceived WMD threats. The Soviet leadership had every 
reason to view the appearance of a Chinese nuclear force with deep 
apprehension. After having failed to block it by withholding technology and 
assistance in different ways, it is entirely logical that the option of pre-
emptive military strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities was seriously 
studied. In more recent times, the US seriously studied the possibility of pre-
emptive military strikes against North Korea in 1993–94, in order to deprive 
the Pyongyang regime of its possibilities of developing as a nuclear power. 
In all of these cases, the final decision not to use pre-emptive military power 
was in all probability motivated by the extreme difficulty of being certain 
that a military strike would neutralise all or the overwhelming parts of the 
nuclear warheads and the corresponding weapon systems. In the Cuban case, 
plans revealed that there was a high likelihood that some missiles could not 
be hit during the first wave of strikes, and that there was then the possibility 
that they could be fired before they could be located and hit by a second 
wave of strikes. In the Chinese and North Korean cases, the target set must 
have included not only key parts of the different production facilities for 
nuclear weapons, but also missile facilities and bomber bases, and must have 
taken account of the risks that nuclear warheads had been dispersed in 
different ways that were extremely difficult to detect. 
The only case in which a pre-emptive military strike has been undertaken in 
order to deprive a state of its WMD capability is the June 1981 Israeli attack 
on the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq. Although undoubtedly a tactical 
success since the reactor was destroyed, the strategic effects of the strike 
were more doubtful.4 
The Iraqi nuclear programme was not stopped, but instead redirected in ways 
that brought it very close to producing nuclear weapons without being 
detected either by different intelligence agencies or by international 
monitoring arrangements. Before the Gulf war, two possible nuclear 
weapons-related facilities had been detected in Iraq. After the war, United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) found no fewer than 21 different 
nuclear weapons-related facilities, with the air campaign during the Gulf war 
having had only a very limited effect on them. The Osiraq attack might have 
delayed the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme, but it certainly did not deter 
Iraq from continuing its nuclear programmes. 
Thus, a look at the practical experience with pre-emptive military strikes 
against nuclear weapons capabilities of different sorts illustrates the 
                                                          
4 It may be noted that the UN Security Council – including the US – condemned 
this attack as “a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
norms of international conduct”. 
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difficulties with the concept. In most cases, serious consideration of the 
option has led to the conclusion that it could not be carried out with a 
reasonable certainty of success. In the one case where it was carried out, it 
proved to be a tactical success but with strategic results that were either non-
existent or counterproductive. The present situation with both Iraq and North 
Korea also illustrates these difficulties. 
When the old UNSCOM inspection regime in Iraq was given up in 1998, it 
was said that its aims could probably be achieved as well by a combination 
of air surveillance and air strikes. There seemed to be the belief that 
surveillance systems could produce a reasonably accurate picture of on-going 
activities, and that the facilities associated with these could then be 
‘revisited’ by air power in the way that happened at repeated occasions 
during the 1990s. 
Clearly, this has not proved to be the case. There are numerous press stories 
circulating in the US on different ways in which Iraqi WMD activities could 
have been concealed, ranging from mobile vans to floating barges and vast 
underground complexes. If these stories don’t show anything else, they at the 
least illustrate the great uncertainty, the difficulty of actually tracking 
activities such as these and the near-impossibility of dealing with them 
through selective and pre-emptive military strikes. 
In the case of North Korea, the difficulties are even more pronounced. While 
the nuclear facilities that have been under IAEA monitoring are well-known, 
there are indications that facilities associated with the efforts to obtain highly 
enriched uranium are far more concealed and protected. In addition, there is 
the near-impossibility of knowing with any certainty the location of the 
nuclear weapons that North Korea might already have built. The large 
number of weapon systems that could carry any of these warheads adds 
enormously to the complexity of the issue. 
The discussion of these cases so far relates only to the question of nuclear 
weapons. Of the weapons of mass destruction, these are the ones that are by 
far the most difficult to develop, produce and deploy. Thus, they are the ones 
that should be the easiest to detect and deal with through selective pre-
emptive military strikes. But with the nearly insurmountable difficulties that 
are there when it comes to nuclear weapons, any serious discussion on the 
possibility of dealing effectively with chemical or bacteriological weapons 
capabilities through selective military strikes becomes far more difficult.5 
                                                          
5 “Many CW and BW production capabilities are hidden in plants that are 
virtually indistinguishable from genuine commercial facilities. And the 
technology behind CW and BW are spreading.” Testimony concerning chemical 
and biological weapons by George Tenet, the US Director for Central 
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It is thus hard to avoid the conclusion that any preventive or pre-emptive 
attack trying to deal with a perceived WMD programme in any country in all 
likelihood will have to be in the form of a military attack aimed at first 
regime destruction and then the setting-up of a new regime that can give 
sufficient guarantees that remaining WMD capabilities will not be used to 
restart programmes. Anything less than this is unlikely to result in more than 
just a repetition of the lessons of the Osiraq attack. 
Experience suggests that a regime determined to pursue a WMD programme 
is extremely difficult to deflect from that course purely through different 
measures of coercion – even when those instruments are available and 
possible to use. In fact, there are no known cases of any country abstaining 
from WMD efforts of any sort because of different instruments of coercion 
being applied against them. 
In the world today, we are faced with a situation in which different WMD are 
available to a growing number of states. According to the US State 
Department, 12 nations at present have nuclear weapons programmes, 13 
have biological weapons programmes, 16 have programmes for chemical 
weapons and 28 have more or less credible capabilities in terms of ballistic 
missiles. No one could even contemplate dealing with all of them by military 
means. 
Thus, apart from the difficulties of pre-emptive military actions to deal with 
real or perceived WMD threats in individual cases, the sheer magnitude of 
the problem that we face when dealing with WMD proliferation makes it 
impossible to consider pre-emptive military actions as anything more than 
something that will only be considered in extreme cases. 
In spite of the perception created, this is likely to be the de facto policy of the 
US as well. During more than half a century of struggling with the issue, in 
the concrete cases the US has never found the arguments for such a course of 
action more compelling than the arguments against. The urgency of the war 
against terrorism is unlikely, in the concrete cases, to have fundamentally 
altered the balance between the arguments. 
That notwithstanding, there is reason to be concerned with the recent upsurge 
in rhetoric about the possibility of pre-emptive military action to deal with 
WMD or other issues. First, there is a risk that this will be seen as a licence 
by other powers to take some such action, and second, there is the risk that 
states that feel threatened by action of this kind will start acting in 
destabilising ways. North Korea illustrates some of these dangers. And the 
recent swing in US policy from a rhetoric that talked about the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                   
Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 6 February 
2002. 
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war in both Iraq and Korea to a posture that emphasises diplomacy, also 
through the UN system, and openings for direct talks with Pyongyang should 
probably be seen as a result of the recognition of these dangers. 
Iran is and will remain a major policy challenge in these regards. All 
indications point to ambitions across the entire WMD range in combination 
with a ballistic missile programme.6 7 Here, it seems unlikely that anyone 
will seriously contemplate pre-emptive military actions other than in very 
extreme situations. But the perceived possibility of such action being 
contemplated against Iran obviously risks complicating efforts to facilitate a 
dialogue aiming both at facilitating change inside the country and at 
resolving issues such as Iranian support for terrorism. Thus, the rhetoric of 
pre-emption runs the risk of becoming counterproductive across a broader 
range of issues. 
The situation between India and Pakistan is a particular case for concern. 
Here, the rhetoric of pre-emption risks becoming profoundly dangerous. If 
there is a perception in Islamabad that New Delhi believes that there is an 
international climate that tends towards tolerating pre-emptive strikes against 
nuclear facilities, the threshold against Pakistan using its nuclear weapons 
against India during a crisis or confrontation may be lowered substantially. 
Thus, rhetoric aimed at reducing the risk of WMD being used may in this 
part of the world end up increasing the likelihood of this actually happening. 
This discussion on the possibility of using pre-emptive military action in 
order to deal with the threat of proliferation of WMD thus points at the 
severe limitations, as well as dangers, of such an approach except in isolated 
and extreme cases. 
Although it would be foolish to completely rule out those cases, it must be 
recognised that pre-emptive military action that does not aim at ‘regime 
                                                          
6 In Issue No. 1 of Russia in Global Affairs, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, 
Head of Research at the Center for Strategic Nuclear Forces, writes on the 
ambitions of Iran: “In Iran, a missile armament programme has been in the 
process of implementation since the early 1980s. Currently, the main emphasis is 
on setting up an infrastructure to produce medium-range ballistic missiles. The 
aim is to build up a most powerful missile capability by 2010–15. It is an aim 
that is facilitated also by Iran’s cooperation with China and North Korea. The 
capacity of the assembly line that turns out Shahab-3 missiles (range up to 1,000 
km) may reach 100 rockets a year”. 
7 In its open assessment to the US Senate last February, George Tenet described 
Iran’s efforts and programmes in far more concrete and worried terms than he 
used for Iraq: “Iran remains a serious concern because of its across-the-board 
pursuit of WMD and missile capabilities. Tehran may be able to indigenously 
produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by late this decade”. 
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change’ risks being of little long-term value in such cases. Although this 
leads into another and no less important debate – it should be recognised that 
in order for a strategy of ‘regime change’ to be successful it needs to be able 
to execute not only the first phase in the form of ‘regime destruction’, but to 
be able to master the more complex task of ‘regime creation’ that has to 
follow. 
Other factors may also be added to this in individual cases. It does not, for 
example, seem implausible that a post-Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad, 
while being ready to honour its commitments to the UN to abstain from 
WMD capabilities, may seek to link this to more concerted international 
actions against the existing nuclear weapons capabilities of Israel as well as 
the WMD ambitions of Iran. Issues of security policy will always have to be 
addressed in a regional perspective.  
With these difficulties thus being obvious, the main thrust of the necessary 
policies to counter not only the threat of terrorism but also the spread of the 
weapons of mass destruction should focus on the building of as strong and as 
broad an international, counter-proliferation legal and political regime as 
possible. It is when there is a law that it also becomes clear who is an outlaw. 
This condition is essential in order to be able to take action, of whatever sort 
that may be, in individual cases, and assures the broadest possible support for 
such action. As both Iraq and North Korea illustrate, there is very little that in 
fact can be done if there is not more or less broad international support. The 
broad international networks of cooperation that such an international regime 
constitutes is also the only realistic way of dealing with the risks of WMD 
technologies being spread to terrorist organisations by theft, smuggling and 
different transnational criminal networks. 
Thus, it seems appropriate to focus attention and activity on the other parts of 
the strategy for dealing with the threat of WMD outlined in the National 
Security Strategy: 
We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export 
controls, and threat reduction assistance that impedes states and 
terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict 
enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build 
coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased 
political and financial support for non-proliferation and threat 
reduction programmes. 
From the European point of view, an appropriate reaction would seem to be 
to seek to augment support for policies along those lines, thus reducing the 
likelihood that we will be confronted with the isolated and extreme cases in 
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which the question of the pre-emptive use of military force will be raised, 
and strengthening the overall international regime against WMD.  
With there being no disagreements in principle among the countries of the 
European Union on this, one should explore whether there are institutional or 
other steps that need to be taken to strengthen the common European 
capabilities in this regard. Such a policy approach is likely to have a more 
significant long-term impact on reducing the WMD threat than any 
discussion on pre-emptive military options. 
Prior to 11 September, the discussion concerning intervention in other states 
centred on the issues mentioned initially, triggered most recently by the 1999 
NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia over the issue of Kosovo. But the 
debate was fuelled by the perceived double standard of the intervention 
against the relatively limited fighting in Kosovo (pre-intervention) versus the 
non-intervention against the genocide in Rwanda.8 
This debate will come back. There is also an important connection between 
the issues of humanitarian intervention, the increasing problem of how to 
deal with failed states, the enormous challenges in any effort at state-
building,9 the tendency of terrorist organisations to seek ‘safe havens’ or 
training grounds in certain areas and the need to deal with the spread of 
certain WMD capabilities. 
Here, the European Union should seek to develop both its policies and its 
instruments. Often stressing the more all-encompassing nature of its so-
called ‘soft powers’ versus the dominating ‘hard powers’ of the US, it needs 
to demonstrate that these powers can indeed be applied to prevent situations 
from emerging that will call for pre-emptive, hard interventions. 
 
                                                          
8 An important contribution to this debate is the 2002 report of the Canadian-
sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
entitled “The Responsibility to Protect”. For a more specific discussion on the 
different issues raised by the Kosovo intervention, see paper presented by Carl 
Bildt, “Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention” at the UN 
University in Tokyo, 2003. 
9 As argued elsewhere, the term ‘nation-building’, which appears often in the US 
debate, is not really appropriate. It is more relevant to speak about state-building, 
since what we are trying to help build in the relevant cases are state structures 
rather than nations. We ought, accordingly, to talk about state-building rather 
than nation-building, although we should recognise that the distinction between 
state and nation that is obvious to most Europeans is far less clear-cut from a US 
point of view. Nevertheless, the term ‘state-building’ more appropriately 
describes what it is really about. 
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Pre-emptive Military Action and 
the Legitimate Use of Force: 
A Russian View 
Alexander I. Nikitin 
he approach of the Russian political establishment towards legitimate 
use of military force has significantly changed during the last decade 
after the creation of the new independent states on the ruins of the 
Soviet Union. In Soviet times, while supporting international law and the 
United Nations rhetorically, Communist rulers considered ideological 
justifications of the use of ‘revolutionary’ or ‘socialist’ force as a legitimate 
excuse for violating some principles of international law. 
A new Russia, obviously a weaker power than the former Soviet Union, 
tends much more to stress and to use (diplomatically) norms of international 
law and procedures of democratic decision-making in the international 
community. What Moscow formerly obtained through bilateral ‘balance of 
power’ talks with Washington, it tries now to reach in many cases through 
using the legitimising/de-legitimising mechanism of UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions, the right of veto, and the requirement of strict 
observance of international legal procedures. This overplay of the legitimacy 
issue could be seen in Moscow’s stand regarding the 1999 bombings of 
Belgrade by NATO in the absence of a UN mandate and in current debates 
around the use of force against Iraq. 
The Russian National Security Concept (its current form reformulated and 
adopted in 2000) names as one of the major sources of external threats to 
Russian national security “attempts of certain states and inter-state alliances 
to diminish the role of existing mechanisms of international security, first of 
all of the United Nations and OSCE”. By diminishing the role of 
international mechanisms, the doctrine means attempts to highlight those 
forceful actions taken by the US or NATO on the basis of their decisions, 
which circumvent or ignore the absence of consensus in international 
organisations. 
More than that, the official National Security Concept (formulated soon after 
the 1999 crisis in Russian-Western relations caused by the use of force 
against Yugoslavia) openly proclaims “NATO’s practice of use of (military) 
force outside the zone of responsibility of the alliance and without sanction 
of the United Nations Security Council” as a threat to Russian security in the 
military sphere. Formally that means that any use of force on behalf of the 
international community or where there is an absence of consensus at the 
UNSC will be automatically considered by Russia as a military threat. 
T 
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At the same time, while the notion of ‘pre-emptive military actions’ is absent 
in both the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation, it could be found in both documents between the lines. 
The National Security Concept, for example, allows the “realisation of 
operational and long-term measures aimed at prevention and neutralisation 
(author’s emphasis) of internal and external threats” and in other contexts it 
speaks of the necessity for the Russian Federation “to react to [a] crisis 
situation in as early a possible stage” in the name of national security 
interests. Criticism of out-of-area operations is somewhat balanced by the 
justification of the “necessity of [the] military presence of Russia in some 
strategically important regions of the world”, including the deployment of 
“limited military contingents (military bases, naval forces)”. 
It is worth mentioning that far before the events of 11 September and the 
crises over Iraqi and North Korean WMD capabilities, the Russian National 
Security Concept proclaimed the “commonality of interests of Russia and 
other states…on undertaking counter-actions against proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction…and [the] fight against international 
terrorism”. 
During the past decade, Russia started four military operations abroad 
involving regional and local conflicts in the absence of UN Security Council 
mandates. Namely, these were the operations of Russian military interference 
in South Ossetia/Georgia and in Transdnestria/Moldova (both in 1992), 
which were started on the legal basis of bilateral inter-state agreements with 
the presidents of Georgia and Moldova, and operations in Abkhazia/Georgia 
(started in 1994) and in Tajikistan (1992–2000), which were undertaken on 
the basis of mandates by the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), 
but not the UN. In all four cases, there was sometimes a silent or sometimes 
a formalised ‘blessing’ from the UN (and later, even small groups of UN or 
OSCE observers were stationed in the areas of mentioned conflicts to 
‘supervise’ Russian operations). 
Formally Moscow insisted that in all four cases, operations were undertaken 
with the consent of the legitimate government of the state on whose territory 
the conflict occurred, and thus, the use of force went under Chapter VI (so 
called ‘soft peace-keeping’) or Chapter VIII (use of force by regional 
organisations) of the UN Charter, and not under Chapter VII, which would 
require a UNSC resolution as a ‘must’. 
Legally, this juggling of UN Charter chapters is really important, because, 
indeed, if use of military force is undertaken by the international community 
against the will of the legitimate rulers of a state in conflict, then it 
necessarily requires the consent of the UN Security Council and a formal UN 
mandate for the use and limits of use of force. Moscow stresses that this has 
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been and remains a principal difference between the use of force by Russia in 
Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova on the one hand (where request for foreign 
involvement from the state side of the local conflict was present), and, on the 
other hand, use of force by the Western community against Slobodan 
Milosevic, the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. In the latter cases, the state 
leaders of the conflict areas obviously opposed international involvement, 
and thus such involvement has become subject to strict coordination through 
the UN Security Council. 
The concept and practice of the use of national or international military force 
outside its own borders is not at all foreign to Russia. In recent years an 
average of between 10,000 and 12,000 Russian military personnel have been 
stationed and active outside Russia. Figures varied in different years, but 
there were rotating contingents of about 1,500 Russian peacekeepers in 
Bosnia and about the same quantity later in Kosovo. In Tajikistan there were 
above 7,000 officers and soldiers from the Russian Ministry of Defence plus 
up to 10,000 Russian border guards on the Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Chinese 
borders. Additionally, there were about 1,700 Russian peacekeepers under 
CIS mandate in Abkhazia, and between 500 and 1,000 Russian military 
personnel in South Ossetia and Transdniestria. 
While the military presence in Georgia and Moldova was reduced after 
1999–2000, the geography of the military presence expanded. In 2002; some 
Russian contingents were relocated from Georgia to Armenia. Further, the 
creation of the Central Asian Rapid Deployment Forces (under the 
Organization of Collective Security Treaty, uniting six countries) expanded 
the presence and military exercises of the Russian military from Tajikistan to 
neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. 
It is worth remembering that Russia opposed the use of military force by 
NATO against Yugoslavia only during that period of 11 weeks when the 
UNSC mandate was absent. After such a mandate was finally coordinated 
and adopted, the Russian military hurried to jump into the NATO-led 
operation that had become a UN action (Russian troops headed by Gen. 
Zavarzin rushed at night to capture the airport of Pristina and thus to obtain a 
role and sector of responsibility within the operation). 
From 1996 in Bosnia and later in Kosovo from the summer of 1999 the level 
of cooperation and inter-operability between Russian and Western (mostly 
NATO) peacekeepers was positive and high. Russia not only supported the 
practice of creating ad-hoc military coalitions for dealing with international 
crises, but tried to practically participate in most of them (one recent 
manifestation of that tendency was the dispatch of a symbolic contingent of 
Russian military to support international operations in Sierra-Leone). 
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Russia’s most significant practical role in recent international military 
campaigns was played in 2001–02 in the course of operations against the 
Taliban regime, by providing serious military support (armaments, 
instructors) to the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan and by cooperating with 
the US military (reconnaissance data, air-corridors, etc.) in the framework of 
the anti-terrorist coalition. But it should be clearly understood that the short 
‘brotherhood in arms’ between Russia and the US regarding the overthrow of 
the Taliban was tactical rather than strategic. It was not (or at least not only) 
caused and cemented by trafficking values and principles of international 
interference, but rather by a coincidence of geo-strategic and pragmatic 
interests of two powers regarding the rogue regime in Afghanistan. Russia 
and the CIS states were seriously concerned about the endless insurgence of 
armed groups, weapons and drugs from Afghanistan to Central Asia and thus 
they had their own pragmatic reasons to support US action. Such unanimity 
would be much more difficult to repeat in the potential case of forceful 
action against Iraq (or, even more so, against Iran or North Korea). 
The very notion of a ‘pre-emptive strike’ was in past decades widely used 
and debated in nuclear doctrines and policy. But in that context pre-emption 
had a much more clear-cut sense. A massive nuclear strike or mechanical 
preparations for such a strike are clearly located in space and time, and could 
be attributed to someone’s state policy and state decisions. If today pre-
emption is embedded in general political strategy on the use of conventional 
force against growing external threats, then the international community is 
dealing with the much more amorphous situation of ‘strike against a 
tendency’ rather than a ‘strike against clear-cut dangerous actions’. And 
tendency is always hard to estimate, for there is much room for subjectivity 
and hidden side-interests. 
The war against the Taliban was in a sense a pre-emptive action. And the 
issue was raised at that time as to how proof should be collected and 
produced for the international community regarding the ‘guilt’ of a certain 
political regime? In principle, such proof should be timely and clearly 
presented to the international community embodied in the UN and its 
Security Council, but that would still mean a decision behind closed doors, 
subjected to various lobbying and side-interests of powers, especially of the 
‘big five’.  
A more democratic procedure would require governments, parliaments and, 
preferably, the general public of major (if not all) states to become 
acquainted with information that qualifies for the ‘death penalty’ for certain 
political regimes and for a significant part of the population with it (Saddam 
Hussein wouldn’t die alone). 
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Even in the case of the war against the Taliban, that was not done. The 
limited information about connections (at that time not fully clear) between 
the terrorist attacks in the US and the political regime in Afghanistan was 
revealed by US authorities to the heads of states of the big powers (including 
the Russian president). But it was done in secret, behind closed doors, 
without the intention to make the information subject to debate in 
parliaments until the very last moment before prepared and inevitable US 
military action. This cannot be considered the appropriate way of 
legitimising the ‘death penalty’. 
The mechanism for legitimising decisions regarding Iraq (through 
International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA – inspections with further 
presentation of findings to the UNSC and followed by the UN resolution) 
seems much more formally appropriate from the point of view of most 
representatives of the Russian political elite. At the same time, there are 
voices in the Russian (as well as Western European) politico-academic 
community that a UN mandate as such is very initial and very formal. The 
UN resolution fixes a temporal (sometimes tactical) consensus of major 
powers at a certain concrete moment of international crisis, while the 
political situation and the scene in the war theatre changes constantly. 
An analysis of UN peace operations in conflict areas shows that in too many 
cases a UN mandate (as well as mandates of regional organisations) serves as 
a carte blanche, justifying the beginning of an operation but lagging far 
behind events in the course of it. The routine UN practice of renewing 
mandates for military operations every six months is obviously too slow for 
mobile campaigns such as another ‘Desert Storm’ or the Afghan war. But 
attempts to diplomatically coordinate a new consensus among the big powers 
every week in the course of dynamic operations will not work for numerous 
reasons. In 1993, for example, when the Commission for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for the first (and last) time in its history 
coordinated a mandate for CSCE peace-keeping operations for Nagorno 
Karabakh, consensus among the mandating powers collapsed before troops 
and finances for operations were collected. As a result, elements of carte 
blanche are always present in mandates for UN or coalition operations, and 
the less concrete and more empty the mandate sounds, the easier it is to reach 
a consensus on it. 
The issue of ‘pre-emptive use of force’ on behalf of the international 
community requires clarification of who exactly uses the force and on whose 
behalf (legally and politically). One of the international tendencies of the 
1980s and 1990s was a shift from UN interference in crises towards 
interference by regional interstate organisations on the basis of their own 
decisions.  
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In 1983, the Organisation of American States (OAS) mandated military 
interference in Grenada (in the absence of consensus in the UN). The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) on the African continent mandated and 
practically undertook several regional, collective military interventions in 
crisis areas (including, for example, large-scale joint military operations of 
military contingents from seven African states on the territory of the Central 
African Republic). 
In Eurasia, the CIS, as mentioned above, mandated and practically undertook 
the use of military force on behalf of regional organisations in Tajikistan and 
Abkhazia/Georgia (the Tajik operation lasted for eight years with multiple 
renewed mandates and the Abkhaz operation is still not finished after eight 
years). In East Asia, the ARF (Asian Regional Forum – the conflict-
resolution ‘arm’ of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
initiated sanctions against Vietnam when it was in conflict with Campuchea. 
In Europe, the CSCE/OSCE created a precedent of mandating regionally 
abortive military operations for Nagorno Karabakh, and NATO (while 
formally denying the status of regional security organisations under UN 
Charter Chapter VIII) mandated and performed the use of force against 
Belgrade. A little bit earlier, the Western European Union (WEU), separate 
from the EU at that time, retained its doctrine of involvement in conflict 
resolution, which stated that the WEU could interfere in conflicts using 
military force not only by UN decision, but on the basis of its own decision 
of a group of participating states. 
Such a tendency to ‘regionalise’ the use of collective force was not opposed 
by the UN. On the contrary, the United Nations, over-burdened with 
unfinished operations in numerous conflict areas applied in the 1990s to 
regional organisations and ad hoc coalitions of states to volunteer to deal 
with regional and local crises and conflicts. 
The last decade also de facto legitimised the practice of delegating the 
authority to use force on behalf of the international community to ad hoc 
coalitions of states or strong organisations. The decade of the 1990s started 
with the Desert Storm operation where the United Nations mandate delegated 
the lead and command of operations against Iraq to the US military machine. 
This action culminated in delegating the lead authority in the Bosnian 
operation to NATO (the International Fellowship for Reconciliation and the 
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina) after the collapse of the UN-
led Protection Force, and ended with operations in East Timor, where the 
Australian military received a UN request and blessing for doing the main 
job on the conflict site. Although in each of these cases, large coalitions of 20 
to 30-plus states were formally created, obviously, the chief ‘contracted’ 
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power exerted enormous influence (both militarily and politically) on the 
course, direction and outcome of the operations in the conflict zones. 
These visible tendencies (ranging from regionalisation of conflict resolution 
and the delegation of authority to the use of real force and to strong national 
or regional military machines and coalitions) mean further distortion of the 
theoretically neutral United Nations model of interference. In fact, what is 
now done in the name of the world community, very rarely represents the 
world community in an operational sense. And in the case of hypothetical 
‘pre-emptive’ strikes, such tendencies create even more concerns. Instead of 
the democratisation of decision-making regarding such a thin matter as 
international interference into crises, in reality we observe opposite 
tendencies: a narrowing of the circle of actual decision-makers and a 
narrowing (and hierarchy-building) of the circle of executors of the ‘will of 
the international community’. 
Currently, three new international actors have been formed in the sphere of 
the international use of force. First, the European Union is finishing the 
creation of a Rapid Reaction Force of some 60,000 military personnel 
representing EU nations. Second, after the reorganisation of the Collective 
Security Treaty among six CIS nations, the Rapid Deployment Forces for 
Central Asia were created with the participation of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Third, after the Prague summit, NATO started 
the process of creating a 20,000-strong mobile force to avoid lagging behind 
the US in out-of-area operations similar to that in Afghanistan or 
(potentially) in Iraq.  
There are very limited attempts to coordinate ‘fire brigade’ structures even 
between EU and NATO, and no attempts at all to launch a doctrinal, 
operational or inter-operability dialogue between them and the CIS. At the 
same time, it is clear that in case of any military activities around Iraq, all 
three of them would be brought to high military readiness and relocated to 
close proximity with each other. How can the international community speak 
of a ‘collective, coordinated pre-emptive action’ if the three military rapid 
reaction machines trained for such actions do not talk to each other? The 
same problem manifested itself in course of operations in Afghanistan when 
NATO, as a collective structure, was de facto marginalised by the US 
military. Most of coordination occurred between the US and the UK, the US 
and Russia, Russia and Uzbekistan, and Russia and Kazakhstan (on air-
corridors and use of bases by Americans) and was done on a ‘semi-closed’ 
bilateral basis, without any real involvement of the UN, NATO or CIS 
channels and mechanisms. 
To sum up, how could a potential Russian stance on the pre-emptive use of 
force in the international arena be modelled? First, at a general political level, 
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Moscow seems not to welcome doctrinalisation of pre-emptive use of force. 
Previous ‘coding formulas’ for the current interference needs of big powers 
(which was ‘anti-terrorist counteractions’) was easily and willingly supported 
by Moscow because it allowed a reconsideration of Western attitudes 
towards Russian actions in Chechnya. But the pre-emptive use of force 
doesn’t supply Moscow with any extra capabilities in the sphere of its vital 
interests, while it may pose hard choices regarding former or current semi-
friends (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, etc.). 
Second, at the level of legal decisions and legitimisation, Moscow insists on 
strictly following procedural formalities: coordination of the essence and 
wording of UNSC resolutions mandating the use of force by the international 
community. As in the cases of the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (and 
several other less controversial cases), whenever the ‘voice of Moscow’ was 
heard and taken into consideration during open and closed debates in the 
UNSC, and whenever the West and Russia compromised on a certain 
decision, then Moscow became a loyal partner in the implementation of such 
a decision. Thus, another period of ‘brotherhood-in-arms’ tactical alignment 
starts. 
Third, behind the level of formalities and legal principles lays the layer of 
pragmatic geo-strategic, political and economic interests of the great powers. 
Having or not having access to WMD is a small matter. The US, Russia and 
half a dozen other influential states are ‘guilty’ themselves. Russia does not 
want to de-nuclearise, and nobody is ready, for example, to ‘punish’ India, 
Pakistan or Israel for obtaining access to nuclear weapons. Thus, motivation, 
time frame, conditions and format for the pre-emption of WMD proliferation 
remain a matter for political bargaining where nothing is clearly predefined. 
International law doesn’t help much behind the thin fence of the requirement 
to have a UNSC resolution on any such pre-emptive use of force. And the 
economic interests of the big powers shouldn’t be put aside in the cases of 
Iraq and Iran, as they were in the case of the Taliban (which was 
economically irrelevant to almost all states). Thus, the matter of pre-emptive 
use of force in the international arena against ‘unreliable’ political regimes 
becomes an area for serious balance of the pragmatic interests of big powers 
with all the associated consequences. 
Fourth, at the level of internal politics, public opinion, propaganda and the 
media in Russia, the concept of pre-emptive use of force remains and will 
remain a source of criticism and contradictions. Public opinion will 
obviously be split and a significant portion of the public will find in the 
approach of pre-emptive strikes another manifestation of the ‘plot of the 
West against Russia and developing countries’. But as long as loyalty to the 
current president and his administration remains high among the political 
establishment and the majority of the public, voices of criticism are likely to 
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be deterred or silenced if the Russian political leadership announces an 
extension of its ‘strategic partnership with the US and the West’ on this pre-
emption matter.  
Thus, all discussion is brought back to focus on the third conclusion: the key 
to any decision on matters of pre-emption lies neither in UN corridors, nor in 
domestic public opinion, nor even in the behaviour of the ‘questionable’ 
states and regimes themselves, but rather in the pragmatic balance of 
interests of great powers regarding these states and regimes. 
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Pre-emptive Military Action and 
the Legitimate Use of Force: 
An American View 
Walter B. Slocombe 
The United States will do what we must to defend our vital interests 
including, when necessary and appropriate, using our military 
unilaterally and decisively. 
United States National Security Strategy 
 
o question has more preoccupied discussions of international law and 
international relations than that of the legitimacy and wisdom of the 
use of force. From the ‘just war’ doctrines of the Middle Ages to the 
Westphalian concept of a sovereign state’s ‘right’ to wage war for whatever 
ends the sovereign judged right, to the contorted efforts of 19th century legal 
scholars to avoid the problems of the legitimacy of ‘war’ by defining all 
kinds of military operations as something other than ‘war’ to the futile efforts 
of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pacts to – with various 
reservations and ambiguities – ‘outlaw’ war to today’s discussion of the 
distinctions between preventive and pre-emptive use of force and the rise of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ as a politically correct form of warfare, practical 
political and military leaders, as well as legal scholars and scholars of 
international relations, have wrestled with the question of when the use of 
military force is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. 
It remains sadly the case that cannons are still the last argument of kings. The 
sincere efforts of leaders and citizens to substitute international institutions 
and international diplomacy for military power, the terrible costs of two 
massive European-based world wars, those of countless smaller internal and 
international wars throughout the world since 1945, or even the potential 
consequences of war fought with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, 
as well as the massively increased potential lethality of conventional 
technology, have not fundamentally changed the fact that the threat and use 
of force are the ultimate instruments of international relations. 
Moreover, it is a necessary qualification to the proposition that diplomacy is 
preferable to force, that where vital interests, or at least conflicts over 
perceived vital interests are at stake, and where willingness to provide 
inducements is not unlimited, diplomacy and negotiation are unlikely to 
succeed unless there is seen to be a real cost to refusal to compromise. The 
consequences that can be imposed by other means of pressure are puny 
N 
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compared with those of military force. Those states (not to mention non-state 
actors) whose actions are the most dangerous and most essential to constrain 
are the least likely to be much affected by ‘international opinion’. In such 
states, the prospects of affecting regime action by appeals to the good sense 
or innate caution of the citizenry are minimal, simply because the regime will 
have been careful to insulate itself very thoroughly from such public 
pressures. Even the most powerful international instrument of pressure short 
of military force – economic sanctions – has a very feeble potential for 
deflecting such states’ actions.1 
Indeed, it is, in some sense too simple even to say that it is an absolute 
principle that force is a last resort. Certainly, the risks and costs of military 
force make it both prudent and moral to refrain from its use while there is a 
reasonable prospect that other means may be effective. But the principle of 
using force only after exhausting non-military alternatives necessarily 
implies a willingness to recognise that, at some point, they have been 
exhausted, and that waiting too long may mean waiting until military options 
are no longer effective at acceptable costs. 
In the limited time and space available, rather than try to cover the whole 
huge field, it seems appropriate to focus on two specific questions2 that have 
come to the fore in the face of fundamental changes in the international 
security environment since the end of the cold war: 
• When is the use of force justified (herein of pre-emption)?  
• Who can legitimately decide on the use of military force (herein of 
unilateralism)? 
                                                          
1 ‘Covert’ action is similarly not often a viable alternative to military force. In 
any event, used on a significant scale, ‘covert’ action is the use of force, though 
perhaps delivered through a different state agency and with different methods. 
2 This limitation leaves out several issues that have in the United States been 
major elements of the discussion of use of force – including the magnitude of 
American interest sufficient to justify the use of military force and the degree of 
popular support required (and the closely related question of the relative roles of 
Congress and the president in domestic US decisions on the use of force). Suffice 
it to say, as to the first, that only important interests justify military action, but 
many interests are ‘important’ in this sense without involving immediate direct 
threats to the US homeland. As to the second, no democracy, and certainly not 
the US, can fight a war on any scale without public and parliamentary support, 
but where there is clear national interest and a coherent strategy for advancing it 
and a convincing rationale for using force to do so, the American public is 
prepared to sustain significant burdens and run significant risks, and Congress is 
prepared to support the Executive branch, or at any rate to acquiesce in its 
decisions. 
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Unilateralism, multilateralism and international decision-makers 
Of the two issues, the second, ‘unilateralism’, is relatively the easier, because 
the dichotomy between ‘unilateralism’ and ‘multilateralism’ is to a large 
degree an illusory one. 
To be sure, there are today a few in the US who prefer – or at least affect to 
prefer – unilateral action as a matter of both principle and expediency. They 
see American military power as so overwhelming that there is no need for 
the assistance of others. Equally important, they see American purposes as so 
noble and the perspectives of other governments as so narrow, even craven, 
that it is not only possible, but necessary, for the US to ignore their views. 
The conclusion these ‘unilateralists by preference’ draw is that involvement 
of other nations in decision-making about American use of force is unwise in 
that it risks diluting the clarity of American purposes, while involving other 
nations in actual operations is pointless because they can add nothing 
significant to American capabilities and including them merely complicates 
operations. 
Conversely, there is a sharply contrary view that decisions on the use of 
military force must always and only be made on a multilateral basis, and 
indeed, must be made by international institutions, preferably, and perhaps 
exclusively, by the United Nations. There are some in the US – and there 
appear to be many more in other countries – who insist, or at least affect to 
insist, that only formal approval by the United Nations can legitimise the use 
of military force, except perhaps in the case of immediate defence by a 
certifiably innocent victim against direct military attack across a recognised 
international border by acknowledged forces of a foreign state.  
There is, however, in international law – and more in international practice – 
widespread acceptance of the concept that, in the end, all decisions on the 
use of military force are unilateral, in the sense of being made by nation 
states, but those decisions must, for reasons of both prudence and principle, 
be made in the light of the opinions and interests of others so as to gain their 
support. The great weight of American opinion takes a view that can fairly be 
described as ‘unilateral if necessary, but multilateral if possible – and 
multilateral should almost always be possible’. 
To begin with the first element – the reservation of the ultimate right of 
unilateral action – the current US administration is by no means the first to 
espouse the notion that the US has the right, even the duty, to act alone if the 
nation’s vital interests are at stake, and that, in the end, it is the US and no 
one else that makes that decision. The quotation at the top of this paper is 
indeed from a National Security Strategy document, but it is drawn from that 
of President Bill Clinton in 1999, not that of President George W. Bush in 
2002. 
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Nor is the idea that decisions on military force are ultimately national 
decisions confined to superpowers. Indeed, it seems very likely that, in 
extremis, every country would take that position. Certainly, even those, such 
as the current German government, who are most enthusiastic in theory for 
multilateral decisions on use of force, insist on reserving the right to make a 
separate national decision on whether a multilateral approval of military 
action is sufficiently justified – or sufficiently serves their own nation’s goals 
and principles – as a requirement for actually participating in the action. And 
there are numerous examples of nations that, in general, regard themselves as 
adherents of a multilateral approach but have proven nonetheless ready to 
use their military forces for their national aims without bothering much about 
international opinion, as Spain did last summer over the occupation of a 
disputed Mediterranean island. To point this out is not to accuse Germany or 
Spain or anyone else of hypocrisy or even to call into question the soundness, 
much less the sincerity, of their general commitment to multilateral decision-
making, but only to observe that it has its limits. 
But if unilateralism in theory is all but universal, unilateralism in practice is 
very hard even for a superpower on a matter of any difficulty. First, in most 
situations, there may not be much of a practical option of truly unilateral 
action. American military operations are almost always greatly facilitated by 
having the cooperation and support of others. The US may have 
overwhelming capability in many, perhaps most forms of military power, but 
the direct military contributions of other nations remain highly useful. The 
military capability gap is real, but it is not infinite. Many allies can make 
very helpful contributions in specialised areas such as special operations 
forces and in capabilities where cutting-edge technology is not required, and 
increasingly where other nations are, albeit on a smaller scale, approaching 
American capabilities in fields such as precision-strike or naval forces. Even 
setting aside direct military contributions, the US is, in almost all 
circumstances, heavily dependent on other countries for bases, over-flight 
rights and access, and usually for even more direct support in the form of 
intelligence, cooperation in applying economic and political instruments, 
and, very importantly, in dealing with the aftermath of conflict. Certainly that 
was the case in Afghanistan. The Bush administration’s National Security 
Strategy may exaggerate a little when it says, “There is little of lasting 
consequence that the US can accomplish without the sustained cooperation 
of its allies and friends in Europe”, but the basic point is correct – and not 
just about Europe. 
And, of course, there are powerful political and psychological dimensions to 
international support. America, however patriotic, even jingoistic and 
ostensibly disdainful of foreigners our popular culture may seem, is far from 
unilateral by preference when it comes to military operations. Opinion polls 
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consistently show – in a variety of contexts – that public support for 
American military operations is far higher where the US has the support of 
its allies than where it would be alone. In part, this reaction is no doubt the 
sensible one that Americans like others to share the costs and risks, but it 
also appears to reflect a more complex judgment about international affairs: 
the American public has more confidence that the decisions of our 
government are right if they are shared and supported by other countries, as 
evidenced both by their formal positions and statements and by their 
willingness to send their own military forces to join in.3 
Moreover, in most situations, it is not that hard for the US to garner 
international support. This is in part the consequence of the obvious fact that 
the US has a wide variety of levers of influence and persuasion at its 
disposal. And the US need not shy away from using those levers. Accepting 
that the use of military force requires – or is at any rate immensely helped by 
– international support does not require the US to be neutral about whether 
that support is forthcoming. Forced to choose between the US and its 
adversaries, most countries will, whatever their misgivings, realise that their 
interests counsel considering the consequences of opposing the US on an 
issue so important to it that the use of military force is an issue. 
But the proposition that, in the end, the US can usually count on the support 
of those countries that matter does not rest simply – or, one could argue, even 
primarily – on the proposition that frustrating the Americans would have a 
price. At bottom, those interests of the US that plausibly could involve the 
use of American military force are also the interests of much of the rest of 
the world. An American diplomacy geared to exhausting non-military 
alternatives as a means of meeting fundamental challenges will, if non-
military means fail after being seriously applied, in most cases, also convince 
many other countries that resort to military force is not only justified, but 
required in their own interest, not just that of the US. 
Nevertheless, to say that international support for the use of military force is, 
in most cases, both necessary and obtainable, is not necessarily to say that 
the only legitimate source of international support is action by the United 
                                                          
3 The political/psychological importance of other countries’ direct military 
participation has an effect that – perhaps fortunately for the US – the contributors 
may not fully realise: those countries that do provide forces to US-led military 
operations, however much they may have to defer to US leadership of the overall 
direction of the military operation, can absolutely reserve a veto over what their 
own forces do – and at the same time exert an influence on the American 
military and, still more, on American political decision-making related to the 
conflict out of all proportion to the objective significance of their military 
contributions. 
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Nations. The interesting and much-disputed legal issues of how the UN 
Charter, in particular Article 51 (reserving the inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defence against armed attack) should be interpreted – and 
what, to a practicing lawyer is an equally important issue – who has the 
legitimate authority to interpret it authoritatively are matters more for 
scholars than practitioners of international relations. 
Of course, formal UN support is desirable, both for its own sake and for its 
impact on the actions and attitudes of individual countries whose support 
may be essential. But insofar as the issue is legitimacy, it is hard to make the 
case that only UN action suffices. In practice, whether ‘the United Nations’ 
has given its sanction for the use of military force means, as a practical 
matter, whether there is a Security Council resolution that can plausibly be 
read as authorising military force.4 That, in turn, means whether there is a 
negative vote by Russia or China. Strictly speaking, of course, the UK or 
France could also veto, and, in theory, a UN Security Council resolution 
authorising the use of military force could fail by reason of not having the 
affirmative votes of a majority of the Security Council, even if no permanent 
member voted against it. As a realistic proposition, however, it is indeed hard 
to imagine a use-of-force situation where a resolution to which none of the 
‘permanent five’ objected enough to use a veto could not obtain a majority 
(even if one or more permanent members abstained) – and it is still less 
plausible that France – not to mention the UK – would exercise a veto in a 
situation where Russia or China or both would not (always laying aside the – 
presumably not very unlikely – case such as Suez in 1956 where the interests 
of France or the UK were uniquely at issue). It follows that to require United 
Nations approval as an absolute condition of legitimate use of military force 
is to say that no military action of which Russia or China (or, in principle, 
France, the UK, or indeed, the US) strongly disapproves is legitimate, no 
matter how broadly the action is otherwise supported, or how well justified 
in other international legal or political terms. To illustrate the point – NATO 
could legitimately highlight various UNSC resolutions as supporting its 
intervention to reverse Milosevic-led Serbia’s expulsion of the ethnic 
Albanian population of Kosovo in 1999. There was, however, no authorising 
action by the Security Council in classic ‘all necessary means’ words, and it 
is not clear that had one been sought, Russia (or China) would have withheld 
                                                          
4 During the cold war, when the USSR could be relied on to veto any UNSC 
resolution it deemed inconsistent with its interest, the US argued that a ‘uniting 
for peace’ resolution of the General Assembly (GA) could carry the same UN 
authority. With the changes in the composition of the GA making it very hard to 
assemble a GA majority – and the end of the cold war confrontation with Russia 
making it more possible to get a permanent-five consensus – this doctrine has 
fallen into desuetude. 
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a veto. That intervention was, nonetheless, broadly regarded as legitimate, 
whether as a ‘humanitarian intervention’ or as a means of forestalling a 
spreading conflict in a region of Europe that has bred a host of wars in living 
memory.  
Would a failed attempt to get a formal Security Council authorisation really 
have changed things? For most of the world, the Kosovo intervention was 
legitimate and would still have been so had a UNSC effort produced a veto.5 
For to say that a UNSC resolution is essential amounts to saying that – not 
‘the international community’ – but Russia, China – and, in principle the 
other permanent members or alternatively, a majority-blocking group of the 
non-permanent members – are the absolute custodians of the legitimacy of 
international force. In these terms, the choice between ‘unilateral’ action and 
‘multilateral’ action is not between a strictly national decision and a UN 
Security Council resolution, but one between efforts to garner as much 
support from other countries as possible, and an insistence, even a 
preference, for acting alone. In such efforts, the actions of formal regional 
institutions such as NATO and of informal ad hoc groups such as the 
coalition that fought the first Gulf war (admittedly with UNSC resolution 
blessing) and may fight a second one, count for as much as a UN Security 
Council hamstrung by a veto. 
Pre-emption: When does the right to self-defence arise? 
The question of ‘pre-emption’ is a much more difficult issue. The concept 
that ‘defence’ is legitimate, while ‘offence’ – more pejoratively ‘aggression’ 
– is not, lies deep in all discussions of use of military force. In practice, the 
distinction has always been hard to draw. Indeed, a good deal of effort has 
been spent – without notable success or general acceptance in practice – in 
attempting to abolish the distinction by aspiring to abolish force entirely as a 
means of settling disputes, by a sort of ‘no fault’ renunciation of force. But 
the principle of ‘self-defence’ has survived, and is, in fact, formally and 
explicitly recognised in the UN Charter as an ‘inherent’ right, not one created 
by the Charter. 
Lurking in the concept of ‘self-defence’ is the question of at what point the 
right arises, of where on the spectrum of prevention, pre-emption and 
response, military action is justified. The American government has, 
especially but not exclusively since the attacks of 11 September, stressed the 
                                                          
5 To be sure, some take the position that the Kosovo operation was ‘proper’ 
because it served legitimate international purposes but not ‘lawful’, because it 
was not explicitly authorised by a UN Security Council resolution. That 
distinction says more about attitudes toward ‘international law’, than about 
norms of international conduct. 
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right of pre-emption in certain circumstances, specifically against terrorists 
and against rogue states threatening to acquire nuclear and other mass 
destruction weapons. 
So far as the United States striking at terrorists is concerned, the issue is 
hardly one of pre-emption. Once hostilities have been started by others, it is 
no longer ‘pre-emption’ for the victim to seek to destroy the source, not just 
to frustrate specific attacks in the future from the same source. The United 
States has already been – indeed was years before September 2001 – the 
victim of attack by the coordinated terrorist groups that are the targets for 
American attacks today. And, beginning at least with the embassy bombings 
in 1998, the United States was prepared to use force to destroy al-Qaeda 
operations and leadership where there was sufficient intelligence of their 
location, entirely independent of any indication that a specific new attack 
was being planned. There are, to be sure, many difficult legal, moral, 
political and practical issues raised by the ‘war’ on terrorism, and by the 
American determination to, in the words of President Bush’s National 
Security Strategy (NSS), “destroy the threat before it reaches our borders”. 
For example, since terrorists are non-state actors, the sovereignty of other 
countries is, by definition, involved in American attacks on them. Countries 
in whose territory terrorists are operating have a responsibility to suppress 
the operations and the US administration has declared that it will regard 
countries that give sanctuary to terrorists as subject to military attack just as 
much as the terrorists themselves. The sovereignty questions raised by this 
position – and other issues of legality and legitimacy – are real and 
sometimes difficult issues, but they are not about pre-emption, rather they are 
about the conduct of a ‘war’ that does not fit traditional patterns. 
The Bush administration has, however, squarely relied on pre-emption in 
also enunciating a potentially more far-reaching doctrine of anticipatory 
action against rogue states that are in the process of acquiring nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons. The NSS says, “We must be prepared to 
stop rogue states…before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass 
destruction against the United States, our allies, or friends”. To an important 
degree, this doctrine is less innovative than either its advocates or its critics 
profess to believe. Perhaps most importantly, it is, in its terms, limited to the 
particular issue of rogue states seeking to acquire WMD; it is not a claim to 
use force pre-emptively (or unilaterally) whenever the American government 
judges US interests to be at stake. 
Critics, however, argue that the administration is claiming that self-defence is 
not limited to ‘pre-emption’ in the sense of forestalling an imminent attack, 
but ‘preventive war’, in the sense of using military force where the only 
threat is a vague and uncertain one of possible conflict at some indefinite 
point in the future. Such ‘preventive war’, it is argued, is not only in 
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violation of international law, but an unbounded invitation for the use of 
force on mere suspicion of the ambitions or intent of another nation, and 
indeed a negation of the very concept of international law.  
Far from ignoring international law, however, the United States government 
has advanced a sophisticated legal argument for the legitimacy of its position 
regarding pre-emption against rogue state WMD proliferation that is squarely 
based on international law principles. The argument begins with the 
proposition that international law unquestionably recognises a right of self-
defence and moreover acknowledges that exercising that right of self-defence 
does not require absorbing the first blow. As the NSS puts it, under long-
recognised international law principles, “nations need not suffer an attack; 
they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present 
an obvious danger of attack”. 
The classic and widely accepted formulation of that right was stated by 
Daniel Webster, as American Secretary of State in the 1840s, during 
negotiations about a British cutting-out operation in American waters in Lake 
Ontario against the American ship Caroline that was being used to supply 
rebels in Canada. He wrote to the British Minister, Lord Ashburton, stating 
that a nation has a right to act first where the “necessity of self-defence is 
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, no moment for 
deliberation”. The administration argues that Webster’s formulation must be 
“adapted to the capabilities and objectives of our adversaries”. The 
traditional concept of ‘imminence’ assumed a context where the need for 
mobilisation and other preparation meant that there was a realistic prospect 
of warning of an attack. Stressing that its claim of a right to pre-empt is 
limited to action “to eliminate a specific threat to the US or our allies and 
friends”, the administration argues for a standard of ‘necessity’ that 
recognises that terrorists and rogue states with WMD would have at their 
disposal “weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used 
without warning”. Accordingly, it is lawful to “take anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even if uncertainly remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack”. 
On balance, the administration has the better of the legal argument: 
Webster’s formulation – which was adopted in the course of a protest 
against, rather than a defence of, a pre-emptive operation and therefore takes 
a restrictive view – speaks of a “necessity of self-defence” that is “instant, 
overwhelming,” etc. Critics argue that only an immediate prospect of specific 
attack can meet that standard. But, in Webster’s formulation, it is the 
“necessity” that must have those characteristics, and such a necessity may 
exist without an immediate prospect of attack. The right of anticipatory self-
defence by definition presupposes a right to act while action is still possible. 
If waiting for ‘imminence’ means waiting until it is no longer possible to act 
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effectively, the victim is left with no alternative but to suffer the first blow. 
So interpreted, the ‘right’ would be illusory. The administration is accurate 
when it points out that once a rogue state has achieved a serious WMD 
capability, effective action to eliminate the capability may well have become 
impossible. The problem is not so much that WMD could be used with little 
warning – attacks with conventional weapons have all too often achieved 
tactical surprise – but that surprise use could be decisive and that the 
capability can be so successfully concealed that pre-emption is operationally 
impossible even if warning were available. On this basis, a strong case exists 
that the right of ‘self-defence’ includes a right to move against WMD 
programmes with high potential danger to the United States (and others) 
while it is still feasible to do so.6 
The problems with pre-emption, unfortunately, are not lack of legal 
legitimacy, but operational practicality. A right of pre-emption is one thing; a 
meaningful capability to pre-empt is quite another. Exercising the right pre-
supposes, both logically and practically, that there is some military operation 
that will achieve the desired result of eliminating the WMD capability that is 
targeted at an acceptable cost, taking into account the enemy’s possible 
reactions. 
The first operational issue with pre-emption is whether the proposed 
operation will actually eliminate the WMD capability targeted. The problem 
is not (usually) whether there is a means of executing a pre-emptive attack 
once targets are identified, but knowing what and where to strike. Precision 
weapons require precision intelligence, and pre-emption requires that 
intelligence be comprehensive as well as precise. Too much attention to 
action movies and too little to the realities of intelligence collection have 
tended to obscure the difficulty of knowing enough about a nation’s WMD 
programmes to have much confidence of eliminating them by pre-emption. 
Still more difficult operationally is dealing with what the enemy may do in 
response, even if his WMD capability has been successfully negated. 
The contemporary cases of Iraq and North Korea illustrate the operational 
problem in some of its dimensions, as discussed below. 
In the Korean case, there is no question about the location of the plutonium-
production reactor and the re-processing facility at Yongbyon, and, as former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry has written, the United States military 
has the capability to destroy them quickly and without causing release of 
                                                          
6 In the particular case of Iraq and North Korea, of course, there may be an 
entirely independent legal basis for action that each is in breach of its obligations 
as a party to the NPT (and in both cases also of other commitments not to have 
or seek nuclear weapons). It is certainly arguable that other states are entitled to 
resort to force to compel compliance with such obligations. 
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radioactive materials. Such an attack would block the prospect of North 
Korea extracting some half-dozen bombs worth of plutonium within the next 
year. But it would not eliminate the North Korean nuclear programme, much 
less Pyongyang’s ability to respond with devastating force. Even with regard 
to North Korea’s nuclear programmes, the Yongbyon facilities are only part 
of North Korea’s potential. There has been no claim that the United States 
knows the location of either the plutonium that was extracted in 1991–92 or 
of the couple of bombs for which that plutonium may have supplied the 
fissile material. Nor is there a claim that the United States has the detailed 
knowledge required for high-confidence targeting of other elements of the 
North Korean programme – notably its incipient uranium-enrichment 
facilities – much less its extensive chemical weapons capabilities. But the 
real problem with pre-emption in the North Korean case is that the North 
Korean capability to respond and escalate does not (so far) rest on its WMD, 
but on its massive conventional forces – and there is no chance that such 
capability could be eliminated pre-emptively, even by a massive effort. Of 
course, the problem will only grow worse if North Korea is able to expand its 
nuclear potential, and at some point, if diplomacy fails, it may be the wiser 
course to act militarily, accepting the limits on American capability to pre-
empt and rely on deterrence and defence to block or blunt a conventional 
attack in response. But it is the risks of such a course that have made not just 
South Korea, but the United States as well, so reluctant to press the case for 
military confrontation. 
In a sense, the case for dealing with the Iraqi WMD programmes by military 
force now may be said to be the case for not letting Iraq reach the point 
Korea is at now. Essentially the argument for eliminating Saddam Hussein’s 
WMD by military force if he will not eliminate them himself under UN 
monitoring is that, despite the real risks, if the capability is not stopped now, 
it will be too late – and the world and the region will have to deal with a 
Saddam regime armed with a powerful WMD capability that can neither be 
pre-empted nor confidently defended against. But it is significant that the 
military option being considered against Iraq today is pre-emptive only in the 
strategic, not the operational, sense. The military option is not to strike at the 
WMD programmes directly but to replace the regime, as the only confident 
means of eliminating its WMD programmes. This is not the product of over-
ambition, but of operational reality. Intelligence of a granularity and 
comprehensiveness necessary for an effective pre-emption limited to the 
WMD programmes themselves is no more available in the Iraqi than the 
Korean case. Indeed, in the Iraqi case there is not even an equivalent to 
Yongbyon, that is, a single key facility whose destruction is militarily 
feasible and would at a stroke deeply set back its WMD efforts. It is this lack 
of a military option able to eliminate the WMD that makes a campaign to 
oust the regime the only military option if UN disarmament efforts fail. 
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Happily, Saddam Hussein has less formidable responsive options than does 
Kim Jong-Il because his military is relatively weak and his ability to strike 
rapidly at high-value targets is much less. The American assessment is that 
none of his potential responses are anything nearly as significant as the North 
Korean potential to wreak immense destruction on South Korea, and that the 
risks entailed by what he can do can be reduced to acceptable levels – and 
are in any event better addressed now than faced later when his WMD 
programmes are far more developed. But Iraq has some potentially very 
destructive responses and their potential use is a major complication for 
military planning – and a major source of the reluctance of many to support 
an invasion. 
In short, the contrasting cases of Iraq and North Korea today may be said to 
illustrate both the conceptual strength of the administration’s doctrine of pre-
emption against rogue state WMD, and its limitations in practice. There will, 
unfortunately perhaps, still be plenty of scope for military operations and 
capabilities aimed at deterrence and at defence if deterrence fails. 
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The Future of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: 
An American View 
Gary Samore 
he international nuclear non-proliferation regime is presently under 
siege from several different directions. Among the litany of pressures 
and problems: 
• The US is considering development of a new class of nuclear weapons 
that could eventually require the resumption of nuclear testing, which 
would almost certainly set off a new round of nuclear tests by the 
nuclear weapons states.  
• Despite improvements, Russia’s security and control over its vast stocks 
of nuclear materials, equipment and technology remains vulnerable, and 
the leak of nuclear assistance to countries such as Iran remains a 
problem.  
• Efforts to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT) appear hopelessly deadlocked in Geneva, with little prospect for 
progress in the immediate future.  
• Looking towards the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), progress to implement the 13 disarmament 
steps identified at the 2000 Review Conference will be incomplete at 
best.  
• In the wake of its 1998 nuclear tests, India is determined to develop a 
robust long-range nuclear capability against China, which is itself 
embarked on a strategic modernisation programme.  
• To maintain a credible deterrent against India, Pakistan will continue to 
expand its nuclear arsenal. Even worse, Pakistan (and at least elements 
within Pakistan’s nuclear establishment) has reportedly provided 
sensitive enrichment technology to North Korea and Iran, substantially 
augmenting their nuclear weapons programmes.  
• In the Middle East, the collapse of the peace process has pushed even 
further into the distant future any prospect for creating security 
conditions conducive to Israeli adherence to the NPT or establishment of 
a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the region.  
• Long in violation of its NPT commitments, Iraq continues to resist full 
cooperation with UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
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UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
inspections as we inch ever closer to a war that may splinter the basis for 
international cooperation on non-proliferation issues.  
• In the meantime, Iran has recently acknowledged that it is developing a 
programme for uranium enrichment, ostensibly for civilian purposes, but 
more likely to pursue a nuclear weapons breakout capability under cover 
of the NPT and IAEA safeguards.  
• Finally, in East Asia, North Korea was caught pursuing a clandestine 
enrichment programme and responded to international pressure by 
restarting its plutonium production facilities, expelling IAEA inspectors 
and withdrawing from the NPT.  
All in all, it is not a pretty picture. Nonetheless, it is important to remember 
that the underlying political and technical factors supporting the nuclear non-
proliferation regime – the basic judgment that nuclear weapons are not 
essential for national security and the technical difficulties for acquiring 
nuclear weapons – remains intact for most NPT parties. The number of 
countries outside the Treaty remains small, and those inside the NPT that 
have violated the Treaty in letter or spirit are few. In most regions of the 
world – the Americas, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia – 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a serious threat. 
Regional proliferation zones 
The Middle East and East Asia are the only regions where the NPT regime is 
under serious pressure, and in both cases, the danger is long-term erosion 
rather than imminent collapse. From the standpoint of political and technical 
barriers to nuclear proliferation, the situations in the Middle East and East 
Asia are mirror opposites. 
In the Middle East, the political barriers to proliferation are low – in the 
sense that the NPT regime does not enjoy widespread public legitimacy – but 
the technical barriers to acquiring nuclear weapons remain relatively high for 
most countries, apart from Israel, which has maintained a nuclear monopoly 
in the region for several decades. In this respect, Iran now appears to be only 
a few years away from crossing the nuclear threshold. If the uranium 
enrichment facility is completed, Iran could seek to divert nuclear material 
for weapons (in violation of IAEA safeguards) or exercise its right to 
withdraw from the NPT with a 90-day notice and convert the facility for 
military uses. In the long term, other countries in the region may try to 
emulate Iran’s example of developing fuel-cycle facilities under the pretext 
of civilian nuclear energy and research programmes, leading to a domino-
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style collapse of the non-proliferation restraints in the Middle East as 
countries seek to divert nuclear material or to withdraw from the NPT. 
In contrast to the Middle East, the technical barriers to proliferation in East 
Asia are low – given the advanced nuclear capabilities in Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan – but the political barriers remain relatively high, including 
public attitudes (especially in Japan) and the security ties between the US 
and its East Asian allies, which reduce the security rational for acquiring 
nuclear weapons. In the long term, however, an unchecked North Korean 
nuclear weapons programme could pressure an East Asian state to hedge its 
bets or even withdraw from the NPT, especially if US security relations in 
the region are weakened. In addition, should North Korea choose to sell 
surplus nuclear material or provide nuclear assistance, it could dramatically 
accelerate the pace of proliferation in regions such as the Middle East where 
the political desire for weapons is great, even if technical capabilities are 
weak. 
Given these circumstances, the most important non-proliferation challenge 
for the coming years will be how to deal with the nuclear threat of Iraq and 
Iran in the Middle East and North Korea in East Asia. The success or failure 
of these efforts will be the most important determinates for the future of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
The Middle East 
The key issue for the Middle East is how a resolution of the Iraqi issue will 
affect efforts to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme. The outcome of the 
Iraqi drama is near. In the coming weeks, Baghdad will either dramatically 
improve its cooperation with UN inspectors or Iraq’s cooperation will remain 
tactical, enough to divide the UN Security Council, but not enough to satisfy 
Washington and London, which have apparently decided that eliminating 
Saddam Hussein is necessary to eliminate Iraq’s WMD programmes. Most 
likely, the US, the UK and a handful of allies will invade Iraq to overthrow 
the Iraqi regime, with or without a second UN Security Council resolution. 
Either outcome – inspections or invasion – would be a success for 
international efforts to enforce compliance against a country that has violated 
the NPT and probably continues to harbour ambitions to develop nuclear 
weapons, although the status of its nuclear weapons programme is uncertain. 
It is probable that Iraq has not made dramatic progress to acquire nuclear 
weapons since the demise of inspections in 1998, and a continuation of 
current IAEA inspections could provide high confidence in detecting Iraqi 
efforts to build clandestine facilities to produce nuclear materials. Over time, 
however, Baghdad’s willingness to accept the current level of intrusive 
inspections is likely to erode if the threat of force appears to fade. From this 
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standpoint, the replacement of the current Iraqi government is more certain to 
achieve a decisive and enduring solution to Iraq’s nuclear ambitions. For the 
time being, the new government in Baghdad can be expected to focus on 
rebuilding its conventional forces under US and UK protection, with less 
need or opportunity to revive Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. 
The credibility of the UN Security Council as an instrument to enforce NPT 
compliance in the case of Iraq will depend in a large measure on whether the 
UN Security Council authorises the use of force. Ideally, authorisation of 
force could be portrayed as a warning that the UN Security Council is 
prepared to take strong measures against countries that pursue nuclear 
weapons programmes in violation of their NPT commitments. Unfortunately, 
at this juncture, the Council appears deeply divided and passage of a second 
resolution is unlikely. Even in the absence of a second resolution, however, 
Washington and London will attempt to justify military action against Iraq as 
enforcement of previous UN Security Council resolutions to disarm Iraq, 
including its nuclear weapons efforts. 
Assuming Iraq’s nuclear programme is eliminated by force of arms in the 
near future, how will it affect Tehran’s calculations and subsequent efforts to 
discourage Iran from pursuing its declared civilian uranium-enrichment 
programme? On one hand, the elimination of Iraq’s nuclear threat will 
remove one significant Iranian motivation for developing a nuclear weapons 
option, and Iran may become even more wary of pursuing policies that will 
attract US hostility and even risk military attack. On the other hand, Tehran 
is likely to view development of a nuclear weapons capability as even more 
essential to deter US pressure and efforts to change the regime. 
From Tehran’s standpoint, the ideal solution to this dilemma is to offer 
assurances of its peaceful intent, while developing a nuclear weapons 
capability as quickly as possible; this presumably explains Iran’s recent 
decision to allow IAEA access to its enrichment facility while it is still under 
construction and to promise IAEA inspections once the plant is operational. 
Tehran has also signalled its willingness to accept additional safeguard 
measures to give maximum confidence against the risk of diversion and the 
existence of undeclared facilities. 
Given the status of its nuclear power programme, however, Iran’s claim that 
the enrichment programme is intended for civilian fuel production is not 
likely to be accepted by Washington. Even if safeguards provide adequate 
protection against the risk of diversion – an assurance that is doubted in 
Washington – Iran could still acquire nuclear weapons materials on fairly 
short notice if it withdraws from the NPT when the plant is operational. To 
secure minimal Iranian cooperation in the impending war against Iraq, 
Washington has deliberately avoided making a major issue of Iran’s 
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enrichment programme. Once the war against Iraq is over, however, the US 
is very likely to turn to its attention to Iran, which presents an easier (though 
less urgent) proliferation problem than North Korea. 
Washington has not yet decided what strategy to pursue, but the usual debate 
can be expected. Some officials will emphasise the use of threats and 
pressure to intimidate Tehran to abandon its enrichment programme, 
including efforts to encourage the emergence of ‘moderate’ elements in Iran 
that may be more willing to sacrifice Iran’s nuclear weapons option to 
appease American hostility. As a last resort, pre-emptive military strikes 
against the enrichment plant will be seriously considered. Other officials will 
argue that international pressure should be augmented by incentives, such as 
accepting Iranian access to nuclear power assistance and secure fuel supplies 
if Iran agrees to forego development of an indigenous fuel production 
capability. 
Critical to the success of any future American strategy to halt Iran’s 
enrichment programme will be whether Washington can enlist the support of 
key powers with influence in Tehran, including the UK, France, Germany, 
Japan and Russia (Iran’s sole nuclear supplier), which share Washington’s 
interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The lingering 
effects of disagreement over Iraq are likely to obstruct development of a 
common policy towards Iran, but the need to deal with Iran could also 
provide an opportunity to help heal wounds among the US, the UK and their 
allies. 
The Far East 
Clearly, Washington’s efforts to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programme have failed. After confronting North Korea with its nuclear 
cheating last October, the US effectively ruled out either military force or 
bilateral negotiations, and sought to orchestrate political and economic 
pressures to force North Korea to abandon its secret enrichment programme. 
Rather than capitulate, however, Pyongyang retaliated with familiar 
brinkmanship, seeking to pressure Washington into negotiations or, if that 
failed, to enhance its nuclear capabilities. Rather than rally international 
support, the US has found itself at odds with China and its East Asian allies, 
especially South Korea, which are wary of pressuring North Korea and prefer 
that Washington negotiate a solution directly with Pyongyang. 
For the near term, the situation can be expected to grow worse. With 
Washington’s focus on Iraq, and the divisions between Washington and 
Seoul, North Korea appears intent on resuming the reprocessing and 
recovering of enough plutonium for a few nuclear weapons in the coming 
months. The IAEA Board of Governors has reported North Korea’s NPT 
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violations to the Security Council, but the Council is unlikely to take strong 
action to deter reprocessing, given New York’s focus on Iraq and the refusal 
of key countries to even threaten sanctions. As much as Beijing opposes 
North Korea’s nuclear programme, it does not appear willing to cut off vital 
assistance that could precipitate the collapse of Kim Jong-Il regime or trigger 
a war on the peninsula. 
In theory, the US could mount air strikes to destroy North Korea’s plutonium 
production facilities – a threat that North Korea takes seriously – but at the 
risk of causing a broader conflict and splintering the alliance with South 
Korea. As a basis for bilateral negotiations with Washington, Pyongyang 
claims it is willing to re-institute the freeze on plutonium production, but the 
US continues to refuse bilateral negotiations unless North Korea first agrees 
to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. In an effort to break the 
impasse, US diplomats have tried to organise multilateral talks, which may 
provide a cover for bilateral US-North Korean talks to begin, but Pyongyang 
has insisted on direct negotiations with Washington. 
Assuming that North Korea proceeds with reprocessing, however, the 
immediate proliferation threat is limited. For over a decade, North Korea was 
believed to have enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons, and the 
amount of additional plutonium that North Korea can recover in coming 
months is relatively small (about 30 kilograms). At least for the immediate 
future, a few additional North Korean nuclear weapons are unlikely to trigger 
decisions in Tokyo or Seoul to acquire nuclear weapons, although a North 
Korean nuclear test could begin to shake confidence in the NPT. Pyongyang 
will probable require the small amount of additional plutonium immediately 
available for its own military needs, leaving little surplus for sale. Over 
several years, however, North Korea could substantially expand its capability 
to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which would pose a 
much more serious proliferation threat. 
Once North Korea has finished reprocessing (and the Iraq campaign is over), 
Washington’s debate over its North Korean policy is likely to intensify. For 
some, the US should respond with more concerted efforts to isolate and 
sanction Pyongyang, in hopes of undermining the regime. For others, the US 
should respond with more concerted efforts to negotiate a comprehensive and 
rigorous agreement, in hopes of ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programme. The most effective strategy may need to combine pressure and 
negotiations: the threat of sanctions are necessary to buttress negotiations to 
secure North Korean concessions, but support from key Asian powers to 
impose sanctions will require demonstrating that a negotiated solution has 
been blocked by North Korean intransigence and unrealistic demands. 
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Conclusion 
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is under the greatest threat in the 
Middle East and East Asia, depending on efforts to deal with nuclear 
programmes in Iraq, Iran and North Korea. In the near future, Iraq’s nuclear 
programme is likely to be eliminated by force of arms, creating both 
opportunities and obstacles to dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. Once 
the Iraq war is over, Washington will also focus new energy on responding to 
North Korea’s nuclear threat. In both cases, the US will need to resolve 
internal debates and coordinate efforts with other critical countries to design 
an approach that maximises pressure and incentives. 
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The New Dynamics of 
Nuclear Proliferation: 
A European View 
Bruno Tertrais 
here are two ways to interpret current evolutions on the nuclear non-
proliferation scene. One is that proliferation remains limited to a small 
coterie of rogue or quasi-rogue nations, such as Iran and North Korea. 
Another is that we are entering a new era of nuclear proliferation and that a 
new ‘wave’ of proliferation is taking shape. 
Whatever the interpretation, it is clear that a key threshold has been crossed 
in the evolution of nuclear proliferation. Evidence of ‘nuclear for ballistic’ 
trade between Pakistan and North Korea has shed new light on the 
‘proliferation networks’ that have developed since the end of the cold war. 
The North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, the importance of which tends 
to be overshadowed by the Iraqi crisis, is a seminal event. The ripple effects 
are already felt in Japan. Meanwhile, Iran seems to have decided to put its 
nuclear programme into high gear. 
The current evolution stems from developments both on the demand side and 
on the supply side. On the supply side, some states or entities have confirmed 
their readiness to engage in nuclear cooperation and trade without full 
guarantees that the recipient will not engage in military nuclear programmes. 
‘Cooperative proliferation’ is hardly a new issue. But today it increasingly 
concerns states or entities that are opposed to Western policies. In the best 
case, commercial interests are the overriding motive. In the worst case, 
nuclear proliferation is seen as a positive. 
On the demand side, it seems that US policies have become an 
encouragement to nuclear proliferation. One way to see the current 
preoccupations of Mr Mohammed El-Baradei, Director-General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who recently had to deal with 
three cases: Iran, Iraq and North Korea, is that President George W. Bush’s 
‘axis of evil’ concept is being vindicated by this year’s evolutions. But there 
is another way to look at it. Even paranoids have enemies: US policies and 
rhetoric cannot but encourage North Korea to develop its nuclear 
programme. 
The legitimate priority given to the war on terrorism has led the US to adopt 
a more benign attitude towards traditional nuclear non-proliferation 
instruments. The lifting of sanctions against Pakistan and India (the second 
U-turn in a decade in Washington’s attitude towards the Pakistani nuclear 
T 
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programme) give the impression to some that nuclear non-proliferation is not 
a general principle in US policy, but just a tool in support of other policy 
goals. And the discussions about nuclear assistance to Pakistan, when added 
to previous US statements about the NPT, raise doubts about the long-term 
commitment to its multilateral nuclear non-proliferation commitments. 
There is also the following paradox. The US perceives the nuclear threat as 
the most important issue for its security and probably believes that it acts 
accordingly. But at the same time, nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as 
the trump card to resist US ‘imperialism’ and ‘aggressiveness’. The US 
Nuclear Posture Review, the massive increase in the US defence budget and 
the US National Security Strategy tend to reinforce the belief that only 
nuclear weapons can guarantee security in a militarily unipolar world. After 
the first Gulf war, many in developing nations concluded that one should not 
fight the US without nuclear weapons. Guess what conclusions the same 
people will draw from the forthcoming Iraqi war? 
Finally, US policies may lead to a resurgence of nuclear rhetoric as a way for 
states to express their opposition to Washington. It is extremely revealing 
that while Brazil had become a champion of nuclear disarmament in the last 
decade, the new team in Brasilia has chosen to refer again to the nuclear 
option. There is no immediate risk that a few ambiguous statements will 
translate into a policy. But they may contribute to a ‘de-legitimisation of 
non-proliferation’. 
The current scene is indeed an interesting one for would-be nuclear 
proliferators. What they see is the US dealing with North Korea very 
differently from the way it does with Iraq. Some will undoubtedly conclude 
that if one has to decide between cheating the regime and leaving the regime, 
it is better to altogether leave it. (Whether we like it or not, they will also use 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ‘precedent’ as an excuse.) 
There are two possibilities for the future. One scenario is that of limited 
opaque proliferation, with a handful of states coming closer to the threshold 
without admitting it. We will have several other ‘Irans’ or ‘Japans’. Another 
scenario is the unravelling of the regime. It will happen if there is a ‘second 
withdrawal’. In such a case, there is a good chance that in 2015 we will have 
no less than ten new nuclear or quasi-nuclear nations. 
The NPT Review Conferences may not be the key to the future of the 
regime. It would be interesting to see a convincing demonstration that the 
full implementation of the ‘Thirteen Steps’ agreed upon in 2000 would have 
any significant impact on the decision of a country to go or not go nuclear. 
The policies of the US, and the way the UN Security Council manages 
proliferation crises, will be much more important. In this regard, the 
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hesitation shown by some UN Security Council permanent members to treat 
the North Korean problem at the United Nations level is not reassuring. 
The US, Europe, Russia and other responsible nuclear-capable nations still 
have many cards to play to influence the dynamics of proliferation. We need 
to continue working on both the supply side and the demand side. On the 
supply side, all nuclear-capable nations need to show restraint on the way 
they manage their nuclear assets. Others still need further enhancement of 
their export controls. One particular note on the Iraqi case: it will be most 
useful to set up a robust, cooperative, threat-reduction programme for that 
country after it is disarmed, including a small centre to finance nuclear 
scientists, akin to the International Centres for Science and Technology 
created in Russia and Ukraine after the cold war. 
The role of positive security guarantees in the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation is well-known. The confirmation and reinforcement of existing 
security guarantees is a key to the maintenance of barriers against further 
nuclear proliferation. This will leave us with some very unpleasant choices. 
Do the US, the UK and France prefer to continue securing the existence of 
the unsavoury Saudi regime or would we rather have an isolated nuclear 
Saudi Arabia? 
We need to find new incentives for states to agree to enhanced safeguards. 
The European Union has a key role to play here and should make full use of 
the ‘conditionality’ principle. Access to European assistance, markets and 
cooperation should be conditional on the full and verified compliance with 
existing non-proliferation norms. As far as dialogue with nuclear-threshold 
nations is concerned, the EU can also play a useful role provided that it fully 
coordinates its initiatives with those of the US, for rogue countries have 
mastered the art of exploiting our differences. Nevertheless, we also need to 
be realistic: lecturing the Indians about membership in the NPT is not the 
most certain way for the Europeans to play a useful role in managing South 
Asia’s nuclear problems. 
We need to continue to work on the full implementation of the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Conventions. The chemical and biological threats have 
become, in the past decades, one of the primary rationales for maintaining 
nuclear deterrence policies. To those states who want more nuclear 
disarmament, we need to say ‘help us first get rid of chemical and biological 
weapons’. When all else has failed, deterrence and protection will remain our 
best chances to manage nuclear proliferation. 
‘Regime change’ is often good for non-proliferation but the case of Iraq is a 
specific one in legal terms and will not be a model. Also, we must have no 
illusions as democratisation is far from being tantamount to de-
nuclearisation. Let us state the obvious: among known nuclear-capable 
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countries, six out of eight are democracies. Those who believe that a 
democratic Iran will be a non-nuclear Iran need a booster-shot of realism. 
‘Preventive strike’ options are increasingly likely to fail given the efforts that 
countries make to disperse and conceal their nuclear infrastructures. States 
have drawn the lessons from the 1981 Osirak bombing and can benefit these 
days from the immense progress of drilling techniques. Also, the 
fundamental dilemma of preventive strike, recognised and epitomised by the 
1962 Cuban missile crisis, remains intact: Will a party strike if there is a 
chance of retaliation or escalation? 
As far as missile defences are concerned – those who still see them as 
‘destabilising’ should now think of the following: Which would be 
preferable, missile defences in East Asia or nuclear weapons in Japan and 
Taiwan? 
A final word on Pakistan, as it is fast becoming the number one nuclear 
problem in the world. A quasi-failing nuclear state, Pakistan is also unable or 
unwilling to become a responsible nuclear actor. Pakistani actors have shown 
their willingness to transfer nuclear expertise to several state and non-state 
entities. Pakistan is the missing link between a nuclear Asia and a nuclear 
Middle East. If things do not change, there will come a time when the de-
nuclearisation of that country one way or the other will become an option to 
be seriously considered. 
 
 | 75 
The Future of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: 
A Russian View 
Vladimir A. Orlov 
t is not a well-kept secret that the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime is now in crisis. The optimism and expectations that followed 
from the indefinite extension, without a vote, of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and, later, from the Final Document 
adopted at the 2000 Review Conference have evaporated. 
The 2003 NPT Prepcom will face enormous challenges. Among them are: 
• contradictory approaches on decision-making on the use of force against 
Iraq; 
• non-compliance of North Korea, which is leaving, if not yet left, the 
NPT; 
• speculations about the intentions of some state-parties to the NPT, 
primarily, Iran; 
• failure to make any progress towards the universality of the regime; 
• failure to make any significant progress towards the implementation of 
‘the thirteen steps’ of nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus at the 
2000 Review Conference and, in certain cases, steps by nuclear-weapons 
states (NWS) exactly in the opposite direction; and  
• new challenges, coming primarily from non-state actors (international 
terrorist organisations and organised crime communities) in the form of 
nuclear terrorism.  
Iraq 
Every day it is more likely that the military solution will be chosen in the 
crisis over Iraq without asking for the mandate by the UN Security Council. 
If – or better yet, when – it happens, the whole architecture of the non-
proliferation regime will be shaken and damaged. Whether it will be able to 
survive, at least in its current form, is not certain. 
The 2003 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspections in Iraq, so far, should be considered a success by the international 
community. Inspections, executed under the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
I 
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Resolution 1441, have generally proved to be an efficient tool in 
investigating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. 
As far as a nuclear-weapons component of inspections is concerned, it is 
obvious that Iraq does not have problems with meeting UNSC requirements, 
nor does it have any nuclear-weapon-oriented programme. Yet it is critically 
important to continue inspections and, in the future, provide permanent 
monitoring of Iraqi facilities, because this country has been in violation of 
the non-proliferation regime in the past. The inspections and monitoring, if 
not interrupted by military action, would provide a good example for such 
internationally approved actions in other regions of the world, if necessary. 
If, however, the military option finally prevails, and if it is not authorised by 
the UNSC, it would clearly demonstrate (for those who still have doubts) that 
the real question about Iraq is not terrorism or non-proliferation concerns, but 
the geopolitical and economic interests of a single superpower. Non-
Proliferation values and principles, in such a scenario, would be used only as 
a pretext. This would question the whole non-proliferation regime and may 
lead in the near future to a revision by some NPT non-nuclear parties of their 
nuclear policy. Iraq will be a checkpoint for the international community and 
for the UNSC, whether it is able to act efficiently – aggressively but 
peacefully – in tracking and preventing non-proliferation violations. 
In the Iraqi crisis, Russia’s position is very close to that of France and 
Germany. At the same time, it is also true that there are many common points 
in Russian and US views on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Both seem to have very 
similar data (if not the same) on Saddam’s WMD and systems of delivery: in 
both capitals, government experts simply would not buy rumours that 
Saddam, after his defeat in the Gulf war and the subsequent sanctions, 
succeeded in his unconventional military programmes and possesses such 
weapons. But, experts on both sides of the ocean continue, Saddam is the 
enfant terrible in a region equally important and sensitive for the US and for 
Russia, and yes, he continues to maintain an active interest in developing his 
WMD programmes, as time and circumstances permit. He is a cheater, and it 
is impossible to deal with him and reach compromise agreements. 
In implementing President Vladimir Putin’s directives and dealing with this 
issue, however, some concerns remain for the Russian government: 
1. What sort of country will Iraq be after Saddam is removed? Who will 
replace him? Will Iraq disintegrate or not? It looks like Russian experts, 
as well as their US counterparts, are yet unable to respond to these 
crucial questions. 
2. Do Russia’s American counterparts recognise that there are major 
differences in Russia’s approach to Iraq and to Iran? Russians definitely 
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do not want their message to be read in Washington that Russia has its 
whole foreign policy for sale and that, after a check for silence in the 
Iraq war is endorsed, both parties could exchange price and wish lists 
with regard to Iran. 
In recent months it looks like the Americans failed to see the nuances in the 
Kremlin and mechanically added Russia to the list of full subscribers to US-
led anti-Saddam plans. Such a simplification significantly offended Moscow 
foreign policy-makers. Moreover, worries about the political consequences 
of the military solution for Iraq, including erosion of the non-proliferation 
regime, have increased in Moscow and have made its position even less 
sympathetic to the US war strategy. 
North Korea 
North Korea is a classic case of non-compliance of the NPT regime. It has 
been a timely and correct decision by the IAEA to submit the case to the UN 
Security Council. Given North Korean capabilities in the nuclear weapon and 
missile areas, it has become a serious factor of instability in Northeast Asia 
and in the world. Nevertheless, a resolution of the North Korea crisis is quite 
possible. It should be implemented on a multilateral basis and simultaneously 
on two levels. 
The first level is the UNSC, which should take the North Korea case 
seriously and examine it closely. The first stage should not involve sanctions 
against Pyongyang but should indicate that, at some further stage, sanctions 
are considered as an option. 
The second level should be a six-party mechanism (both Koreas, US, China, 
Japan and Russia) that should result in a document (probably non-legally 
binding, using examples of the Agreed Framework or the 1994 Trilateral 
Statement on Ukraine) having two key elements: 1) non-withdrawal of North 
Korea from the NPT and its readiness to open the whole territory for 
unconditional IAEA inspections; and 2) providing US security assurances to 
North Korea. 
These two elements should go in a package. Then, a bigger package can be 
negotiated, including economic and energy assistance to North Korea by the 
above-mentioned states as well as by the EU and, possibly, some other 
issues, such as missile non-proliferation. The non-nuclear-weapon status of 
North Korea and security assurances to that country can be, simultaneously 
or later, strengthened by the revival of the agreement between the two 
Koreas of a non-nuclear-weapon status of the Korean Peninsula, and 
assurances provided by nuclear weapon states (NWS). 
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Russia is well-positioned to play a positive and active role in bringing 
resolution of the crisis, if joined in its efforts by the US, China and Japan, at 
a minimum. If such an agreement is achieved, Russia is also well-positioned 
to play its role in providing North Korea with different energy sources. One 
of the solutions may be the construction of a nuclear power plant in the 
Russian Maritime region, close to the Russian-North Korean border, and the 
export of Russian nuclear energy to North Korea under a multilaterally 
developed mechanism. 
The next few months will be decisive in dealing with North Korea and its 
nuclear-weapon programme (regardless of how much this programme is of 
an imitative character, there is little doubt that such a programme exists). 
This situation is a field of opportunities for talented diplomats. If, however, 
the North Korean crisis is mismanaged, it may lead to a disaster – a chain 
reaction. After North Korea develops at least a couple of primitive nuclear 
bombs, the whole balance of power in the region will be destroyed and Japan 
will be the first to start rethinking about its own nuclear-weapons option. 
This may open a door to a real catastrophe for the entire non-proliferation 
regime. 
Iran 
Iran is considered by Russian foreign policy strategists as an important 
political partner in the region, with whom dialogue is sometimes very 
difficult but may finally bring concrete results. Iran is considered as a 
stabilising, rather than a destabilising player. At the same time, many in the 
Russian government are concerned about Iran’s potential clandestine nuclear 
weapons programme, without even mentioning its missile programmes. A 
general assessment in Russia of the level of Iran’s nuclear weapons 
programme, however, contains the following observations: 
1. The programme is at a very initial stage. 
2. It lacks financial and intellectual resources. 
3. It will not become successful without massive outside support, which is 
unlikely. 
4. There has not been a political decision made in Tehran on ‘joining the 
nuclear club’, and it is not clear whether it will ever be taken. 
5. Even if such a decision is taken, with its own resources Iran will need at 
least eight years before its first nuclear test.  
The policy implications of this assessment are as follows: 
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1. There is no reason why Russia should stop completion of the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant, taking into account that this is a light-water reactor 
and that spent fuel will be taken back to Russia. 
2. There are some possibilities for expanding peaceful nuclear cooperation 
with Iran, though each of them should be carefully examined before any 
decision is taken and no future joint project should go beyond 
construction of light-water reactors. 
3. The situation in Iran and its intentions should be carefully monitored, 
and in this context, an active Russian presence in Iran should be 
considered as an important facilitating factor. 
4. It is highly desirable for Iran to join the IAEA Additional Protocol and, 
in any case, IAEA involvement in monitoring Iranian nuclear activities 
should be a priority. 
5. If, however, this does not happen and if there are signs of progress in 
such a programme, Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear field 
should be frozen.  
After my trip to Iran in December 2002, my own assessment is that there are 
influential forces in Iran that are interested in ‘playing by the international 
rules’ and making every effort possible to prevent a ‘nuclear-weapons’ 
scenario from materialising in Iran. They see Iran as a responsible member of 
the NPT and the IAEA. At the same time, these same forces strongly 
advocate dynamic technological development of Iran (in parallel with 
democratisation of the society and more openness towards the West), 
including development of the full nuclear cycle. It is important to take into 
consideration that, under any scenario of Iranian domestic politics, Iran plans 
to be an active and strong player in nuclear issues in the 21st century. 
In this situation, it is imperative that the IAEA continues its efforts with 
scheduled inspections in Iran. It may also be a productive idea to use the 
Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) in providing clear rules for nuclear imports 
to Iran by all NSG members, not only Russia. It is critical that there is an 
agreement in place between Russia and Iran on returning the spent nuclear 
fuel back to Russia. And it is highly desirable, though not politically easy, to 
bring Iran to the Additional Protocol requirements. 
Universality 
American, Russian and British plans, immediately after the 1995 NPT 
Extension Conference, to take specific steps to bring India, Pakistan and 
Israel to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, at least in a long-term future, 
have never been activated. To the contrary, with the Indian and Pakistani 
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1998 nuclear tests, the possibility of taking steps towards bringing these two 
nations to the international regime has become close to zero. The euphoria of 
the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT has become unproductive. 
The failure to take any practical steps towards bringing Israel to the NPT is 
potentially the mostly dangerous ‘time bomb’. The NPT’s indefinite 
extension without a vote was possible thanks to a ‘big package’, which 
included a resolution on the Middle East aimed at bringing Israel, one day, to 
the regime. 
If the Iraqi crisis is resolved with the use of force and if the international 
community fails to prevent North Korea’s departure from the NPT, others, 
particularly from the Islamic world, will likely examine, among other 
options, withdrawal from the NPT before or at the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference using as an explanation the failure to implement the Middle East 
resolution from the ‘big package’ of 1995. 
State depositories of the NPT, as well as others interested in survival of the 
NPT regime, such as New Agenda Coalition states (NAC) should start 
making efforts to resolve the ‘universality’ problem. Realistically speaking, 
however, in the current political climate practical ways to move forward are 
not clear. 
Nuclear disarmament 
The 2000 NPT Conference decision on the ‘thirteen steps’ on nuclear 
disarmament could have become practical working steps for NWS. 
Nevertheless, the opposite has happened. To name just a couple of examples: 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not entered into force, and, primarily 
with the US position in mind, the Treaty looks more dead than alive; even a 
moratorium on nuclear tests has been questioned. The US has increased the 
role of nuclear weapons in its policy and the Conference on Disarmament is 
now more dormant than ever before in its history. Further sub-strategic 
nuclear weapons have not been yet included on the US-Russian arms control 
agenda. 
Is this the end of the multilateral nuclear disarmament process and the 
beginning of an era of unilateral steps? This is unlikely to happen, but it is 
definitely a profound crisis of multilateral diplomacy. 
Russia is currently in an awkward position, balancing between its view of 
multilateral disarmament diplomacy as an important tool in a changing world 
and its frustration with the inefficiency of existing multilateral instruments. 
There has been a growing temptation in the Kremlin to make deals with 
Americans, simply ignoring multilateral fora. But it would be also accurate 
to mention another trend, competing with the US-centric one, towards re-
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evaluating the role of multilateral arms control mechanisms and finding ways 
to revive in them. 
Nuclear terrorism 
For Russia, nuclear terrorism is not a Hollywood-style scenario. According 
to the January 2003 statement by General Igor Valynkin, who is in charge of 
nuclear weapons security and head of the 12th Main Directorate of the 
Defence Ministry, “the information we have obtained indicates that 
international terrorists have been looking for opportunities to get 
unauthorised access to [Russian] nuclear facilities and to provoke acts of 
terrorism and sabotage using nuclear devices”. 
Nuclear terrorism is considered as a major threat to Russia’s national 
security. It could take a number of forms: unauthorised access to nuclear 
devices (weapons); sabotage of nuclear installations, primarily, nuclear 
power plants; unauthorised access to weapons-grade fissile materials; or the 
use or threat to use radioactive sources. In each case, the consequences 
(casualties among the population and psychological effects) would be 
disastrous. Russian government experts have implemented a detailed analysis 
of possibilities and consequences of acts of ‘mega-terrorism’ and came to the 
conclusion that nuclear terrorism, at least in one of its faces, is a real and 
present danger. 
In our assessment, the most threatening trend is cooperation (or coordination) 
between various non-state actors, particularly between international terrorist 
organisations and organised crime communities, which is a new 
phenomenon. With a tremendous increase in their financial power in recent 
years, non-state actors have become more aggressive in their attempts to gain 
access to (or to develop by themselves) WMD including a ‘dirty bomb’ 
scenario. To achieve the most impressive psychological effect, mega-
terrorists would most likely try to combine ‘traditional’ terrorism with use of 
some WMD components (like chemical weapons) with a cyber terrorist act, 
aimed at paralysing computer networks of ordinary users or financial 
markets. The extent to which non-state actors enjoy support, directly or 
indirectly, from some ‘states of concern’ is not clear. There are indications 
that several links existed in the past and a possibility that such links have not 
disappeared. They should not be ignored, but further investigated. 
In 1995, after the NPT Extension Conference, a colleague made a juicy 
statement at a seminar that “the surgery went well, the patient is alive, but he 
is in the emergency room”. In 2003, the patient is again in the emergency 
room (if of course he has ever left it). It is unlikely that he will need further 
surgery. What he really needs is everyday treatment based on already 
prescribed medicines. 
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Introduction 
François Heisbourg 
he European Security Forum’s meeting about Turkey’s strategic 
future took place shortly after the end of combat operations in Iraq, 
against the backdrop of redefined US-Turkish relations. To set the 
stage, we had four papers: “Anchoring Turkey in Europe”, by Nathalie Tocci 
(Research Fellow at CEPS); “A US View”, by Henri J. Barkey (Head of the 
Dept. of International Relations, Lehigh University); “A Russian View” by 
Natalia Oultchenkov (Head of the Turkey Desk, Institute of Oriental Studies, 
Russian Academy of Sciences); and “Post-11 September Impact: The 
Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited”, by Hüseyin Bagci and Saban 
Kardas (both are Professors at the Middle East Technical University, 
Ankara). 
In her oral presentation, Ms Tocci recalled that it was ‘old Europe’ that had 
been the most sceptical towards Turkey’s membership in the EU. 
Conversely, the Turkish Parliament’s vote on 1 March 2003 (rejecting the 
agreement to provide transit rights to US ground forces through Turkey to 
Iraq) was widely seen in ‘old Europe’ as a decision whereby Turkey asserted 
its democratic credentials. In this new context, Turkey’s continued support 
for internal reform and resolution of the Cyprus issue could be central to its 
accession prospects to the EU (facilitated by the fact that the US is no longer 
pressing Turkey’s case). Furthermore, the EU could probably pick up in 
economic terms where US support is now diminishing.  
When presenting his paper, Professor Barkey underscored that the events of 
March 2003 had exploded the myth of Turkey’s strategic importance to the 
US, although America would continue to value strategic stability in Turkey, 
given the US fear of radical change there. He underlined the deep impact of 
the March events on the military-to-military relationship between the two 
countries, which could reduce the military component in overall US-Turkish 
relations and, as a consequence, weaken the military role of Turkey itself. 
Like Ms Tocci, he highlighted the importance of Cyprus in shaping Turkey’s 
future relationship with the EU. 
Ms Oultchenko reminded participants that Turkey’s European orientation is 
not a predetermined result of its foreign policy. Further, she pointed out that 
democratisation could have the consequence of eliminating the traditional 
processes that Turkey has used to prevent radical Islam from moving into 
policy. As a result, there is a real possibility of “turning an old and well-
known ally into a new antagonist”. She noted, however, that the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) had been pragmatic rather than 
T 
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populist in its handling of the US troop transit issue, as it had genuinely tried 
to obtain parliamentary approval for the agreement to support US troops. 
Professor Bagci drew three lessons from the Iraqi crisis: 
• Turkey is a functioning democracy; 
• the client-patron relationship between Turkey and the US has 
disappeared; and 
• the military no longer controls politics. 
Turkey is moving towards Europe and the US will have to accept it. A new 
optimism has emerged in Turkey about joining the EU, fuelled by 
Commissioner for EU Enlargement Günter Verheugen’s recent remarks 
about dates for accession (2011–12). Turkey’s strategic importance should 
continue to be considerable, particularly as issues relating to Syria and Iran 
come to a head. 
In the initial round of discussions, several points were made: 
• Turkey’s chances of joining the EU have been substantially enhanced as 
indicated by one European participant, because we now have proof that 
Turkey is a living democracy. This point drew a response from an 
American participant that the decision taken by parliament on 1 March 
2003 was not democratic simply by virtue of having been directed 
against the US, but because it allowed for Turkey’s disengagement from 
the military: “The real losers are not Turkey or the US, but the Turkish 
military”. On this issue, a Turkish participant noted that the army’s 
distancing from the US had begun before the crisis in Iraq, with their 
refusal to seek US funding for Turkey’s involvement in the Kabul 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The same participant 
noted that continued army resistance to reform in Turkey had been 
largely driven by the suspicion that the EU isn’t really going to let 
Turkey in, ever. Hence, statements such as those made recently by Mr 
Verheugen as well as those made by the President of the European 
Commission, Romano Prodi, were most helpful. 
• The ability of the EU to replace anything as large as the US economic 
contribution (the ‘strategic rent’) to Turkey was seriously questioned. 
Historically, EU transfers to an accession state did not readily exceed 1% 
of GDP. Yet the same European participant also suggested that it is 
healthier for Turkey not to receive the sort of massive windfall proposed 
in the rejected US/Turkish agreement, which distorts macroeconomic 
policy. Turkey would be better off exercising a virtuous fiscal policy. At 
this point, a Turkish participant added that assets are not the issue – $60 
billion of Turkey’s assets are based abroad; Turkey needs good 
government more than new money. Nevertheless, another participant 
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mentioned Turkey’s massive foreign debt, just in case anyone got carried 
away with an over-optimistic a view of its economic prospects. 
• Subsequent to Professor Bagci’s expression of scepticism as to the 
desirability of Turkey serving as a role model for others, another Turkish 
participant agreed that this was probably appropriate vis-à-vis the Arab 
world. Things could be different, however, in Central Asia and even 
more so in the case of Europe, where as a member of the EU, Turkey 
would have great integrative virtues, leading to a more diverse, ‘non-
Christian’ EU. 
• The Cyprus issue drew some debate, with a Turkish participant 
suggesting that this should be seen as a process and not as a window of 
opportunity that would slam shut in May 2004. This idea drew the retort 
from a European that the EU would lose all leverage vis-à-vis Cyprus 
once it was a full member in late 2004; therefore, Northern Cyprus 
would do well to work hard on the UN Annan plan. 
• US policy in Turkey drew questions and discussion. Whereas Turkey 
used to know what the US policy was during the years of former 
President Bill Clinton (the ‘bear hug’ policy of working with Turkey on 
all aspects plus constant pressure on the EU for Turkey’s membership), 
it is less clear today, all the more so since some of the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI) ‘neo-cons’ don’t really want Turkey in the EU. 
This discourse drew the remark that the administration under President 
George W. Bush is divided into two camps, but not along the lines of the 
‘neo-cons’ versus ‘the others’: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz tends to believe in democracy in Turkey and in Turkey’s 
membership in the EU, whereas this view has little traction in the White 
House (and even less with Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense 
Policy Board). 
In the final round of discussions, one participant suggested that the general 
flow of the meeting had been too optimistic, given that relations over 
Northern Cyprus remain tricky and tensions in Northern Iraq could become 
ugly, not to mention the risks for Turkey attendant to a crisis involving 
weapons of mass destruction in Iran! Another participant wondered about 
Turkey’s role in a ‘brave new Middle East order’ subsequent to the Iraq war 
and what would be the implications of a ‘clean-up’ in the Caucasus, where a 
‘post-Aliev’ Azerbaijan goes to war to liberate Nagorno-Karabakh? 
On the subject of post-war Northern Iraq, the panellists tended to concur that 
the risks were still there: provocations can occur and Turkey continues to see 
‘autonomy’ as a bad word, given the Ottoman-era experience of autonomy as 
a first step to independence. But none discounted the possibility of evolution, 
nor the idea that ‘surprises can happen’. 
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Regarding Azerbaijan, no objection was raised when one of the panellists 
indicated that the Azeris wouldn’t start a new war. As far as Iran is 
concerned, problems could no doubt arise for Turkey, but for the moment, 
Iran is not hostile towards Turkey joining the EU. 
Northern Cyprus truly remains a problem: all has not been well since the 
army and the ‘deep state’ used their veto to block the UN Annan plan. 
Further, the deep state views the government of Prime Minister Recep 
Erdogan as an abomination. Notwithstanding these sobering notes, the 
overall feel of the meeting was neatly captured by one of the individuals who 
contributed a paper: “Anything can happen, but so far, so good!”. 
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Turkey’s Strategic Future: 
Anchoring Turkey to Europe 
The Foreign Policy Challenges ahead 
Nathalie Tocci 
ince the foundation of the Kemalist Republic, Turkey has sought to 
associate itself with the West, i.e. with Europe and the US. Although 
the end of the cold war strengthened Turkey’s ties with the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, the dominant position in Ankara never advocated a 
turnaround in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. On the contrary, Turkey 
presented its strategic importance to the West precisely in view of its 
bridging role to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.  
Turkey’s European orientation has remained a cornerstone of its foreign 
policy. Since 1987, this has taken the form of aspiring to become a full 
member of the EC/EU. After December 1999, its prospects of full 
membership were accepted by the European Council, although these remain 
in the distant and uncertain future. Scratching beneath the surface, however, 
there is not yet a consensus either in Turkey or in the EU concerning the 
desirability of a fully European Turkey and the necessary transformation that 
this would entail. As such, while Turkey’s European orientation is likely to 
persist, its depth and the ensuing levels of integration in the EU remain 
unclear. Developments in Turkey, in Europe and the wider international 
system will determine the evolution of EU-Turkish relations. At this 
particular juncture, developments in Cyprus and Iraq are critically affecting 
the relationship.  
As noted by several Turkish analysts, ‘there are many Ankaras’. The 
multifaceted nature of the Turkish foreign policy establishment became 
particularly evident in the aftermath of the December 1999 Helsinki 
European Council. Turkey’s candidacy meant that it was no longer sufficient 
to pay lip service to the goal of membership. If Ankara was serious in its 
aspirations to join the European Union, it had to demonstrate that it was 
equally committed to the Copenhagen criteria. As European demands for 
reform rose, the concerns and resistance against change in Ankara emerged 
more clearly.  
Effective opposition to EU membership, or rather to the reform necessary to 
attain it, existed in most groups within the Turkish political system. Those 
resisting change included circles in the nationalist right and in the nationalist 
left, as well as in both the civilian and the military establishments. Some 
right-wing nationalists preferred to establish closer links to Turkic Eurasia 
S 
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than to see Turkey’s full integration with Western Europe. Traditional 
Kemalists objected to the erosion of sovereignty within the EU. Others 
opposed the comprehensive internal reforms demanded by Brussels and were 
more inclined to pursue Turkey’s Western orientation through closer ties 
with the US.  
Often spurred by the US, conservative elements within the Turkish 
establishment argued that Turkey should be admitted to the Union on laxer 
conditions, given its strategic importance. For example, the Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli argued that “we need to have a 
just and honourable relationship with the EU. We strongly oppose the 
notions that we should fulfil every demand of the EU to become a member or 
that we have to enter the EU at any cost.”1 Turkish national pride was used as 
a major weapon, as Turkish Eurosceptics accused pro-Europeans of 
displaying a “lack of confidence in the nation, the Republic, the 
institutions…everything called Turkish”.2 Turkey’s alternatives to Europe 
were also cited. On 6 March 2002, National Security Council (MGK) 
Secretary General, General Tuncer Kilinç stated that given EU demands, 
Turkey should start looking for alternative allies such as Russia and Iran. 
The landslide victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at the 
November elections tilted the balance within the party political system in 
favour of the pro-European reformists. In AKP’s rhetoric, commitment to EU 
membership, as well as the reform path necessary to attain it, is crucial. The 
AKP refuses to define itself as a religious party but rather calls for greater 
religious freedoms. In order to carry a consistent political message, it 
advocates personal freedoms in other spheres as well, including cultural and 
linguistic freedoms. Its support for EU membership is not only viewed as an 
end to be attained through painful reforms, in the AKP’s rhetoric, the EU 
anchor is portrayed also a means to attain the objectives of reform, which are 
as important as membership itself. But while the balance within the party 
political spectrum tilted in favour of the reformists (the only opposition 
party, Deniz Baykal’s Republican Peoples’ Party ‘CHP’ also declares its 
strong support of reforms and EU membership), this is not necessarily the 
case within the wider establishment, which includes the civilian 
administration, the presidency, the intelligence community and the influential 
military.  
Pro-European reformers in Turkey have been weakened internally by the 
lack of credibility of EU policies towards Turkey. EU actors, particularly 
those who are of a conservative/Christian-Democratic leaning, have 
                                                          
1 Devlet Bahceli is quoted in “Bahceli Toughens on EU and Its Domestic 
Supporters”, Turkish Daily News, 3 April 2002. 
2 See Gunduz Aktan, “New Consensus”, Turkish Daily News, 3 April 2002. 
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frequently indicated their reluctance to accept Turkey as a full member, 
irrespective of its compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Religion, 
geography, demography, economic development as well as the legitimate 
concerns over democracy and human rights have been cited as the impeding 
factors to Turkey’s EU membership. One of the most recent expressions of 
European exclusionism were the comments by Convention Chairman Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing just prior to the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, 
when he stated that Turkey has a “different culture, a different approach, a 
different way of life…Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population live 
outside Europe, it is not a European country…In my opinion it would be the 
end of the EU.”3  
In several instances in the recent history of EU-Turkish relations, ‘anti-
Turks’ in Europe and ‘anti-Europeans’ in Turkey reinforced each other in a 
vicious circle of antagonism and lack of reform in Turkey, together with 
European distancing from Turkey. On the one hand, the more sceptical the 
member states were about Turkey’s future in Europe (and thus the less 
forthcoming were EU policies towards Turkey), the more credible the 
Turkish nationalists and conservatives appeared (who claimed that Turkey 
would never be admitted to the EU and thus it should be cautious in pursuing 
domestic reforms and foreign policy changes). In other words, as Turkey’s 
mistrust of Europe grew, its own process of Europeanisation slowed. On the 
other hand, as and when hardliners in Ankara gained prominence in the 
determination of domestic and foreign policy, EU actors became less 
forthcoming in their decisions concerning Turkey.  
Until December 2002, an important example of Turkish mistrust of European 
countries was the dispute over Turkey’s participation in European security 
and defence policy (ESDP). Turkey’s veto threat over the ESDP’s use of 
NATO assets and capabilities was not simply driven by what the civilian-
military establishment deemed as broken European promises. These simply 
served to create the legal context through which Turkey articulated its 
claims. What lay behind these claims was Turkey’s fundamental mistrust of 
the EU and its strong preference for NATO, in which it is a full member. 
Turkey did not trust an independent European involvement in crisis areas, 
many of which are likely to be around Turkey. Turkey feared a European 
defence involvement in Cyprus in particular. Indeed, the final decision taken 
in December 2002 in Copenhagen excluded Cyprus (and Malta) as possible 
locations of ESDP operations, as these countries were not participating in 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace. 
                                                          
3 “Giscard Remarks Cause Uproar in Ankara, Brussels”, Turkish Daily News, 11 
November 2002. 
90 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
On other occasions the vicious circle was broken, opening the way to 
virtuous interactions. The event of 3 August 2002, in which the Turkish 
parliament (despite acute domestic political turmoil) succeeded in passing 
fundamental constitutional reforms, added credibility to Turkey’s requests 
for a date to launch accession negotiations. Without these reforms, the 
European Council’s decisions in Copenhagen in December 2002 would have 
been far less forthcoming.  
In recent months, EU-Turkish relations have been critically affected by both 
the Iraqi crisis and the Cyprus impasse. In March 2003, the Turkish 
parliament rejected the government’s proposed motion to allow 62,000 
American troops to be deployed in Turkey for a second-front attack against 
Iraq. After weeks of uncertainty, the American troops were re-routed to 
Kuwait. The rejection led to a temporary setback in US-Turkish relations, as 
well as new tensions on the EU-Turkey agenda. Many criticised the 
government for its inexperience in handling the situation. The government’s 
indecisiveness and its failure to invest sufficient effort to ensure an approval 
of the motion could have caused severe political and economic losses.  
By rejecting the motion, Turkey lost the $6 billion war compensation grant 
and the $24 billion package of cheap long-term loans offered by the US, 
negotiated by Turkish policy-makers who had recalled the considerable 
economic costs of the 1991 Gulf war. The incident plunged US-Turkish 
relations to their lowest ebb since the 1974 arms embargo on Turkey. In the 
aftermath of the rejection of the motion, tensions rose as the US 
administration strongly warned the Turkish establishment not to intervene in 
Northern Iraq independently of American command. EU member states also 
cautioned Turkey not to intervene in Northern Iraq. Several analysts warned 
that the setback in US-Turkish relations within a wider context of an 
expanding transatlantic rift could harm Turkey’s EU bid, by the reduction of 
American support for Turkey’s accession process.  
Ensuing events, however, gave rise to greater optimism. In the context of the 
Iraqi crisis, the Turkish government strengthened its relations with the Arab 
world and Iran, without straining its relations with Israel or hinting at a 
reversal in its Western orientation. Indeed, the AKP government had 
mishandled the passing of the motion. But the new and inexperienced 
government did so under extremely complex circumstances, owing to the 
widespread public opposition to the war, the ambivalence of the military and 
the uncertainty concerning whether a second UNSC resolution mandating 
war would have been passed. Since the start of the war, Turkey has to date 
refrained from sending additional troops to Northern Iraq, which could 
trigger clashes with Iraqi Kurdish forces. Turkey’s conduct from the 
beginning of the war has allowed an improvement in its relations with the 
US. More importantly it added a positive impetus to EU-Turkish relations, as 
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evidenced by the recent visit of French Foreign Minister Dominique de 
Villepin to Ankara. Despite mistakes, the independent and democratic 
decision taken by the Turkish government concerning the war, while at the 
same time showing restraint in Northern Iraq, sent positive signals to 
Western European countries, especially those that have been historically 
sceptical of Turkey’s EU membership and were also opposed to the war in 
Iraq.  
Yet perhaps an even more fundamental challenge in EU-Turkish relations 
concerns Cyprus, particularly in view of the forthcoming accession of the 
island. Because of the obstacles posed in Turkey’s European path by the 
accession of a divided island, there has been an essential overlap between the 
hardliners on the Cyprus conflict and the most nationalist and Eurosceptic 
forces in Turkey. To the most conservative forces within the Turkish 
establishment, the EU accession process is viewed as a threat to Turkey’s 
policy on Cyprus. Furthermore, an intransigent position on Cyprus added 
another obstacle in Turkey’s EU path and thus dampened the momentum in 
favour of what some viewed as threatening domestic reforms.  
At the same time, the lack of a credible EU policy towards Turkey 
strengthened the arguments of nationalist and Eurosceptic forces in Ankara 
and Lefkoşa, which argued against an early settlement within the EU. 
Moderates and reformists in Turkey accepted that because of Turkey’s own 
shortcomings, EU membership would occur for Cyprus prior to Turkey. 
Nevertheless they could not accept that owing to allegedly unchangeable 
features of the Turkish state and society, Cyprus should mark the borders of 
the united Europe, keeping Cyprus and Turkey on opposite sides of the 
European divide. As long as Turkey’s fundamental scepticism of European 
intentions persisted, a settlement in Cyprus would be viewed by Ankara as 
‘losing Cyprus’ rather than sealing a win-win agreement.  
In anticipation of the Copenhagen Council meeting, the new AKP 
government displayed a fundamental shift from earlier administrations 
concerning Cyprus. It declared openly that it did not regard a continuation of 
the status quo as a solution and it appeared willing to recognise the link 
between EU-Turkish relations and a Cyprus settlement. On the eve of the 
Copenhagen meeting, the government effectively argued that if the European 
Council gave Turkey an early and firm date to begin accession negotiations, 
the government would support a Cyprus settlement on the basis of the 
comprehensive UN Annan plan.  
Judging by events, the Copenhagen offer was insufficient to induce Turkey 
and the Turkish Cypriots to sign an agreement on 13 December 2002 or 
thereafter. This ultimate failure was caused not only by the miscalculated 
Turkish bargaining tactics, but was fundamentally linked to Turkey’s 
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mistrust of Europe. Whether a deal would have been reached if Turkey had 
received an earlier and firmer ‘date’ or if the EU-15 had formulated a more 
resolute and coherent policy towards Turkey before the European Council 
will remain unknown. But what was clear was that the Turkish government 
considered these conditions as the minimum assurance to hedge against a 
prevailing mistrust of the EU. Pressure alone would be insufficient to clinch 
an agreement.  
After the Copenhagen Council meeting, trends continued to oscillate as the 
by-products of an ongoing battle between elements pushing for and pushing 
against a settlement. Different positions and logics were continuously aired. 
Those sceptical of Turkey’s future in Europe persisted in their effective 
opposition to Cyprus’s EU membership, and consequently, in their 
opposition to the UN Annan plan. Those in favour of Turkey’s EU 
membership, but unsatisfied with the Copenhagen decision, proposed a 
postponement of a settlement until Turkey’s EU prospects became more 
clear. Other pro-Europeans pushed instead for an early settlement based on 
the UN Annan plan, as they appreciated the difficulty of reaching an 
agreement following Cyprus’s EU membership and understood that in future 
the international burden would be placed predominantly on Turkey’s 
shoulders. The most evident manifestation of this flux of ideas was the 
effective rift between the AKP government and the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership.  
With the failure of The Hague negotiations, for which the Turkish Cypriots 
were primarily blamed, the conservatives in Turkey and Northern Cyprus 
appeared to win the day. Although The Hague meeting temporarily sealed 
the fate of the UN Annan plan, it did not entail the end of the debate in 
Turkey. The Cyprus challenge remains on the table and will have to be 
tackled if Turkey is to progress along its path to the European Union. There 
are strong reasons for Turkey to pursue a settlement prior to the effective 
accession of Cyprus in May 2004. The scope to do so exists, as evidenced by 
the recent opening of the border point and the huge flux of people crossing 
the frontier. Politically, the opportunity for change could emerge with the 
December 2003 parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus. The extent to 
which this opportunity will be seized will depend on the extent to which, by 
the end of the year, the Turkish establishment will have reached a consensus 
concerning an early settlement on the island – a consensus that had not been 
achieved in March 2003.  
The battle to reach this consensus goes far deeper than Cyprus and deals with 
the very nature of the Turkish nation-state and its strategic future. In the 
coming months and years, decisions taken in both Brussels and Ankara are 
set to determine the extent to which Turkey’s historic European orientation 
will translate into slow but steady progress towards full EU membership. 
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Turkey’s Strategic Future: 
An American View 
Henri J. Barkey 
his paper looks at the change effected by the Iraq war upon 
Washington’s perceptions of Turkey’s strategic future. The first 
section analyses the pre-war stake held by Washington in Ankara. The 
failure to open up a second front in the north against Saddam Hussein’s 
regime has surprised, if not shocked, US decision-makers. As a result, US-
Turkish relations are likely to experience a period of change and re-
evaluation. This paper shows that this is more likely to occur through the 
change in the Iraqi regime than through a parliamentary vote. In recent years, 
Turkey was a pivotal state in Washington’s containment strategy of Iraq. The 
US air operations over Northern Iraq that protected the Kurds and 
constrained the Baghdad regime also created an uncomfortable dependence 
on Ankara. The change will enable the US to approach Turkey with a more 
realistic, and in the long term, tension-free manner. 
A pre-war view: Washington’s stake in Turkey1 
US interests and objectives in Turkey have steadily expanded since the end 
of the cold war. The cold war’s straightjacket has given way to many new 
considerations. The primary US foreign policy vision after the cold war was 
based on preventing regional disputes from threatening its own and its allies’ 
interests and on expanding market reforms, democratic principles and 
practices. Without a serious Russian threat to European security, US 
attention shifted to mid-level powers that have had ambitions to acquire non-
conventional weaponry and the means to deliver it, such as Iran and Iraq. 
This policy vision lacked the simplicity of containment, but it would impact 
Turkey significantly. Turkey’s proximity to many of the regions in flux or 
conflict, together with Ankara’s long-standing adherence to the NATO 
alliance, helped Washington to re-interpret this country’s geo-strategic 
importance. The war in Iraq, however, is likely to alter these calculations 
further. 
Simply put, on the eve of the Iraq war, Turkey’s strategic importance for the 
US could be summarised along the following four dimensions.  
                                                          
1 This section draws on Henri J. Barkey (2003), “The Endless Pursuit: Improving 
US-Turkish Relations”, in Morton Abramowitz (ed.), The United States and 
Turkey: Allies in Need, New York: Century Foundation. 
T 
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• First of all, it served as a potential platform for the projection of US 
power. Saddam Hussein’s resilience in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf 
war had made Ankara essential to sustain the UN sanctions regime and 
more importantly, Washington’s containment policy. From the Incirlik 
base in Turkey, American and British airplanes (as part of Operation 
Northern Watch) routinely patrolled the no-fly zone over Northern Iraq 
in an effort to keep Saddam Hussein’s forces away from Kurdish-
controlled parts of Iraq. It is difficult to see how the US could have 
sustained its policy of sanctions, regime isolation and the protection of 
the Kurdish population without Turkey’s cooperation.  
• Second, Turkey was a bulwark standing in the way of revisionist regimes 
such as Iran’s, intent on changing the regional landscape. Turkey’s 
strong links to the US, NATO and the West were in direct opposition to 
some of the Iranian regime’s regional preferences (if not designs). 
Hence, even in the event of cordial relations with Ankara, no Iranian 
government can ignore Turkey’s reaction in its regional calculations. 
The improving relations between Turkey and Israel throughout the 1990s 
has changed the strategic setting in the Middle East – although much 
exaggerated by Arab countries – and served to change the perception of 
Ankara in Washington as a more balanced regional player.  
• Third, what also made Turkey different and valuable is that it is a NATO 
ally, which takes security seriously; its need for military modernisation 
notwithstanding, Ankara has a large number of troops under arms that 
are deployable and is committed to maintaining its spending on defence. 
Even if the economic crisis has put a dent in its modernisation plans, 
Ankara intends to continue along this path as the April 2003 decision on 
purchasing AWACS aircraft demonstrates. 
• Finally, Washington’s perception of Turkey represented an alternative 
and successful path for many countries in the Middle East and Central 
Asia. It is a model to be emulated as NATO’s only Muslim member and 
candidate EU member. In addition to its historical ties to the West, 
Turkey has a vibrant, albeit flawed, democratic political system and in 
the 1980s embraced economic liberalisation – well ahead of Latin 
America; save for Israel, it is the only one to do so in the Middle East.  
Ankara’s actual contribution to Washington’s challenges went well beyond 
the Middle East. Turks collaborated with the allies in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Turkey steadfastly improved relations with Bulgaria and Romania, 
took the lead in organising Black Sea regional institutions and thus proved to 
be a source of stability in the Balkans. Successive US administrations in the 
early 1990s encouraged Turkey’s efforts to reach out to the Turkic Central 
Asian countries and the Caucasus, to provide them with technical and 
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economic know-how (not to mention political leadership), all designed to 
counter the growing Iranian and Russian influence in the region. At 
Washington’s request, Turkish forces also took part in the ill-fated Somalia 
operation. Similarly, in April 2002, Washington prevailed upon Ankara to 
take over the leadership of the Afghan peacekeeping force in Kabul, the 
ISAF. 
It was Prime Minister and later President Turgut Özal who, after a decade of 
turbulence, solidified Turkey’s image in Washington. He made himself a 
valued interlocutor during the Iran-Iraq war, and decisively manoeuvred his 
country in support of US and allied action against Iraq in 1990. Although 
often drawing attention to his Muslim identity and Turkey’s unique role in 
NATO, Özal nevertheless succeeded in convincing Washington of his deep 
commitment to the West and its values. Despite his traditional upbringing 
and religious roots, Özal was by far the most pro-American leader Turkey 
has ever had. He shared none of the suspicions of the US held by his left- and 
right-wing contemporaries. Having engineered the most far-reaching 
restructuring of the Turkish economy, he strongly believed in Turkey’s 
ability to become an economic powerhouse of its own, allied with the US. 
With Mr Özal, Washington could envisage in Turkey a more democratic, 
stable and prosperous ally and, as a result, a better commercial partner. 
Turkey’s growing strategic value made its internal stability an even more 
important concern for US policy-makers. Instability in Turkey can 
potentially lead to the ascendancy of anti-Western forces, be they Islamic or 
nationalist in orientation, which could then lead to the denial of access to 
critical military facilities and change the whole environment in the Middle 
East. The emergence of the twin challenges to the regime in the last two 
decades of the 20th century in the form Kurdish and Islamic political activism 
has deeply undermined Turkey’s self-confidence. Not only has the state gone 
out of its way to prosecute citizens for the most minor infractions, the civil 
war against the insurgency led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and 
the rise of the Islamic movement have resulted in greater military 
interference in Turkish domestic political matters. The combination of 
domestic instability and the military’s resurgence has worried Washington 
decision-makers, in part because the tactics used by the state could end up 
making matters worse. In addition, the mismanagement of the Turkish 
economy by successive governments has resulted in the worst economic 
crisis of the post-World War II period, provoking a US-initiated $31.5 billion 
IMF rescue package.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that Turkey’s EU aspirations have 
corresponded well with what the US wanted to see develop in Turkey. What 
the EU process provided Turkey was a path to greater affluence and most 
importantly, to greater democratisation. In part, it was because of Turkey’s 
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inability to implement reforms on its own that made the European Union 
accession process such an attractive option. Indeed, Washington has 
genuinely seen Turkey as an integral part of the European security 
architecture and the European continent. In addition, EU candidacy also 
offered the prospect of resolving some of the thorniest problems, such as the 
Cyprian and the Aegean ones. Hence, the EU membership process, even if it 
is to be realised a decade or more down the road, is more than just a device to 
improve domestic political conditions. In reality, as far as Washington could 
see, Turkey as a member of the EU would be fully integrated into the West 
as a democratic and prosperous country, very much emulating Greece’s path. 
After Iraq: The future of US-Turkish relations 
On 1 March 2003, the Turkish Parliament narrowly defeated a government 
motion that would have allowed up to 62,000 American soldiers to be based 
on Turkish soil for combat operations against Iraq. The loss of the northern 
front shocked Washington. No one in Washington had expected that Turkey 
would refuse the US request, because it was understood that Turkey would 
not leave its primary ally in the cold. This expectation was driven home even 
more by recent US assistance to Ankara at critical junctures, ranging from 
help against the PKK insurgency and the capture of its leader in Kenya 
(effectively putting an end to it), to the 2001 IMF rescue package. The new 
pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government of Turkey 
mishandled the parliamentary vote. It had reluctantly concluded that its 
commitments to the US would take precedence over the overwhelming 
public opposition.  
In reality, the negotiations over basing the troops in Turkey lasted much too 
long, which in turn allowed for opposition to build up. While the focus 
appeared to be on the economic compensation package that Turkey was 
going to be offered in exchange for its cooperation, what most observers 
failed to notice was the difficult nature of the negotiations relating to 
Northern Iraq. The Turkish military was intent on not only entering Northern 
Iraq to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state there, but perhaps even 
preventing the evolution of a federal arrangement in Iraq that could allow the 
Kurds to win control of the oil-rich cities of Keokuk and Mogul. As part of 
this strategy, the Turkish General Staff wanted to make sure that Turcomans, 
a Turkic-speaking ethnic minority in Iraq, would be able to have their own 
regional government, preferably controlling these same cities.  
Hence, the entry of Turkish troops there potentially presented the US with a 
nightmare scenario, because Iraqi Kurdish groups had promised to confront 
them, militarily if necessary. Furthermore, Washington also understood that 
both the hard bargaining over Northern Iraq and the lukewarm public support 
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by the Turkish officer corps for the government’s parliamentary motion was 
essentially designed to weaken the AKP government both domestically and 
internationally, even at the expense of the immediate needs of the US.  
Ironically, the failure of the parliamentary vote meant that Ankara dealt itself 
out the Northern Iraq game. Its warnings that it would enter Northern Iraq 
irrespective of an arrangement with US troops fell largely on deaf ears; the 
US and many European Union members warned Ankara of dire 
consequences. Ankara, therefore, has few good options left in Northern Iraq. 
It has for the most part been reduced to the role of an interested observer. In 
some ways, as far as the US is concerned, this has been the silver lining in 
the failure of the second front. Had the war lasted longer and caused more 
casualties, the political picture would have been different. US Congressional 
unhappiness with Ankara would have manifested itself in many different 
forms. Should Ankara attempt to enter Northern Iraq once again to support 
the Turcomans, against the wishes of the Kurdish groups there, it is likely 
that US-Turkish relations would suffer terribly. 
Barring such an eventuality, US-Turkish relations will remain strong. Of the 
four dimensions outlined above, only the Iraqi one has been removed. Yet 
the other issues remain salient, though not with the same sense of 
significance. With the US shutting down its Operation Northern Watch, 
which had helped contain the regime in Baghdad, an important source of 
friction between the two countries will be eliminated. Moreover, 
Washington’s disappointment with Turkey is different this time. In previous 
disputes, the US always had the Turkish military to fall back upon, but in this 
instance, the Turkish high command failed the US. Given that the Iraq war 
was driven by the US Department of Defense (the bastion of pro-Turkey 
sentiment in Washington), this is likely to have an enduring effect.2 This will 
also have repercussions for the Incirlik air base, the mainstay of US forces in 
Turkey, which is now likely to be severely downgraded. Still, this does not 
mean that Turkey will not be important to Washington for the foreseeable 
future. Despite Washington’s disappointment with Ankara over the second 
front, the Bush administration signalled its desire to harmonise relations by 
disbursing $1 billion in aid and grants. The package was clearly aimed at 
making sure that Turkey does not fall off the economic recovery process. 
What it also means, however, is that the days of ample strategic rents are 
over. 
                                                          
2 According to one reporter with excellent contacts, in the negotiations leading to 
the war on Iraq, US Joint Chief of Staff General Myers was reported to have 
thrown his telephone in anger and frustration after a discussion with his 
counterparts in Ankara – see Yasemin Çongar, “Savasin Arka Cephesi”, Milliyet, 
31 March 2003. 
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One potential ramification of these developments is the civilianisation of the 
Turkish-American relationship. This result, however, depends very much on 
the performance of the new AKP government and does not mean that 
Turkey’s military significance within NATO will be diminished. The AKP 
administration came to power promising first to focus on improving Turkey’s 
chances with Europe, which in turn meant the furthering of the 
democratisation process, improving the economy and dealing with Cyprus. 
Such a development – especially when compared with the Islamic Welfare 
Party’s discourse after its first-place finish in 1995 – was welcome news to 
Washington. Should the AKP succeed in pushing forward on these fronts, 
then the Turkish-American relationship could improve significantly. For 
Washington, Turkey’s EU aspirations are important because they represent 
the shortest route to long-term stability, based on a working democracy and 
economic prosperity. So far, however, the AKP government has allowed 
itself to be checkmated (albeit temporarily) on Cyprus by the hard-liners in 
the country and has made little progress, if any, on the other issues. It has 
wasted its precious time on foreign and domestic policy. 
In short, with the disappearance of Saddam Hussein, Ankara lost an 
important part of its leverage in Washington. Nothing of the same import is 
out there to replace it; Central Asia, the Caucasus and Iran are important, but 
Turkey’s influence and abilities are not as vital as they were with Saddam’s 
Iraq. Of course, if the Iraqi experiment turns foul for the US and a pluralistic 
regime does not succeed in taking root in Baghdad, Turkey will once again 
loom large in the American imagination. For the time being, however, the re-
evaluation of Turkey’s contribution to the US will open new opportunities in 
the relationship. Perhaps what the US hopes from this new government is 
that it tries to emulate Turgut Özal’s approach. 
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Turkey’s Strategic Future: 
A Russian View 
Natalia Oultchenko 
n an article with a symptomatic title: “Turkish-Russian relations in the 
shadow of the relations of the two countries with the West”, a well-
known Turkish scholar, Gulten Kazgan, states that from the 18th century 
to the present, Turkish-Russian relations have been governed by the relations 
that each country has held with the leading Western nations. In other words, 
their mutual relations are derived from their relations with the West. In the 
same article, Kazgan described some scenarios for the possible development 
of Turkish-Russian relations in the first quarter of the 21st century. One of the 
scenarios is that if relations with its main Western allies (the US and the EU) 
are not effective and relations with Russia become more so, then Turkey may 
become more active in regional policy. Consequently, Turkey would develop 
closer political and economic ties with Russia, while its cooperation with the 
US in these areas would diminish.  
To understand the possible changes in Russian-Turkish relations in the post-
war period, this chapter first reviews the latest developments in US-Turkish 
relations. It argues that the reason for differences between the US and Turkey 
is not the alternative positions taken by their leaders on the Iraqi problem. 
The main issue is that close cooperation with the US is a question that 
generally divides Turkish society. An analysis of relations between Europe 
and Turkey follows, concluded by the impact that the ties between Turkey 
and the West have upon relations with Russia. 
The new Turkish government, formed by the pro-Islamic Party of Justice and 
Development, has shown a rather pragmatic character. That explains the 
government’s lack of hesitation in supporting the war operations in Iraq. 
Because the government is also responsible for the success of its economic 
policy, it may ultimately find that the price of Islamic solidarity is too high 
for the new cabinet. The problem is that the government inherited a weak 
economy, showing few and dim signs of recovery after the crisis in 2001. As 
the Turkish State Minister Ali Babacan has recognised, options for the 
government’s economic policy are highly limited by the huge state debt and 
its servicing. According to Minister Babacan, Turkey has to repay $82 billion 
in 2003, most of which will be re-borrowed internally and abroad. Thus, any 
extra financial assistance lightens this exhausting burden. 
Before the government’s request to send Turkish troops abroad and station 
foreign troops in Turkey, the US had agreed to grant $6 billion in aid to 
Turkey, along with $24 billion in credit. On the eve of the vote, Prime 
I 
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Minister Recep Erdogan said that “Those who are against the war today will 
speak another way after [a] three-day salary delay”. Nevertheless, the request 
was rejected by the parliament, which is mainly composed of a ruling party 
for whom justice is more of a party slogan than an area to develop. 
Meanwhile, there had been mass demonstrations in Ankara that reflected 
public opposition to the war. 
To understand the anti-war spirit in Turkish society, it is important to 
consider it alongside the desire for independence from the US and the West 
in general. This spirit greatly intensified during the more recent economic 
crises, when a large part of Turkish society blamed the crises on faulty IMF 
policy. As the public viewed the situation, the IMF was attempting to 
supplant Turkey’s national government. Parliament’s decision proved that 
Turkish society is divided in its thinking about cooperation with the West as 
a whole and with the US in particular. 
The government did not expect the rejection of its request. Afterwards, the 
government had to resort to putting economic pressure both on the 
parliament and on society to argue its case effectively. Mr Erdogan 
cautiously said that the government could not criticise the will of the 
parliament and that they respected the hesitation of the deputies and the 
people on this question. Yet he stressed that they should have considered the 
situation from all sides and that the country’s problems could not be solved 
by a simple vote of yes or no. “The choice made by the parliament is an 
alternative one”, Mr Erdogan explained. That was the government’s way of 
warning about an impending crisis. The inevitable fall of some 
macroeconomic indicators ensued. As the Russian newspaper Commersant 
noted, the Turkish parliament had effectively voted for a crisis. 
The next day, the government announced a package of new fiscal measures. 
The government intended to obtain additional funds by increasing taxes and 
rejecting some social programmes. The Turkish press commented that as the 
government had lost the American aid, it was going to take it from the 
pockets of the people. 
As for the position of the government towards the US, Mr Erdogan pointed 
out that the government wanted the US to understand the sensitivity of 
regional policy for Turkey and to reduce its political demands. At the same 
time, he reminded the US of the deep political roots of their bilateral 
relations, based on mutual respect. The US pointed out its disappointment at 
the outcome of the vote, but at the same time the US expressed appreciation 
for the government’s readiness to cooperate. On this basis, the two sides 
were ready to re-start their negotiations on Iraq. Just before the war started, 
the Turkish parliament passed a motion allowing American armed forces to 
use Turkish air space. Thus, it would appear that the economic pressure 
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exerted by the government, together with the diminishing political demands 
from the US, convinced the Turkish parliament to comply with the 
government’s request. 
Immediately afterwards, Turkey sought discussions with the US about 
economic aid. It was quite clear by then that the $6 billion aid package was 
out of the question. By the end of March, however, the US announced their 
intention to support Turkey with a grant of $1 billion. US Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz persuaded the Senate committee on appropriation 
(which viewed Turkey as having escaped cooperation) that, “indeed Turks 
were not cooperating as much as we had expected. It is also wrong, however, 
to say that they do not cooperate with us [at all]. Making use of Turkey’s air 
space is of great importance for us…When the war crisis is over it would be 
in our interest [for] Turkey [not to] face economic difficulties. We hope for 
more cooperation and we consider Turkey our valuable ally.” 
At the beginning of April, US Secretary of State Colin Powell paid a short 
visit to Ankara. In his meeting with the press, Mr Powell said that the US 
expected Turkey to support US military action in Northern Iraq. Mr Powell 
promised that after the visit, if the US obtained the support they hoped for, 
the Senate would vote through the aid package for Turkey.  
To calm the public debate after Mr Powell’s departure from Ankara, the 
Turkish Republic President Necdet Sezer made a statement, stressing the 
importance of Turkey’s strategic partnership with the US. He emphasised 
that nothing was going to change in this important relationship between the 
two countries. Nevertheless, he pointed out that both the Gulf war in 1991 
and the new crisis in Iraq had had a negative impact on Turkey, resulting in 
economic losses. He went on to say that Turkey understood the demands of 
the US given the circumstances; Turkey was already supporting its ally and 
would continue to do so. Nevertheless, he said that Turkey also hoped for a 
similar understanding of its needs. One could, however, gather more insight 
into Turkey’s needs in Sezer’s discussion about how important Iraq’s future 
is to Turkey and Turkey’s readiness to take part in its determination. Thus, 
Turkey was ready to aid the US in Northern Iraq, but on condition of 
receiving the $1 billion aid package and guarantees on the Kurdish issue as 
well.  
The US recognised Turkey’s worries over Northern Iraq from the beginning 
of the military campaign in the region. Northern Iraq had become de facto 
independent 12 years ago and it was possible that it would try to use the war 
as an opportunity to declare its independence officially. For these reasons, 
the US remained quiet when Turkish troops went to Northern Iraq, despite 
the fact there had not been any prior US agreement with the Turkish 
government regarding this action. Some days later, the Chief of Turkish Staff 
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General Hilmi Ozkek commented on the situation, saying that the territorial 
integrity of Iraq and the Iraqi ownership of its oil sources were the main 
foreign policy principles guiding Turkey. General Ozkek rejected any links 
between the presence of the Turkish troops in Iraq and Turkey’s possible 
attempts to revise the Mosul question. At the same time, he stressed the fact 
that Turkey was hardly ready to accept any other territorial changes.  
At the beginning of April, the US Congress voted through an aid package of 
$1 billion for Turkey. The Turkish newspaper Milliyet paid special attention 
to the speech by one member of the group that had supported Turkey – 
Congressman Robert Wexler – who said that as a democracy, Turkey was a 
model for Muslim world. He added that cooperation with Turkey is not a 
topic for debate but an essential condition for stability in post-war Iraq.  
Meanwhile, American officials claimed that they were working with Turkey 
to prevent any developments in Northern Iraq that would be worrying for 
Turkey. Thus, it would appear that the two sides had reached some 
compromise on Iraq after all. 
In summary, the important points are: 
• The Iraqi crisis proved once again that Turkish society is divided in its 
views about cooperating with the West, especially with regard to the US. 
In other words, Turkish society is bipolar in its desire for and ideals of 
westernisation.  
• The ex-President of the Turkish Republic Suleyman Demirel viewed the 
government’s request to station foreign troops in Turkey as provocative 
and commented that the US should not have made such unrealistic 
demands.  
• Compromise is vital for further development of US-Turkish relations. 
The prospects for relations will improve when these are based on 
strategic partnership and mutual interests, rather than a perception of 
Turkey as just a tool to serve American interests.  
• When the US is ready to accept such a foundation for relations with 
Turkey, it will gain additional flexibility and stability in the complicated 
conditions of the Middle East.  
There is a rather influential lobby in the US that believes US-Turkish 
relations are strategically important to US interests in the region and is ready 
for compromise. Nevertheless, until this view is more widely shared, there 
are not many reasons to continue discussions on the crisis in bilateral 
relations.  
Another important dimension in Turkish foreign policy is its relationship 
with the EU. Turkey is still far from reaching the EU’s criteria for 
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membership in economic or political terms. On several occasions, the 
government has declared its intention to decrease inflation to a single figure 
in three years. For this purpose, it actively uses its IMF credits. Nonetheless, 
after another economic failure, the country has been burdened with a high 
level of inflation and is even more heavily in debt.  
Numerous unsolved political questions remain. It was hardly a coincidence 
that the European Commission renewed the so-called ‘Partnership 
Agreement’, outlining the membership requirements for Turkey – including 
the rights for national minorities – just after Turkish troops were stationed in 
Northern Iraq. Bearing in mind that Turkish society is already divided in its 
attitudes towards the West, the EU should consider taking greater account of 
Turkey’s situation. Postponement of Turkey’s membership in the EU allows 
those parts of Turkish society that do not support Europeanisation to exert 
more influence.  
Although it is not possible to prevent international integration, it is possible 
to regulate it. The EU membership process offers effective influence for the 
economic and political development of Turkish society. To maintain such 
influence, it is necessary to make Turkey’s progress towards membership 
more evident to Turkish society. The most recent elections showed that a 
large part of the Turkish population have begun to think that inefficient 
policy was the result of the absence of Islam (or traditional values). Even if 
the newly elected pro-Islamic party fails, this section of society may attribute 
the failure to the overall lack of Islam in public policy. As the 
democratisation process advances under EU pressure, Turkey is losing the 
traditional mechanisms that have prevented radical Islam from seeping into 
policy. Attempts to improve Turkey from a Western point of view and 
criteria – without enough support for its transformation – could have the 
unexpected result of turning of an old and well-known ally into a new 
antagonist.  
There is an understanding of this inter-relationship within the EU. Professor 
J. Luchiani of the European Institute (Florence) noted that Turkey’s 
orientation towards Europe is not a predetermined effect of Turkish foreign 
policy; it is just a strong (if unsteady) tendency that needs constant support 
from both Turkey and the EU. This view suggests that Turkey’s prospects 
are promising. Nevertheless, the former US Ambassador to Turkey, Morton 
Abramowitz pointed out in his interview with Defense News magazine that, 
“It is not clear where Turkey is going to move now, if it [is] going to become 
a country like Iran or Syria or if it is going to stay in the Western bloc”. This 
is not, however, the moment of choice for Turkey alone. It is also the 
moment of choice for the US and the EU. The Turkish government has 
already responded clearly: Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs 
Minister Abdullah Gul said that a change of Turkish foreign policy is out of 
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question. It remains to be seen whether the majority of Turkish society will 
share the conviction of the government. The future also depends largely on 
Turkey’s Western allies to revise the outline of their mutual relations.  
As there are still no definite changes in the course of Turkish foreign policy, 
there are likewise no serious expectations of dealing with Russian-Turkish 
relations. Moreover, if there is any balancing activity in Russian foreign 
policy it is mostly a balancing between the Western policy centres. Like 
Turkey, Russia still considers regional policy as a second-rank vector. 
In the short term, Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy is beneficial for 
Russia. Turkey’s regional outlook has resulted in closer relations with 
Central Asia and some regions where the Turkic population prevails, more 
than with Russia as a whole. Despite the fact that bilateral relations these 
days are not classified as confrontational but as regulating competition, 
Russia’s apprehension of pan-Turkism is still alive. In addition, Russia is the 
main gas supplier for Turkey – with a minimum market share of 40%, it 
already has an efficient control lever. Rem Vyahirev, the former head of the 
Russian gas company Gasprom, was right when he said that whoever started 
first in Turkey would win. Now Russia’s two gas pipelines are preventing 
alternative gas projects from development and keeping the Turkish gas 
market under control. Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas offers some 
guarantees of Turkey’s political loyalty.  
In the long term, Russia and Turkey are both losing out because of their 
weak regional policies. Both countries are missing the opportunity to become 
the two leading countries within the new Eurasian centre of world policy. 
Moreover, the Western approach to problems in the region (over which it 
already exercises much influence) may not always match the interests of 
either country. But until the advantages of strategic, regional partnership are 
clearly recognised, neither of the two sides should expect any visible changes 
in Russian-Turkish relations.  
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Turkey’s Strategic Future 
Post-11 September Impact: 
The Strategic Importance of Turkey 
Revisited 
Hüseyin Bagci and Saban Kardas 
he aim of this paper is to analyse the debate surrounding Turkey and 
its increasing strategic importance in the wake of the 11 September 
2001 terror attacks on Washington and New York. Traditionally, 
Turkey has been considered important because of its geographic location 
between Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which gives it easy access to 
strategically significant regions and major energy resources. Further, thanks 
to its character as a modern Muslim country, culturally Turkey stands as a 
bridge between Western and Islamic civilisations. Turkey’s strategic value 
became more visible following the events of 11 September 2001, and 
consequently, Turkey has come under the spotlight. As a result, Turkey and 
Turkish foreign policy started to receive great interest and the mood in 
discussions about the country and its strategic worth was usually optimistic. 
The discourse was, however, mainly historic, temporal and isolated from 
reality, which led to a narrow focus. It was often lost in the debate that, seen 
in a wider perspective, there are a number of other factors that indicate the 
necessity of taking a more cautious and balanced approach. In this sense, the 
tone of this paper is rather critical. First, we briefly summarise the main 
arguments used to emphasise an enhanced strategic role for Turkey in the 
new era. Each argument is approached critically and the shortcomings of the 
argument are underlined. The paper concludes with an attempt to develop a 
more balanced interpretation of post-11 September developments upon 
Turkish foreign policy. 
Growing acceptance of Turkish theses on the fight against 
terrorism – ‘you-see-we-were-right!’ syndrome 
The first effect of the 11 September attacks that contributed to Turkey’s 
current position was the alleged growing acceptance of the Turkish approach 
to the fight against terrorism in international relations. Turkey itself had long 
struggled against separatist terror and political Islam in a domestic context. 
Since the 1970s, Turkey has been engaged in fighting against terrorism and 
continues to be one of the major targets of terrorist activities at home and 
abroad. Turkey’s first encounter with international terrorism was the political 
assassinations carried out by ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the 
T 
106 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
Liberation of Armenia) against Turkish diplomats abroad in the 1970s. 
During the last two decades, the Kurdish issue in particular and the terrorist 
activities of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) involved cross-border 
aspects and became an international concern.1 Therefore, one part of the 
Turkish strategy to deal with this problem was to seek international 
cooperation in fighting terrorism. In this regard, successive Turkish 
governments endeavoured to generate international concern about terrorism 
in general. They worked hard to convince European countries to limit the 
activities of various separatist, leftist and Islamic organisations. As part of its 
activities, Turkey even tried on some occasions to bring the terrorism issue 
onto NATO’s agenda.2 
Along with trying to raise the terror issue in several political and diplomatic 
fora, Turkey did not hesitate to resort to military instruments as well. To 
meet the rising challenge of separatist terror in the south-eastern Anatolian 
region, Turkey employed a stubborn and at times harsh policy based on 
heavy reliance on military measures. The policy sought to stop the terrorist 
activities carried out by the PKK, then root out the formation of terrorist 
groups and their support bases. In a similar vein, emphasis on the use or 
threat of force outside its borders as part of the fight against terrorism was a 
logical extension of this policy. Numerous instances of Turkish incursions 
into Northern Iraq are cases in point. The authority vacuum that emerged 
after the imposition of a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq enabled the PKK to use 
the region as a rear base to conduct terrorist attacks inside Turkish territory. 
Based on a somewhat complicated mix of the notions of ‘hot pursuit’ and 
self-defence, Turkish armed forces were dispatched into Northern Iraq to 
destroy PKK guerrillas, training camps and to prevent PKK from planning or 
executing subversive attacks on Turkish soil. Although some of those 
operations were limited in scope, some were large-scale, involving thousands 
of troops – at times the number of Turkish soldiers crossing the border 
reached 35,000 – backed by tanks, artillery and helicopters.  
                                                          
1 For more information on the PKK, see the extensive analysis provided in Nihat 
Ali Özcan (1999), PKK (Kürdistan Isci Partisi): Tarihi, Ideolojisi, ve Yöntemi 
(PKK: Its History, Ideology and Methodology) Ankara: ASAM Yayinlari; for 
the international dimension of the PKK’s emergence and operations, see Michael 
Radu (2001), “The Rise and Fall of the PKK”, Orbis, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter, pp. 
222–325 and Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow (1997), The Kurdish Question 
and Turkey, London: Frank Cass, pp. 47–63. 
2 It must be underlined, however, that to avoid making the PKK issue an 
international one and to keep the PKK from becoming an interlocutor, Turkey 
was cautious in these endeavours. Therefore, it focused on including terror as a 
whole into NATO statements. 
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In its relations with Syria (as far as its support for PKK terrorism is 
concerned), Turkey offers another example where it resorted to essentially 
military means. By mid-1998, the PKK had come to rely almost entirely on 
Syrian support. The PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan had been given 
sanctuary by the Syrian government and Syrian territory was a safe route for 
PKK militants in their journey between the PKK training camps in 
Lebanon’s Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley and the Turkish border. Indeed, 
during the Turkish-Syrian crisis of October 1998, Turkey used coercive 
diplomacy, backed by a credible threat of force, against the Syrian regime to 
end its support for the PKK and cease providing shelter to Ocalan. It is worth 
noting that, in the meantime, Turkey had already strengthened its military 
ties with Israel to exert pressure on Syria from the south. Turkey’s threat of 
force accompanied by military manoeuvres undertaken close to the Syrian 
border bore fruit. Faced with the overwhelming power of the Turkish 
military, the Syrian government complied with Turkish demands: it asked 
Ocalan and the PKK to leave the country, which constituted the first step in a 
chain of events leading to the capture of Ocalan in Kenya. Following their 
expulsion from Syria, PKK forces relocated to Northern Iraq. Yet a 
subsequent Turkish incursion into the region dealt a severe blow to their 
military capabilities causing the PKK’s military collapse.3 
As experience shows, Turkish activities to this end (be they diplomatic or 
military) were hardly welcomed by its neighbours or by its Western partners; 
as a result, Turkey could not raise the necessary international support in its 
own fight against terrorism. Indeed, these issues have constantly been a point 
of tension and disagreement in Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1990s 
and Turkey came under severe international criticism. Assertive Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East region added to the already troubled 
relations with its Arab neighbours. Similarly, Turkey’s relations with its 
Western partners deteriorated from time to time owing to the problems 
stemming from Turkey’s struggle with terrorism.  
Issues surrounding its battle against terrorism have been a major impediment 
to Turkey’s prospects for closer integration into the European Union. In 
particular, charges were often raised against the country at several 
international platforms that Turkey’s approach to tackling terrorism was a 
major source of human rights violations as well as a limitation of individual 
rights and liberties at home. Therefore, Turkey has always been under 
European pressure to undertake domestic reforms to ameliorate the situation. 
As far as foreign policy is concerned, with its principally military-oriented 
security strategy (in stark contrast to the ‘civilian’ European approach), 
                                                          
3 Svante E. Cornell (2001), ‘The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics”, Orbis, 
Vol. 45, No. 1, winter, pp. 31–46. 
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Turkey’s assertiveness in the region was seen as an indication that Turkey 
was ‘security consumer’ or an ‘insecurity provider’ to European security, and 
thus an actor to be treated with a certain reservation.4 
Against this background, it is obvious that Turkey was one of the main 
beneficiaries of the new atmosphere. At last, the threat of terrorist activities 
was formally recognised as an international concern and a consensus on the 
issue seemed to emerge. The challenge posed by terrorism to international 
security was considered so acute that it was enough justification for the 
North Atlantic Council to invoke NATO’s Article 5 for the first time. From 
the UN to the OSCE and down to regional organisations, the prevailing 
mood was captured; similar revolutionary decisions were adopted to express 
the willingness to respond to terrorism on an international level.  
It did not take long for Turkey to grasp this golden opportunity: the 
president, the prime minister, the foreign minister and other officials gave 
their full support to those international initiatives.5 This diplomatic move was 
more than an expression of international solidarity with the US and the 
victims of those startling attacks. In each speech, they emphasised that the 
events of 11 September proved the validity of Turkish arguments, reminding 
their audience that Turkey itself had suffered under terrorism. They went on 
to express their hope that Turkey’s European partners would also realise their 
past mistakes in criticising Turkey and eventually readjust their policies vis-
à-vis Turkey in the face of the new realities out there, which proved Turkey’s 
position had been correct. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer said the attacks 
should be a lesson for the European countries and called for a change in their 
attitude towards terrorism. After pointing out that terrorism was a crime 
against all humanity, he said, “That’s why we have always repeated in all 
international platforms that international cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism should be improved. The attacks on the US have shown how 
correct Turkey is in its stance against terrorism. I guess the attitudes of 
European countries have begun to change too.”6  
                                                          
4 This critical interpretation of Turkey’s place in European security architecture 
can be found in Dietrich Jung (2001), Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?, 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper No. 35, September, pp. 1–
21; for a counterview, see Melthem Müftüler-Bac (2000), “Turkey’s Role in the 
EU’s Security and Foreign Policies”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 489–
502. 
5 See several Turkish daily newspapers from 12–13 September, 2001; also, for a 
collection, see Newspot, No. 29, September–October 2001. 
6 “Sezer: I reckon Western countries are going to view terrorism differently from 
now on”, Turkish Daily News, 13 September 2001 and Cumhuriyet, 13 
September 2001. 
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In the Turkish view, the European countries misinterpreted the balance 
between the concepts of human rights and terrorism, a point emphasised by a 
senior Turkish foreign ministry official: “The US was very well aware of the 
concerns raised by Turkey regarding terrorism. Nevertheless, Europeans did 
not understand this and the concept of human rights was raised by our 
European colleagues when we referred to terrorism at international 
gatherings. And now, it is clearly seen that a balance between the concepts of 
terrorism and human rights is necessary.”7 Further, in a similar line, Turkey 
stressed that terrorism is a global issue and thus must be fought globally. 
This point was repeatedly emphasised by government officials, as well as 
columnists and civil society organisations. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, in 
his address at the Organisation of Islamic Countries Summit, underlined the 
argument: “Terrorism does not have geography, it is the same terrorism, 
which manifests itself in several countries, in the West and in the East, in all 
geographies, all over the world…Therefore, terrorism is a global 
phenomenon that crosses borders and the fight against it requires effective 
international cooperation.”8 In this sense, NATO’s decision to invoke Article 
5 was a welcome development for Turkey, as expressed by Ambassador 
Onur Öymen, Turkey’s Permanent Representative to NATO: “We have 
always called for terrorist activities to be included within Article 5…We 
have always stated that an attack does not only mean a country’s intrusion 
into another country’s territory but it also covers terrorist attacks which [are] 
an international problem. That’s why NATO’s invocation of Article 5 is very 
important for us.”9 
                                                          
7 “Shifting of International Perceptions on the Agenda: A New Role for Turkey”, 
Turkish Daily News, 13 September 2001; for more on the initial Turkish 
position, see Baki Ilkin (2002), “Combating Terrorism and Rebuilding 
Afghanistan: The Turkish Perspective”, Foreign Policy-Ankara, Vol. 27, Nos. 3–
4, pp. 3–9. 
8 Ismail Cem (2001), Statement to the Press at the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (Doha, 10 October 2001), reprinted in Newspot, No. 29, September–
October; see also “Turkish Top Officials Call for Increase in International 
Cooperation against Terrorism”, Turkish Daily News, 13 September 2001; and 
Mustafa Balbay (2001), “Terör Sinir Tanimiyor (Terror Recognises no 
Borders)”, Cumhuriyet, 12 September; the Turkish Industrialists and 
Businessman Association (TUSIAD) also stated that the terrorist attacks exposed 
the dimensions of international terrorism and that there is a need for international 
cooperation and solidarity to fight against international terrorism, in Milliyet, 13 
September 2001. 
9 “Ankara backs Activating Article 5”, Turkish Daily News, 14 September 2001 
and Cumhuriyet, 14 September 2001. 
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Furthermore, some Turkish analysts did not hesitate to announce the advent 
of a ‘global 28 February’.10 In challenging the rise of political Islam on 28 
February 1997, secular elites used the particular conditions of Turkey as a 
justification to limit individual rights and democratic freedoms, backed by 
the powerful military. After the 11 September attacks, it was argued that the 
US and Western countries may embark on a similar policy on a global scale, 
so as to wipe out several international networks (irrespective of whether they 
are moderate or radical) that were supposedly behind the attacks. As part of 
this new strategy, the US would be less willing to criticise non-democratic 
practices in the Islamic world for the sake of assuring their cooperation in the 
global war against terrorism. That could (the argument goes on) hint at the 
emergence of a new ‘precedent’ justifying the Turkish way of dealing with 
terrorism, and in effect, relieve Turkey of some of the external pressures it 
had encountered in the past. 
The first observation about these arguments is that they were, to a large 
extent, propaganda. It was not possible to hear, from the outside, a 
corresponding appreciation of the Turkish theses, except from some 
American commentators.11 Notably, Michael Radu was a very vocal 
supporter of the Turkish position on this issue. He argues that “Europeans, at 
least before 11 September, were playing games in the name of ‘human 
rights’ – particularly for terrorists, who were protected at home even against 
the vital security of non-EU countries…Let us hope that once the US and 
Turkey, to mention just two cases, are finally seen as equally victimised, the 
EU response will be similar…That revision also includes a new look at 
Turkey’s anti-PKK and anti-Islamist policy – not as anti-democratic, but as 
protective of the Muslim world’s only truly secular democracy”.12 This 
optimistic mood and Turkish discourse, however, largely remained wishful 
thinking. 
The main problem with this argument was that Turks chose to interpret these 
developments in such a way that this new ‘precedent’ justified whatever 
Turkey did in the past to fight against separatism and political Islam. This 
point was very well-illustrated by Ismail Cem: “For years, Turkey has kept 
on explaining to the international community what terrorism is, the 
consequences of it, the importance and the need for international cooperation 
in struggling against it, and have kept on making proposals at international 
platforms for methods of a collective struggle against terrorism. The events 
                                                          
10 Rusen Cakir, “Global 28 Subat Süreci Basladi” (Global 28 Subat Process has 
Taken a Start), Hurriyet, 15 September 2001. 
11 For a similar view, see Murat Belge, “Jeopolitik”, Radikal, 22 January 2002.  
12 Michael Radu (2001), “The War on Terrorism is not an American War”, 
Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December, pp. 52–54. 
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of 11 September have proved how right Turkey’s sensitivity on this issue 
was. What everyone is trying to do collectively today is no different from 
that which Turkey has strived to achieve for years.”13  
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Turkish arguments will be entirely 
accepted by the West in general or by Europeans in particular without any 
reservations. For instance, Turkey warmly welcomed NATO’s activation of 
Article 5, but one has to bear in mind the particular conditions in which 
NATO took that decision and the unique position of the US in shaping 
NATO decisions; thus its value as an almost automatic precedent remains an 
open question. Even if one accepts that Article 5 could be activated against 
terror attacks, what is less clear is whether it will be applicable to the threats 
or attacks coming from an organisation established in one’s own country. 
Finally yet importantly, when the time comes to implement Article 5, there 
could be differences over identifying the concrete sources of a terrorist threat 
or how to respond to that particular threat.14 
Another limitation to Turkey’s optimism is exerted by differing views on 
terrorism. Concerning the Kurdish issue, the European view is broadly that it 
cannot be simply confined to fighting against terrorism. Official Turkish 
discourse preferred to view the Kurdish issue as originating from socio-
economic conditions in south-eastern Anatolia, aggravated by the problems 
posed by terrorist activities that are supported by external actors trying to 
undermine Turkey. In European eyes, however, the issues are more related to 
political and cultural rights, and democratisation.15 Thus, the well-known 
analogy is applicable here: one person’s ‘terrorist’ may be another person’s 
‘independent fighter’. Further, there is reason to expect that this will remain 
the case, despite initial Turkish optimism to the contrary.16 Large Kurdish 
                                                          
13 “Cem: Turkish Model is Paradigm of Civilisation”, interview of Ismail Cem 
by the Turkish Daily News, 7 January 2002. 
14 For an early sceptical approach by Sadi Erguvenc, see Lale Sariibrahimoglu, 
“Turkey Should be Cautious on Article 5”, Turkish Daily News, 14 September 
2001; however, Ümit Özdag underlines that although it may not act as an 
automatic trigger, NATO’s invocation of Article 5 could be used as a precedent, 
as noted in “Interview with Ümit Özdag”, 2023, No. 6, 15 October 2002, p. 23. 
15 For more information on different perceptions of the issue in Turkey and 
Europe, see Cornell, op. cit., p. 31; for an analysis of the Kurdish issue through a 
human rights and democratisation perspective, see H. Ayla Kilic (1998), 
“Democratization, Human Rights and Ethnic Policies in Turkey”, Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 91–110. 
16 For an optimistic view that after 11 September, the PKK issue would no longer 
be considered within the context of an ethnic conflict or independence 
movement, see Rana S. Sezal (2001), “Kimlik Politikalari, Terör ve Etnik 
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populations in Europe are acting as a strong pressure group and limiting the 
manoeuvrability of Western governments. As it is rightly claimed, the 
Kurdish issue has also been a European one, as it affects the Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants living in Europe and the host countries.17 There is a 
fundamental difference between the EU and Turkey in regards to the 
problem of terrorism. Even after one accepts the reality of terrorism, the 
ways to tackle this problem are perceived differently. The Turkish approach 
is closer to that of the US than the EU.18 As we observe, the EU and the US 
differ on many issues, including the question of how to identify the causes 
and sources of terrorism as well as the means to be used in fighting against it. 
The EU has stressed the importance of preventive measures and prioritising 
political and economic instruments; it has questioned the effectiveness of 
punitive military measures. Considering that the Europeans were even 
critical of the US, an expectation that they would welcome Turkish activities 
without any reservations is hardly tenable.19 
Therefore, it is hard to be very optimistic and expect a major breakthrough in 
Western responses to Turkey’s approach to combating terrorism.20 In 
addition, Turkey’s hope that the new emerging consensus on terrorism will 
relieve it of European pressures on the Kurdish issue is difficult to sustain. 
The Europeans will likely resist subsuming this wider problem under the 
rubric of terrorism and maintain their demands for Turkey to continue with 
the necessary domestic reforms in political and cultural aspects, even after 
the attacks of 11 September. Thus, the Kurdish issue will not cease to be one 
of the hurdles Turkey has to face in its journey towards the European Union. 
The discussion about the list of terrorist organisations prepared by the EU 
                                                                                                                                   
Catisma Kavramlari: 11 Eylül Sonrasi Türkiye’nin Terör Sorunu”, Stratejik 
Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 20, December, p. 100. 
17 See for instance: Gülistan Gürbey (2000), “Die Europaesierung des 
Kurdenkonflikts”, Blaetter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik (4:99), p. 
404. 
18 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu (2001), “Afganistan Savasi’nin Transatlantik Iliski 
Boyutu” (The Transatlantic Relations of the Afghanistan War and its 
Consequences with Regard to Turkey), Zaman, 27 November, p. 10. 
19 For an argument to the effect that Turkey could capitalise on the US 
interpretation of terror and thus solve its own PKK problem, see Damla Aras 
(2002), “Minareyi Calan Kilifi Hazirladi: Bir Baska Acidan 11 Eylul”, Stratejik 
Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 24, April, p. 39. 
20 Ali Nihat Özcan, a Turkish expert on terrorism, also points out that the 
selective response to terror in Europe would limit Turkey’s utilisation of the new 
conditions in “BM Karari ve PKK”, NTV: Arka Plan, 3 October 2001; for a 
transcript of this television interview, see 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/110594.asp (news portal). 
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(briefly outlined below) within the context of forging an international 
coalition against the sources of terrorism was illustrative of this point: 
Turkey started an intensive diplomatic initiative in the wake of 
the 11 September attacks to use the international environment 
to convince EU members to include ten Turkish organisations 
on its list of terrorist organisations. The inclusion of an 
organisation on the list means that its assets will be frozen, its 
offices closed and its activities traced. Nevertheless, this may 
not automatically translate into the extradition of its members 
to their country of origin, particularly if the country is a non-
EU member and still practices the death penalty. Despite 
Turkey’s efforts, the EU included none of the terrorist 
organisations on its list, which was published on 27 December 
2001. The exclusion of the armed militant groups from the first 
version of the list, such as the outlawed PKK and the 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), 
which are active in some European countries under different 
banners, especially drew Turkish reaction and left a problem on 
the agenda for some time.21 Turkish diplomacy and lobbying 
worked; thus on 2 May 2002, the two organisations were finally 
added to the modified EU list. This decision was seen by many 
as a victory for Turkey.22 Yet, to see the effectiveness of these 
measures, one has to take into consideration a couple of other 
factors. 
First, the PKK announced in April that it would cease all 
activities and regroup under a new name, the Kurdistan 
Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK).23 KADEK said 
it was ending its armed struggle to campaign peacefully for 
greater rights for Kurds in southeast Turkey, but without 
disbanding its armed wing. The Turkish government has termed 
the name change as meaningless.24 Yet despite Turkey’s 
demands, KADEK is not included on the EU list. The EU 
countries prefer to suspend their judgement on whether to 
include it. 
                                                          
21 Selcuk Gültasli (2002), “The Opportunity and the Principle”, Turkish Probe, 
Issue 479, 31 March. 
22 “Türkiye Brüksel’de Zafer Kazandi” (Turkey won a victory in Brussels), 3 
May 2002 (retrieved from the news portal at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr). 
23 Mehmet Ali Birand, “PKK or KADEK”, Turkish Daily News, 2 April 2002. 
24 Ali Nihat Özcan and Ö. Rengin Gün (2002), “PKK’dan KADEK’e: Degisim 
mi Takkiye mi?”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 25, May, pp. 5–20. 
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Second, these EU norms need to be transformed into national 
legal orders. That being said, in some of the EU member states, 
the national legal norms are not enough to limit the activities of 
these terrorist organisations effectively, a point that has been 
used by the operatives of those organisations. This is especially 
true as far as Belgium is concerned.25 Third, most of these 
organisations have been active in Europe for decades and they 
know the ways to circumvent such legal barriers. For instance, 
a spokesperson for the DHKP-C has claimed that these 
decisions will not substantially affect their activities.26 What the 
EU member states can do, however, is freeze their bank 
accounts – yet they have no money in banks. The same source 
further claimed that the name DHKP-C is on the EU list, but 
that the registered name of their organisation is the DHKP and 
DHKC; further, the source mentioned the fact that they have 
been working in the United Kingdom for many years, even 
though the DHKP-C is outlawed there. They may have more 
ways to find loopholes in European legal norms. Therefore, 
Turkey still has to work hard in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of this initiative. 
One can expect similar divergences between Turkey and the EU in the future. 
Caught between Islam and terrorism: Turkey as a role model for 
the Islamic world? 
The second development regarding Turkey’s growing strategic importance is 
the increasing reference to Turkey as a model for the Islamic world. The war 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda was, in a political and intellectual sense, 
also a war against a militant, reactive, anti-Western (or anti-American) 
interpretation of Islam. The protests against American operations and support 
for Osama bin-Laden in some parts of the Islamic world created fears that the 
developments could lead to a so-called ‘clash of civilisations’, or a 
‘Christian-Muslim confrontation’. Thus, the American administration strived 
to use every opportunity to prevent such a negative interpretation of the 
American role and to deliver a message that this was not a war against Islam. 
As proof of this policy, the inclusion of certain Muslim countries into the 
international coalition appeared to be necessary, especially when it later 
                                                          
25 “DHKP-C and PKK on EU Terrorist List”, Turkish Daily News, 3 May 2002; 
“Belgian Judicial Officials: There is not much to do against the PKK and DHKP-
C”, Turkish Daily News, 6 May 2002. 
26 “DHKP-C: The List did not Affect Us”, Turkish Daily News, 10 May 2002. 
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came to using force in Afghanistan.27 When viewed in this light, Turkey 
came to be seen as a valuable asset for American strategic policy in the 
region. 
No doubt, Turkey offered the all assistance within its capability to the 
international coalition from the very beginning, through allowing the use of 
its territory and air space for logistical support and through its contribution to 
the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this was 
more than a practical military/strategic contribution in the long-term war 
against the forces of terrorism and fanaticism. Hence, the fact that Turkey is 
the only Muslim country with a secular system of governance, which is also 
member of NATO and other European institutions, was repeatedly expressed 
not only by the Turkish policy-makers themselves, but also by the 
international observers and US officials. As such (the argument goes), 
Turkey would be a perfect role model for the Islamic world.  
The 21st conference of the American-Turkish Council (ATC) held in 
Washington in March 2002 was an important venue where those arguments 
were often heard. A few days before the conference, Deputy Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz underlined that supporting moderate Muslims who 
abhor terrorism and extremism was central to winning the war on terrorism: 
“To win that war against terrorism, we have to reach out to the hundreds of 
millions of Muslims who believe in tolerance and moderation…By helping 
them to stand up against terrorists, we help ourselves”. Therefore, the anti-
terrorism campaign was not just a military fight but also “a battle for hearts 
and minds as well”; within this context, Turkey “can be an example for the 
Muslim world” of a country that reconciles Islam with liberal democracy.28 
According to US President George W. Bush, Turkey was a hope-provoking 
alternative against radicalism and religious intolerance. In the message he 
sent to the ATC conference, he stressed that Turkey, with its Muslim beliefs 
and its embrace of the democratic ideals of Atatürk, set an example.29 In his 
address at the conference, US Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman also 
                                                          
27 “With Turkey’s Pledge, US Coalition Gets its First Muslim Troops”, 
International Herald Tribune, 2 November 2001. 
28 Matt Kelley (2002), “America Must Support Moderate Muslims to Win War 
on Terror, No. 2 Pentagon Official Says”, Turkish Daily News, 11 March; see 
also US Department of Defense (2002), “Bridging the Dangerous Gap between 
the West and the Muslim World”, remarks prepared for delivery by Deputy 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz at the World Affairs Council in Monterey, California, 
3 May. 
29 “Turkey a Model Secular Country: Bush”, 18 March 2002 (retrieved from the 
news portal at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr); see also “21st ATC conference held 
in Washington”, Turkish Daily News, 19 March 2002. 
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underlined one of the few things that had not changed after 11 September: 
“Turkey is once again highlighted as a model for those countries with an 
Islamic heritage who choose to be – and work to be – modern, secular, 
democratic, and true to their faith simultaneously. Those of us who have 
admired Turkey for this vision for years now find we are not so alone in 
wishing that your great endeavour succeeds.”30 
Yet the very fact that the terrorist activities were undertaken by an 
organisation justifying its actions by reference to Islam was a serious moral 
challenge to which many Muslim countries had to respond.31 There was a 
considerable effort on the part of the political leaders and intellectuals in the 
Islamic world to stave off linking terrorism in general, and the 11 September 
terrorist attacks in particular, to Islam and Islamic groups. Nowhere was this 
concern more visible than in Turkey, as a country that, while orienting itself 
towards Western norms and values, maintained its ties with Islam and the 
Islamic world. Indeed, it was this duality that put enormous pressure on 
Turkey to call upon the world to draw a distinction between Islam and 
terrorism. Turkish political leaders and intellectuals, like their counterparts in 
other Islamic countries, took pains to emphasise that Islam was a religion of 
peace and a distinction between Islam and terrorism must be drawn. The 
prime minister declared that equating Islam with terror was unjust,32 and 
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said that, “Terrorism does not have a religion 
[or] geography and there can be no justification for terrorism under any 
circumstances…To identify terrorism with any religion is an insult to all 
religions. We strongly condemn those who have used the name of our holy 
religion to define some terrorists. Following the tragedy in the US, Turkey 
conferred with some fellow members of the OIC [Organisation of Islamic 
Conferences] and urged its NATO allies as well as EU members to avoid 
such misuse.”33 
                                                          
30 US Department of State (2002), “Grossman: Change in the Value of Enduring 
Alliances”, remarks to the American Turkish Council by US Undersecretary of 
State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Washington, D.C., 19 March. 
31 See Anas Malik (2002), “Selected Reflections on the Muslim World in the 
Aftermath of 9-11”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 
Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer, pp. 201–225. 
32 “Ecevit’ten Teröre Karsi Dayanisma cagrisi”, Hürriyet, 12 September 2001; 
see also “ABD’nin Yanindayiz”, Hürriyet, 13 September 2001; for the response 
by several Turkish intellectuals, see “Linkage to Islam rejected”, Turkish Daily 
News, 14 September 2001. 
33 Ismail Cem (2001), “Statement to the Press”; see also US Department of 
State, “Remarks with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem”, 27 
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In this regard, the OIC-EU summit, which was held in Istanbul on 12–13 
February 2002, was an expression of Turkey’s determination to assume its 
role of bridging the East and the West, calling for harmony, rather than 
conflict between the two civilisations. The forum turned out to be a useful 
platform for an intensive exchange of views among representatives of 
international organisations, high-ranking politicians, opinion-makers, 
intellectuals from EU-member countries, OIC-member countries and 
observers. Mutual compliments filled the air, although it remains to be seen 
what it will bring about in concrete political terms.34 Nevertheless, 
organising such a conference and bringing together EU member states and 
Muslim countries around the same table had a symbolic meaning, which was 
seen as the start of the new Turkish role.35 Ismail Cem’s views on the 
conference were reflective of this: “An example of what Turkey could do [to 
play a bridging role between the Islamic world and the Western Christian 
world] can be seen in the forthcoming meeting of the OIC and the EU. For 
the first time these two organisations will be coming together for a political 
exchange of opinions. Besides, in the aftermath of 11 September we are 
strongly opposed to the wrong perception of placing terrorism and Islam side 
by side. I had spoken with many of my Western colleagues [to] draw their 
attention to the sensitivity of the wording used…In correcting such mistakes 
and in establishing some sort of a harmony, Turkey has a pioneering place 
that is provided to it by its history, culture and modern identity. We have to 
act in awareness of that responsibility.”36 
This argument implied at least two inter-related aspects: first, Turkey’s 
support for the coalition was instrumental in defusing the charge that the war 
was a Muslim-Christian confrontation.37 Foreign Minister Cem expressed 
this point was very well when he said, “This is the fight between democracy 
and terrorism, and the struggle between the wise and fanatic. We believe that 
this fight will be won by our side. Turkey will be the biggest obstacle before 
those who want to divert this [fight] to a wrong path such as a fight between 
                                                                                                                                   
September 2001 (retrieved from the news portal at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/5089.htm). 
34 The coverage of the forum in the Turkish press was retrieved from 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/oic/oic.htm; see also the information provided 
on Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (retrievable from 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/OIC_EU_cdrom/index.htm). 
35 Elif Ünal (2002), “West and East Attempt to Bridge Differences in Turkey”, 
Turkish Probe, No. 473, 10 February. 
36 “Cem: Turkish Model is Paradigm of Civilisation”, interview of Ismail Cem 
by the Turkish Daily News, 7 January 2002. 
37 In a sense, this was Turkey’s duty – see Karaosmanoglu, op. cit. 
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the religions.”38 Second, the Turkish model was offered as an alternative to a 
Taliban version of Islam. Thus Islam and modern values are compatible with 
each other and it is possible to reconcile Islam within a Western-style, 
democratic and secular system. In the words of Dale F. Eickelman: “Turkey 
can only offer the world an example of a nation in which Western democratic 
values and Islam converge in an increasingly strengthened civil society, in 
which the state and religion are not seen as adversaries. ‘Western’ societies, 
like Islamic ones, have no place for either militant secular extremism or 
militant religious extremism.”39 In practical terms, Turkey’s decision to take 
part in the Western-led coalition was expected to facilitate other countries 
adoption of a counter-terrorist stance and cooperation with the US.40 Seen 
from another perspective, it was also argued that this geo-cultural dimension, 
in addition to the geo-political position, could constitute another asset for 
Turkey in its relations with the Western world, particularly as far as its quest 
to become a full member of the European Union.41 
Yet the argument that Turkey could be a role model for the Islamic world is 
also controversial in some aspects. First, Turkish ambitions in this direction 
are not new and we have enough evidence to judge how they are perceived in 
other parts of the Islamic world. Turks themselves are proud of being the 
only secular country in the Islamic world. Yet, it is also equally true that 
Turkey’s perception of itself as a model may not go beyond being an 
illusion; the Western ideas promoted by Turkey have hardly penetrated into 
other Muslim societies. Arab countries’ criticism of the secular Turkish 
model (along with other problems dominating Turkish-Arab relations) are no 
secret. In this sense, any fundamental shift in the perceptions of other 
Muslim societies, which would ease the objections to adopting a Turkish-
style system, cannot yet be observed. On the contrary, in view of the growing 
anti-American feelings, it is hard to expect that such a role for Turkey would 
be welcomed. The American way of dealing with terror, through primarily 
military means or through supporting the existing non-democratic regimes in 
the Islamic world may hinder the burgeoning reformist movements in those 
                                                          
38 “Bu, Demokrasi ile Terörizmin Kavgasi”, Hürriyet, 14 September 2001. 
39 Dale F. Eickelman (2002), “Turkey between the West and the Rest”, Turkish 
Probe, No. 474, 17 February. 
40 Ilter Turan (2001), “Short Term Pains for Long Term Pleasures”, Private 
View, Spring, p. 10. 
41 Orhan Gökce and Birol Akgün (2002), “Degisen Dünya Politikasinda 
Türkiye’nin Rolü: 11 Eylül’ün Getirdigi Firsatlar, Riskler ve Tehditler” 
(Turkey’s Role in the Changing World Politics: Opportunities, Risks and Threats 
Brought about by 11 September), paper presented at the first METU 
International Relations Conference, Ankara, 3–5 July, p. 14. 
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countries. Such an approach may result in setbacks to the natural 
transformation of Islamic societies, giving radicalism in the Islamic world a 
new impetus. In this sense, Turkey’s attempts to carry Western values into 
the region may even widen the existing gap between Turkey and other 
Islamic societies. 
Second, the main problem with this argument is the question of whether it is 
possible at all to transform a society from the outside. As long as domestic 
enthusiasm for reform is lacking, international pressures to change a 
society’s culture or its legal, political and economic structures to conform to 
certain models have limited effect. To influence a society from the outside, 
international actors must have strong links that enable them to stimulate 
changes in the behaviour of domestic actors. For instance, if we remember 
Turkish-EU relations, despite the existence of strong connections, there is 
still a resistance to change by the Turkish establishment. Considering the 
lack of connections, societal differences and geographical distances between 
Turkey and other Muslim societies, prospects for Turkey’s influence over 
other Muslim countries remain limited. Similarly, democratic regimes and 
other practices cannot be established overnight, nor can they be taken 
granted. It took Turkey decades to reach its current position and this was no 
doubt a painful process. Turkey’s particular journey also dictates against 
transplanting its experience into other societies that have not followed a 
similar path. Nevertheless, even if one assumes that the Islamic world wants 
and needs change, there is nothing to suggest that this model would be the 
one imposed from Washington, given that Turkey has its own political 
agenda. 
A Turkish zone of influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus? 
This section reviews the third area where Turkey’s influence is supposedly 
growing and Turkey is expected to play a role. The war against Afghanistan 
and terrorism brought the Central Asian, Caspian and Caucasus regions once 
again into the focus of interest. Some countries in the region, which are 
mostly ruled by former Communist leaders in an authoritarian manner, were 
also under pressure from domestic opposition. Since this opposition was 
mixed with some elements of Islamic radicalism, particularly in the case of 
Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan, the regimes became active 
supporters of the international coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
Moreover, the prospect of American involvement in the region offered a 
good chance to those countries for balancing the Russian dominance with the 
assurance of American support. Consequently, they did not hesitate to 
respond to American demands and provided the US with access to their air 
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space and military bases.42 US willingness to widen the international 
coalition against terrorism diminished concerns for human rights and 
democratisation; as a result, human rights violations and anti-democratic 
practices by these governments could be overlooked. The disappearance of 
human rights considerations in effect facilitated the US cooperation with the 
Central Asian countries and US engagement in the region.  
In developing this relationship, Turkey’s special ties with the region again 
appeared to be an important asset for US policy. Turkey had a lot to offer: 
not only did Turkey have strong political, cultural and economic connections 
to the area, but it had also accumulated a significant intelligence capability 
there. In addition, the large experience Turkey had gathered in fighting 
terrorism could help to expand the global war on terrorism to this region.43  
As the focus of interest shifted to a possible operation against Afghanistan 
and then to assuring the collaboration of Central Asian countries, Turkish 
analysts soon discovered that Turkey’s geo-strategic importance was once 
again on the rise. It was thought that, thanks to the easy access to the region 
offered by its geography and its strong ties with the countries there, Turkey 
could play a pivotal role in the conduct of US military operations in 
Afghanistan, along with general reshaping the politics in Central Asia. As 
noted by one analyst, Osman Nuri Aras, “Turkey is situated in a critical 
geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional 
power struggles with a potential to affect the balance of power at world scale 
take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sorts of 
conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not 
only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching 
from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Africa, but also 
make it possible to control its neighbourhood…All these features make 
Turkey a centre that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be 
world powers…In the new process, Turkey’s importance has increased in 
American calculations. With a consistent policy, Turkey could capitalise on 
this to derive some practical benefits…Turkey has acquired a new 
                                                          
42 For more on the motivations and contributions of these countries, see Alec 
Rasizade (2002), “The New ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia after Afghanistan”, 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer, 
pp. 132–134; for more on Uzbekistan, see Nermin Güler (2001), “Özbekistan Dis 
Politikasinda Dönüm Noktasi: 11 Eylül”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 20, 
December, pp. 59–65; for the contribution of these countries to the US 
operations, see US Department of Defense (2002), International Contributions to 
the War Against Terrorism, Fact Sheet, 7 June. 
43 Afghanistan is discussed more fully in the next section. 
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opportunity to enhance its role in Central Asia.”44 Indeed, growing 
international interest in the region had further implications on the energy 
resources in the Caspian basin and Central Asia. Even before the 11 
September events, there had been much talk about a new ‘great game’ in the 
making on the chessboard of Central Asia and the Caucasus.45 After the war 
in Afghanistan, there was an increasing belief among many analysts that the 
centuries-old great game was entering a new phase.46  
According to this line of reasoning, the US military operations in 
Afghanistan were not simply a reaction to the attacks of 11 September. 
Rather, “The plans for the American offensive in Afghanistan were not 
formulated in response to 11 September, but existed prior to the terrorist 
attacks in the US. Therefore, it could be argued that the attacks on 11 
September provided the US with the opportunity to enter Afghanistan to 
further extend a project that had already started months, if not years, 
earlier.”47 This interest was attributed to the special geo-strategic significance 
of Afghanistan: “Afghanistan occupies a strategic position in the geo-
political landscapes in general and the geo-politics of the oil and natural gas 
resources in particular. Afghanistan has been in an extremely significant 
location spanning South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East…The US 
administration has significant political, military and economic reasons to try 
to turn Afghanistan into a base for American military operations in the 
region. There can be no doubting of Afghanistan’s strategic importance to 
the US.”48 One analyst goes so far as to claim that “The hidden stakes in the 
war against terrorism can be summed up in a single word: oil”.49  
This reading of post-11 September developments in the region found large 
support among many Turkish analysts. A number of studies raised the same 
                                                          
44 Osman Nuri Aras (2001), “Yasanan Yeni Surecte Avrasya Enerji 
Kaynaklarinin Yeri ve Önemi” (The Place and Importance of Eurasian Energy 
Resources in the New Process, 2023, 15 November, No. 7, p. 38. 
45 M. E. Ahrari and James Beal (1996), The New Great Game in Muslim Central 
Asia, McNair Paper 47, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies; see also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (1997), 
The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geo-strategic Imperatives, 
New York, NY: Basic Books. 
46 Rasizade, op. cit., p. 125. 
47 Bülent Gökay (2002), “The Most Dangerous Game in the World: Oil, War, 
and US Global Hegemony”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, summer, p. 48. 
48 Ibid., p. 49. 
49 Ibid. (quote by Frank Viviano, which was reported in the San Francisco 
Chronicle, 26 September 2001), p. 61. 
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argument, with the implication that those developments further contributed to 
Turkey’s strategic position.50 The construction of alternative pipelines to 
transport oil and gas from the region to the world markets is the crux of the 
issue, because the Caspian resources are landlocked. The methods and the 
routes through which the oil and gas are carried to world markets have direct 
geo-political effects. But it has long been on the agenda without a definite 
answer. Turkey had been pressing for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
project. The developments in the wake of 11 September turned out to 
strengthen Turkey’s hand in this issue. The US threw its weight on Turkey’s 
side and the construction of the pipeline was scheduled to start around 
September 2002 and finish by the end of 2004.51 
Against this background, within Turkey there is a growing optimism that the 
cumulative effect of these developments will strengthen Turkey’s position 
within the region and promote a Turkish zone of influence. But this argument 
has the following limitations. A proactive Turkish engagement with Central 
Asia and the Caucasus is not a new concept.52 After they gained 
independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly emerged 
Turkic states looked towards Turkey as a model. There was also a 
corresponding great enthusiasm in Turkey for closer relations with the 
region, as well as Western support to promote the ‘Turkish model’ that 
embedded secularism in a predominantly Muslim society, adopted a 
capitalist-market economy, a multi-party system and prioritised Western 
orientation. For Turkey, this region was to offer a new area to expand 
Turkish influence and boost Turkey’s geo-strategic value to the West. 
Turkish ambitions, however, remained largely unrealised and soon that 
model started to decline in the face of the political realities of the region and 
changes in Western perceptions over time.53 The demise of the Turkish 
model was mainly because of internal constraints: Turkey lacked enough 
financial and economic resources to meet the expectations of these countries. 
                                                          
50 See for example the editorial, “Türkiye, Hazar, ve Afganistan Ekseninde 
Petro-politik (Petro-politics at the Axis of Turkey, Caspian and Afghanistan)”, 
2023, 15 November 2001, No. 7, pp. 8–15; see also Nadir Biyikoglu (2001), 
“Afganistan Gercegi ve Büyük Oyun’a Dönüs” (The Reality of Afghanistan and 
Return to the Great Game), 2023, 15 November, No. 7, pp. 16–21; and also Aras, 
op. cit.  
51 “Bush Voices Support for Oil and Gas Pipelines Leading from Caspian to 
Turkey”, Turkish Daily News, 5 June 2002. 
52 E. Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (1993), “Turkey’s New Eastern 
Orientation”, Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview/RAND, pp. 37–97. 
53 Idris Bal (2000), Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: 
The Rise and Fall of the ‘Turkish Model’, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
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Given that the structural obstacles to Turkey’s influence in the region, such 
as the compatibility of the Turkish model, the receptivity of the target 
governments, the role of other players (particularly Russia) and the 
constraints domestic problems put on Turkish foreign policy, expectations of 
expanding Turkey’s role post-11 September are difficult to sustain. 
Considering that Turkey continues to struggle to overcome its own economic 
and financial problems, the question arises as to how it will be able to engage 
in an active new role in the region. 
Yet the developments so far imply that in the new era Turkey is viewed 
differently in the region. Previously, Turkey was perceived as a model for the 
economic, social and political transformation of these countries. This time, 
the role expected from Turkey is limited to military and strategic fields. 
Turkey has concluded several new military cooperation and education 
agreements in the region in addition to the existing ones. After 11 September, 
Turkey stepped up its military assistance to Uzbekistan54 and Kazakhstan55 
(and to a lesser extent to Kyrgyzstan),56 by supplying arms, military 
equipment and military training to modernise the capabilities of these 
nations. Further, after those countries allowed the US to use their airspace 
and military bases prior to the military campaign in Afghanistan, Turkish Air 
Force Command personnel conducted site surveys for possible airfields in 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to be used in air operations.57  
Similarly, post-11 September developments and the ensuing US interest in 
the region had spillover effects in the Caucasus, which provided an added 
impetus to Turkish activity in the region. Positive steps were taken on 
pipeline projects, and Turkey’s close relations with Azerbaijan along with 
Turkish-Georgian cooperation in the military field accelerated remarkably. 
Turkey had already started providing military assistance to Georgia in 1997. 
After the decision taken by the US to establish a military presence in 
Georgia,58 Turkey’s efforts to cooperate with Georgia became especially 
important.59 
                                                          
54 “Turkey Equips, Trains Uzbek Military”, Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002; 
“Kivrikoglu Visits Uzbekistan; Signs Deal for Military Assistance”, Turkish 
Daily News, 19 March 2002.  
55 RFE/RL Central Asian Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, 21 March 2002. 
56 “Turkey, Kyrgyzstan Aim at Strategic Partnership”, Turkish Daily News, 22 
February 2002. 
57 US Department of Defense (2002), International Contributions to the War 
Against Terrorism, Fact Sheet, 7 June, p. 12. 
58 “US Military in Georgia Will Increase Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
Security”, Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002; for the effects of this new 
development on the region, see Kamil Agacan (2002), “ABD’nin Gürcistan’a 
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Aside from these military contributions, Turkey tried to raise a common 
concern for terrorism in the region through bilateral visits and on multilateral 
platforms. From 29 to 30 April 2002, the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia held a summit in the Turkish city of Trabzon and signed an 
agreement to work together against terrorism, along with promising 
cooperation on pipelines to bring the energy-rich region’s resources to the 
West. The summit was completed by a joint press conference with the three 
leaders after signing the agreement on “The Struggle against Terrorism, 
Organised Crime and other Important Crimes” (Trabzon, April 2002).60 
Similarly on 4 June 2002, a summit for “Cooperation and Confidence-
Building Measures in Asia” was held in Kazakhstan’s capital Almaty, which 
brought together heads of state of Turkey, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, 
Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. The leaders signed the “Declaration 
Aimed at Eradicating Terrorism and for Supporting a Dialogue between 
Civilisations” (Almaty, 2002), as well as an accord that included regulations, 
principles and commitments for establishing a comprehensive security 
mechanism.61 The celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Black Sea 
                                                                                                                                   
Asker Göndermesi: Terörle Mücadelede Üçüncü Cephe mi, Yoksa Köprübasi 
mi?”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 24, April, pp. 69–76. 
59 “Turkey Donates Vehicles, Communications Equipment to Georgian 
Military”, Turkish Daily News, 7 March 2002; see also “Turkey Gives Military 
Aid to Georgia”, Turkish Daily News, 12 June 2002; it should further be noted 
that the US policy towards Azerbaijan has also changed: in December 2001, 
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (preventing US from giving direct US 
government assistance to Azerbaijan) was revoked. 
60 “Caucasus Cooperation Agreement against Terrorism Signed”, Turkish Daily 
News, 1 May 2002; an agreement was reached on holding the summit regularly 
in the coming years, as noted in Disisleri Güncesi, April 2002; it was criticised, 
however, because it failed to include some key players of the region, notably 
Russia, Armenia and Iran – see Yusuf Kanli (2002), “A Summit with Missing 
Key Players”, Turkish Daily News, 1 May; for more on the impact of the summit 
on the region, see Hasan Kanbolat (2002), “Türkiye-Azerbaycan-Gürcistan 
Zirvesi ve Bölgedeki Ortak”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 3, No. 26, June, pp. 52–57. 
61 Newspot, No. 33, May-June 2002; in his address at the summit, President 
Sezer re-emphasised Turkey’s experience in fighting terrorism and the 
importance of international cooperation in tackling this issue – see President’s 
Press Office (2002), Asya’da Isbirligi ve Güven Artirici Önlemler Konferansi 
Zirve Toplantisi’nda Yaptiklari Konusma, 4 June. 
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Economic Cooperation organisation (BSEC) on 25 June 2002 in Istanbul was 
another occasion where terrorism was discussed at a regional scale.62  
All of these events imply that what is actually required from Turkey is for it 
to play a ‘subcontractor’ role in the region, to facilitate an American 
presence there within the wider context of the war on terrorism, rather than 
create a genuinely independent Turkish zone of influence or promote the 
Turkish model once again. Therefore, Turkey’s ambitions and 
manoeuvrability are very much limited by international interests in the 
region. A policy based primarily on limited contributions in the military field 
but lacking an economic dimension would be flawed. It is bound to remain 
temporary and once the conditions have changed, and the region returns to 
normalcy, the underlying realities may re-surface, leaving Turkey at a 
disadvantage in political and economic terms. 
This observation is strengthened by a parallel development in the way this 
region is treated by the international power centres. These countries are 
geographically landlocked with no direct connections to open seas. 
Furthermore, they are also far from the prosperous Western markets. In the 
short term, they may not be able to attract significant foreign capital, except 
energy investments. They will probably be seen as ‘raw material suppliers’, 
rather than as ‘emerging markets’; in other words, they will not be viewed as 
‘Asian tigers’ or just Central and Eastern European countries, but new ‘Gulf 
states’. For this reason, in the foreseeable future, the prospects for these 
countries to be part of the global market economy and move towards 
democratic, pluralistic regimes are limited. They will be approached from a 
strategic perspective, and therefore, it is against this background that 
Turkey’s pivotal role in the region can be better understood. In this context, 
as far as the optimism surrounding the construction launch of the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline is concerned, it must be noted that a number of other 
developments could diminish the benefits of the pipelines to Turkey. High 
construction costs, possible developments concerning alternative routes (such 
as Afghanistan)63 and the tactics to be employed by other players could have 
adverse affects on the feasibility of the project. 
A more concrete reality, which speaks against Turkish ambitions in this 
region, is the changing shape of US-Russian relations. Under President 
                                                          
62 “Black Sea Economic Cooperation Tackles Energy and Terrorism”, Turkish 
News, 26 June 2002. 
63 “Afghanistan is on Agenda Again as Energy Route”, Turkish Daily News, 24 
May 2002; for an analysis on the impact of the war on the BTC pipeline, see 
Cenk Pala (2002), “Afganistan Savasi’nin Hazar Boru Hatti Projelerine Etkisi: 
‘Kirmizi Kalem’ bu Kez Kimin Elinde?”, Stratejik Arastirmalar Dosyasi, Vol. 3, 
No. 11, pp. 17–24. 
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Vladimir Putin, Russia has chosen a non-confrontational style of relations 
with the US. Meanwhile, Mr Putin has made great progress towards restoring 
Russian power and influence in the region (and cementing Moscow’s 
primacy) without being opposed by Washington.64 In this regard, following 
11 September, Russia cooperated with the US and did not resist US military 
deployment in Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the same time, partially in 
return for its concurrence with US engagement in the region, Russia also 
tried to use the international atmosphere and the discourse of fighting against 
terrorism to justify its own activities in the region, thus strengthening its 
position.65 Based on these developments, there are some arguments that a 
US-Russian rapprochement may provide better security and stability in the 
region; thus, the US should also recognise Russian interests there. If events 
follow such a course, problems will ensue for Turkey, since Turkey and 
Russia have been competing with each other in this area.66 Nevertheless, it 
must be noted that many analysts refer to prospects for cooperation between 
the countries. Throughout the 1990s, contrary to earlier expectations, both 
sides had prioritised economic interests and Turkish-Russian relations 
developed cooperatively.67 Similarly it is argued that cooperation, rather than 
competition, will continue to characterise relations after the events of 11 
September 2001. Such cooperation could be extended beyond bilateral 
relations and include a multidimensional partnership in Eurasia.68 
                                                          
64Stephen F. Larrabee (2001), “Russia and its Neighbors: Integration or 
Disintegration”, in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (eds) (2001), The 
Global Century, Globalization and National Security, Volume II, Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press, pp. 859–874.  
65 For an analysis of the new developments, see Elnur Soltan (2001), “Bush-
Putin Zirvesi: Soguk Savas’, in Ikinci Bitisi”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 20, 
December, pp. 5–24; however, Ozdag notes that rather than willingly consenting 
to US deployment in Central Asia, Russia had to bow to US pressure, see Ümit 
Özdag (2001), “Terörizm, Küresel Güvenlik ve Türkiye”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 
2, No. 19, November, p. 8. 
66 For an early warning that Turkey’s ‘bridging role’ may shift to Russia, see 
Mehmet Binay, “Ankara Köprü Rolünü Devrediyor” (Ankara is Handing over its 
Bridging Role), 5 October 2002 (retrieved from the news portal at 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr). 
67 Duygu Bazoglu Sezer (2001), “Turkish-Russian Relations a Decade Later: 
From Adversary to Managed Competition”, Perceptions, Vol. 6, No. 1, March-
May, pp. 79–98. 
68 This is justified by referring to a document called the Eurasia-Action Plan, 
signed in November 2001 by the foreign ministers of the two countries (see 
Karaosmanoglu, op. cit.). In his New Year’s address, Foreign Minister Cem also 
underlined that Turkey perceived Russia more as a partner than a competitor in 
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What role does Turkey have in Afghanistan? 
As has been made clear so far, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors 
in the fight against terrorism, hence it rigorously supported the international 
coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. When it became clear that the 11 
September attacks had originated from Afghanistan and a military campaign 
was inevitably going to take place, the government was quick in obtaining a 
parliamentary authorisation in October 2001 to contribute troops to the US 
campaign. The bill, which met with public opposition,69 also authorised the 
government to allow the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish territory and 
permit the use of Turkish airspace and airbases.70 Yet the military Chief of 
Staff General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu and other top officials expressed their 
hope that the scope of the conflict and Turkey’s direct contribution would be 
limited. Reflecting the overall ambivalence of the Turkish elite, Mr 
Kivrikoglu maintained that Turkey could not remain aloof to the 
developments in Afghanistan, yet at the same time called for a limited 
Turkish role – which left out an active Turkish contribution to combat 
operations.71  
The Turkish government, however, decided to contribute to the campaign by 
sending special forces to work with US troops in humanitarian operations 
and train Northern Alliance fighters. Turkey also hinted that it could make its 
experience in guerrilla warfare available and help carve out a coalition 
among various Afghan factions against the Taliban. Additionally, the US 
benefited from Turkish airspace, used the Incirlik airbase as a transport hub 
for the campaign, and according to some reports, received intelligence from 
                                                                                                                                   
Disisleri Güncesi, January 2002. Similarly, Turkey’s reaction to US-Russian 
rapprochement was positive, see “Turkey Pleased with US–Russian 
Rapprochement”, Turkish Daily News, 29 May 2002, where even a change in 
Russia’s attitude towards Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is noted. For the 
evolution of the Russian position, see Sinan Ogan (2002), “Kremlin ve Lukoil 
Arasinda Rusya’nin Baku-Ceyhan Politikasi”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 3, No. 26, 
June, pp. 68–76. 
69 “Majority Opposes Attack on Afghans”, Turkish Daily News, 4 October 2001. 
70 Turkey had already provided the US with overflight rights in September 
shortly after attacks: “Turkey opens Airspace to US”, BBC News Online, 22 
September 2001. 
71 See Turkish daily newspapers from 3 October 2001; for different reactions, see 
“Asker Gönderme Icin ne Demislerdi?”, 2 November 2001, 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr (news portal); this initial ambivalence and 
‘passivism’ was, however, criticised by some analysts, see Umit Özdag, 
Terörizm, Küresel Güvenlik, pp. 10–11. 
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Turkey.72 But the rapid collapse of the Taliban rule made the possible role of 
Turkish soldiers in the actual combat phase unclear and a new rationale 
emerged. When the Taliban rule in Afghanistan came to an end, it became 
possible to launch international initiatives to rebuild the country and the role 
of Turkey was again undeniable. Although it was not able to make a 
significant contribution in terms of financial reconstruction aid, Turkey 
actively participated in the International Security and Assistance Force 
(ISAF), charged with helping the newly formed interim Afghan authority and 
with providing order and stability in the capital, Kabul. Within the 
framework of the ISAF, Turkey contributed to the training of national 
Afghan police and military forces, provided military aid and equipment, and 
patrolled Kabul and its environs. In June 2002, when the British mandate was 
over, Turkey assumed the lead-nation role and took over the command of the 
ISAF.73 
Based on these developments, it is claimed by most analysts that Turkey is 
going to become a more assertive power, not only in its immediate 
neighbourhood, but also ‘out of area’. In Turkish reasoning, its active support 
for the US military campaign was a logical corollary of its position on 
fighting international terrorism. According to Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, 
it was natural that Turkey joined the war against terror because the US had 
always stood behind Turkey. He emphasised that the war had to be fought to 
the end, until the Taliban regime was wiped out.74 For Turkey, at the same 
time, capitalising on the US-led war on terrorism was a useful instrument to 
enhance its influence in Central Asia. By taking strategic decisions and an 
active part in the military realm, Turkey sought to have a say in the future 
political landscape of not only Afghanistan, but in Central Asia overall.  
As regards to Turkey’s active participation in ISAF, this was in line with its 
policy on peace operations, as it had evolved in the post-cold war era. Turkey 
has been involved in several UN and NATO peacekeeping missions, from 
Somalia to Bosnia and Kosovo. This time, through participating actively in 
the ISAF and commanding a multinational force, Turkey could demonstrate 
                                                          
72 “Analysis: Turkey’s Pivotal Position”, BBC News Online, 18 October 2001. 
73 For the Turkish debate on ISAF, see Saban Kardas (2002), “Dilemmas of 
Peacebuilding: Reflections on Turkey’s Drive for ISAF Command”, Turkish 
Daily News, 19 April. 
74 “Basbakan Sayin Bülent Ecevit’in TBMM’de Yaptiklari Konusma”, Disisleri 
Güncesi, 10 October 2001; see also “Basbakan Sayin Bülent Ecevit’in CNN 
International Televizyonu’na Verdikleri Mülakat”, Disisleri Güncesi, 12 October 
2001. 
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its military strength and ability to project power abroad, thus expanding the 
overall Turkish sphere of influence in the politics of the region.75  
More concretely, Turkey sought compensation for its military support in the 
economic domain.76 The Turkish economy, already undergoing a severe 
crisis and under an IMF programme, was hit by the 11 September shock 
badly. Turkish Economic Minister Kemal Dervis, after claiming that Turkey 
must support the international fight against terrorism because it had suffered 
greatly from similar threats, hinted that there could be a price. According to 
him, “Turkey’s strategic importance for the European Union and NATO is 
increasing and within this strategic framework Western allies should 
consider the cost that Turkey will have to bear”.77 A similar reasoning was 
used by Prime Minister Ecevit for justifying assistance to the US.78 In 
practical terms, that meant the delay of loan repayments, and when 
necessary, the provision of new IMF loans as well as direct US assistance.79 
In the same vein as the general arguments about Turkey being an example to 
the Muslim world, it was also claimed that Turkey could become a model for 
Afghanistan as well. The war against Afghanistan offered the possibility to 
replace the fundamentalist Taliban regime to which Turkey had been 
consistently opposed and was an important reason behind Turkey’s support 
for the American war. Prime Minister Ecevit was one of the vehement 
supporters of this view, and during his correspondence with President Bush 
he underlined that a military operation in Afghanistan should include the 
                                                          
75 “Leadership to Test Turkish Military Might”, Turkish Daily News, 3 May 
2002. 
76 For more on Turkey’s motives, see “Afganistan Politikamizi Ulusal 
Cikarlarimiz ve Tercihlerimiz Belirliyor”, interview with Huseyin Bagci, 2023, 
No. 7, November 2001, pp. 22–27; see also Mehmet Seyfettin Erol (2002), 
“Firsatlar ve Zorluklar Ikileminde Türkiye-Afganistan Iliskilerinde Yeni 
Dönem”, Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 23, March, pp. 77–85; see also Alan 
Makovsky (2002), “Turkey’s Unfinished Role in the War on Terrorism”, Insight 
Turkey, Vol. 4, No. 1, January-March, pp. 44–45; and also Hugh Pope, 
“Turkey’s Role in Afghanistan Presents Opportunity”, Wall Street Journal, 6 
June 2002, p. A16. 
77 “Turkey Rattled by Conflict Fears”, BBC News Online: Business, 17 
September 2001. 
78 “Turkey Promises Troops for Afghan Campaign”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 
4, October–December 2001, p. 180. 
79 “US Delegation Suggests Rethink of Turkey’s $5 Billion Military Debt”, 
Turkish Daily News, 2 October 2001. 
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toppling of the Taliban regime.80 He went on to say that the model to be 
introduced had to be one similar to Turkey’s secular democratic model to 
ensure peace, stability and tranquillity in Afghanistan. At times the 
discussions became emotional. The deep historical ties between the two 
countries have been continuously repeated to underline the ‘necessity’ of 
Turkey’s support for the Afghan people: Afghanistan was the first country to 
recognise the new Turkish Republic; Turkey had helped Afghanistan in its 
modernisation efforts; Ataturk – the founding father of the modern Turkish 
Republic – had put special emphasis on Afghanistan, and so on.81 Some 
proponents of a proactive Turkish foreign policy went on to suggest that 
“The first country to recognise Kemal Atatürk’s revolution and adopt the 
Turkish model was Afghanistan in 1921. Under the right political 
reformulation, to which Turkey will undoubtedly contribute, Afghanistan 
could be the first model in the post-cold war period to rehabilitate itself 
through the methods and means provided in the historic Turkish national 
experiment.”82 Foreign Minister Cem, while acknowledging the universal 
validity of the Turkish model, called for caution as the Turkish model “is not 
one that could be forced from the outside. What kind of a model they want, 
what kind of a model they need, and what kind of a model they are ready for 
[should] be decided upon by the Afghan people themselves.”83 
From an American perspective, as discussed above, Turkey’s support and 
participation in the coalition was useful to rebut allegations that the US was 
engaged in a war against Islam. Therefore, similar to Turkish arguments, 
there were extensive US references to Turkey constituting a model for 
Afghanistan as well.84 Along with the military contributions previously 
noted, Turkey had important links in the country and the region that could 
facilitate the US presence there. As for the peacekeeping phase, Turkey has a 
                                                          
80 Fikret Bila, “Ecevit’ten Bush’a: ‘Taliban devrilmeli’”, Milliyet, 26 September 
2001. 
81 See for example the Prime Minister’s address at a party group, as reported in 
Hürriyet, 11 September 2001; for coverage of Foreign Minister Cem’s visit to 
Kabul on 17 December 2001, in which he made extensive references to historical 
ties as a facilitating factor of cooperation, see Turkish daily newspapers from 18 
December 2001. 
82 Paul M. Wihbey and Sule Kilicarslan (2001), “A Turkish Strategic Window of 
Opportunity”, Insight Turkey, October–December, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 21. 
83 “Cem: Turkish Model is Paradigm of Civilisation”, interview of Ismail Cem 
by the Turkish Daily News, 7 January 2002. 
84 “Powell: Atatürk Afganistan Konusunda Hakliydi”, Hürriyet, 6 December 
2001. 
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large standing army with accumulated experience in special operations and 
peacekeeping; thus, it could spare its troops for such a mission.85 
Yet the heightened expectations regarding the region are difficult to 
substantiate.86 First, Turkey’s interests in Afghanistan are similar to the 
sudden discovery of Central Asia and the Caucasus after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Therefore, because of the lack of any previous strategic 
perspective towards the country and the region as a whole (except for those 
in the Atatürk era), raising expectations conjecturally is highly problematic. 
Second, as was discussed earlier, Turkey’s potential for becoming a model to 
the Muslim world is highly limited. In the case of Afghanistan, this is further 
limited by the particular characteristics of this war-torn country: the people 
of the country are illiterate and very closed-off from the world; the society is 
very fragmented and its economy has collapsed. Since Western liberal values 
are not welcomed by the people in relatively more-developed Muslim 
countries, one may wonder how Turkey would be able to carry these values 
to Afghanistan? 
With regard to military contributions and the assumption of the ISAF 
command, these actions will certainly give an important impetus to Turkey’s 
role in the region and its international standing. Nevertheless, such actions 
are not backed by other economic and political incentives in the medium and 
long-term, and the practical benefits could be severely limited. Past 
experience of Turkey’s earlier expectations regarding Central Asia and lack 
of means could further limit the transformation of this engagement into 
political influence. The effect of geographical distance and the global reach 
of the US should therefore be carefully evaluated. As the empirical evidence 
about Central Asia suggests, although Turkey sees itself as a bridge to open 
up these countries to the West, the West has in fact been able to establish 
direct contacts in the region. In the military domain, during the preparation 
and conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US was able similarly to 
gain the support of other regional powers, notably Pakistan, and thus 
minimised the role of Turkey in the overall operation.87 Finally yet 
                                                          
85 See Makovsky, op. cit., pp. 42–44. 
86 For a critical account, see Kardas, op. cit.; for a careful approach, see Erol, op. 
cit. 
87 There were even speculations that in the planning and conduct of the military 
campaign in Afghanistan, US central command could be situated in Turkey, yet 
they turned out to be unsubstantiated exaggerations of Turkey’s role. Based on 
this prospect, some analysts had even gone so far as to argue that moving the 
central command to Turkey could revitalise Turkey’s strategic importance and 
create a counter-balance against the growing influence of the EU/Germany in the 
eastern Mediterranean, in view of the accession of Cyprus into the EU (see the 
132 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
importantly, the dynamism of US foreign policy in the new era (and whether 
Turkey can keep pace with it) should be taken into consideration when 
evaluating the impact of the Afghanistan engagement on Turkish foreign 
policy (i.e. how many other such engagements Turkey can sustain?). 
Following this argument, any shift of international interest away from 
Central Asia, especially if one considers the US intentions to expand the war 
on terrorism, could also result in a situation where the novelty of the 
‘strategic importance of the region’ may wear off. In this scenario, the out-
of-area role could lose the wider political context in which it takes place and 
turn out to be another sporadic, short-term engagement. 
A breakthrough in Turkish-EU relations? 
Another active area in Turkish foreign policy after the 11 September attacks 
is Turkish-EU relations. The basic Turkish argument could be summarised as 
follows: because the events of 11 September have proven Turkey’s value, not 
only to the Americans but also to the Europeans, Turkey should now 
anticipate a warmer West.88 Turkey therefore tried to use this opportunity to 
cement its relations with the US and Europe, by emphasising its role as a 
significant pro-Western power at such a critical juncture. Furthermore, there 
was a strong Turkish belief that in the new era created by the events of 11 
September wherein the concern for fighting international terrorism was going 
to be the major leitmotiv, the international system would be increasingly 
dominated by security-oriented considerations. Following this line of 
argument, the role of powerful security actors (such as the US and NATO) 
would be enhanced at the expense of less powerful ones (EU members and 
the common foreign and security policy – CFSP). In this manner, the 
urgency of Turkey’s relations with the EU on the CFSP and the European 
security and defence policy (ESDP) was expected to diminish.89 Along with 
the hope that Turkey’s renewed importance would boost Turkish-EU 
relations, there was an additional impetus behind the Turks’ viewpoint: in the 
context of the growing American-Turkish strategic partnership, the Turks felt 
confident that the US would not abandon Ankara and would press the EU to 
satisfy Turkish demands. Therefore, according to Turkey, the EU should 
                                                                                                                                   
article “Prof. Osman Metin Öztürk’le Söylesi”, 2023, No. 6, October 2001, pp. 
18–19). 
88 Volkan Bozkir, Vice Secretary-General for European Union Affairs, “Turkey 
Can Anticipate a Warmer West”, Turkish Daily News, 3 October 2001. 
89 For an assessment of the effects of the war in Afghanistan on the EU’s CFSP 
and ESDP, see Saban Kardas (2001), “Afganistan Operasyonu’nun AGSP’ye 
Olan Yansimalari”, 25 November (retrieved from http://www.liberal-
dt.org.tr/guncel/Kardas/sk_afganistan.htm). 
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appreciate the Turkish position in some of the problems that have dominated 
relations between the European Union and Turkey for some time. 
Turkish expectations that the EU and European countries would be more 
receptive to Turkey’s position on fighting terrorism have already been 
elaborated upon. Other issues that were supposedly going to be solved in a 
manner favourable to Turkey’s interests included the Cyprus conflict, the 
deadlock on the ESDP and Turkey’s troubled EU membership process. There 
were indeed some initial positive steps in all those areas that led to a sense of 
optimism.90 There appeared to be a chance to overcome the squabble over 
the ESDP-NATO relations and over the role Turkey would have in the 
development of the ESDP. On the eve of the Laeken Summit in December 
2001, a consensus, called the ‘Ankara Document’ was reached between 
Turkey, the UK and the US. After a long pause, the dialogue among the 
leaders of the two communities on Cyprus resumed. Both of these 
achievements were viewed as a success by the Turkish politicians91and the 
US was said to have given stimulus to these developments.92 
At the risk of simplifying the situation, we suggest that there are some 
fundamental challenges to Turkey’s arguments that limit a sudden 
breakthrough in EU-Turkish relations. The main weakness of the Turkish 
discourse could be identified as follows. The initial rhetoric seemed to 
perceive the West as a monolithic bloc.93 Although this appeared to be true in 
the immediate aftermath of the 11 September terror attacks, when all the 
European powers expressed their solidarity with the US against the dangers 
of terrorism, after the novelty of these slogans faded away the underlying 
divergences in transatlantic relations over a wide range of issues resurfaced. 
These differences were exacerbated by another feature of Turkey’s approach 
to the EU, in which it relied on US pressure in its dealings with the EU. 
These developments slowly put Turkey in an awkward position for several 
reasons. 
                                                          
90 “Rays of Light: For the First Time in a Year, Turks are Seeing Some Flickers 
of Hope”, The Economist, 15 December 2001, Vol. 361, No. 8252. 
91 “No Concessions on ESDP and Cyprus: Ecevit”, 7 December 2001 (retrieved 
from the news portal at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr). 
92 Colin Powell’s visit to Ankara was the particular indicator of US support: 
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see also Jim Kapsis, “Beyond Geopolitics for Cyprus”, The Washington Times, 5 
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93 See the quotation from Economy Minister Dervis in the above example. 
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First, because EU-US relations were increasingly characterised by 
disagreements over several issues and transatlantic relations were more 
occupied with how to find a solution to these problems than relations with 
Turkey, the sense of urgency within the US about Turkey’s problems was far 
from meeting the Turks’ expectations.94 Even if one assumes that the US was 
inclined to support Turkey, it would approach EU-Turkish relations from a 
strategic perspective. Yet the US approach may not be compatible with the 
actual realities of EU-Turkish relations and Turkey’s expectations of the EU. 
This reasoning applies largely to EU democratisation and human rights 
priorities vis-à-vis Turkey – illustrated by the famous analogy of a 
‘democratic and stable Turkey versus a stable and democratic Turkey’. That 
could in turn lead to the next problem. This ‘tactic’ of using its relations with 
the US as leverage vis-à-vis the EU is likely to cultivate a mood of distrust 
between Turkey and the EU, as well as friction between the EU and the US. 
Instead of creating a healthy dialogue with the EU, Turkey’s use of its 
strategic ties with the US (and US lobbying as a stick against the EU) was 
increasingly perceived as a kind of low-intensity threat against Brussels. In 
the long term, Ankara itself hinders the creation of a strong channel of trust 
with the EU and is thus isolated. Against such a picture, it was no surprise 
that the Turkish elite soon began to question Turkey’s membership in the 
EU. This debate was paralleled by another one on whether Turkey should 
make a choice between EU membership and a strategic partnership with the 
US.95 
The Turkish political elite’s perception of the country as an indispensable 
actor to the West, particularly in the political and strategic realm, is a cause 
for further problems. It is true that Turkey’s role in the European security 
architecture is vital, but the security-dominated basis of Turkey’s perceptions 
of its relations with Europe impacts not only on the way Turkey values itself, 
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but also on the actual course of developments. At times, this leads to robust 
attitudes towards the EU and demands for concessions or different treatment 
that hampers the integration process. More importantly, capitalising on its 
strategic importance diverts attention away from Turkey’s real problems and 
reduces the urgency to implement the economic, political and cultural 
reforms demanded by the European integration process. In other words, the 
more Turkey focuses on its indispensability to the West, the less it is willing 
to undertake the necessary transformation in its journey towards EU 
membership. Therefore, EU representatives have been quick to make their 
positions clear against Turkey’s attempts to capitalise on its strategic 
importance and de-emphasise membership criteria. The EU commissioner 
responsible for enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, maintained that Turkey 
should meet the hard criteria to become a member of the EU; otherwise, the 
whole ‘Europe integration project’ will lose its credibility. He went on to say 
that a scenario where the EU “softens the conditions for Turkey’s 
membership” in return for Turkey’s “guarantee of strategic aid” was 
unacceptable: “We cannot make such a bargain”.96 Given the initial 
expectations that, similar to Turkey’s entry into NATO after it contributed 
troops to the Korean War, Turkey’s participation in the military campaign in 
Afghanistan would pave the way for Turkey’s membership into the EU, this 
warning is quite revealing. 
Finally but importantly, given that the underlying roots of the problems that 
have dominated EU-Turkish relations are unlikely to suddenly disappear, 
even after 11 September, caution is advisable. The continuation of the Greek 
veto on the Ankara Document, which in Turkey’s view97 resolved the tension 
over ESDP, and Turkey’s futile attempts to force the EU to set a deadline for 
the start of membership negotiations are some examples of continuing 
differences. Therefore, a fundamental shift in the EU’s policy towards 
Turkey just for the sake of Turkey’s enhanced strategic importance is hard to 
expect. Rather, the determination to carry out transformation on the domestic 
scene and the speed with which Turkey delivers this change should continue 
to remain the single most important determining factor in Turkey’s relations 
with the EU. 
US-Turkish relations: revival of the strategic partnership? 
This section reviews US-Turkish relations in further detail. As already 
underlined in the American point of view, Turkey came to be seen as a 
critical country whose support and cooperation was essential. Initially, there 
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(retrieved from the news portal at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr). 
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was a strong belief in the US that supporting moderate Muslim countries that 
oppose terrorism and extremism was the key to winning the war on 
terrorism. The Turkish model, which embeds Islam within a secular system, 
appeared to be the best candidate to fit this role. In addition, Turkey’s 
geographical location and experience in fighting terrorism made its 
cooperation essential to the international coalition against terrorism. 
Furthermore, Turkey was more than willing to contribute to the US agenda in 
Afghanistan by providing troops to the peacekeeping force. As a result, the 
US-Turkish relations that had been characterised by ups-and-downs 
throughout the 1990s, started to receive renewed interest. As previously 
noted, many American politicians liked to call Turkey “a steadfast partner in 
[the] war on terrorism”.98 The changed mood was observed not only in the 
declarations of American politicians, but also in the titles of articles written 
on the issue, which were at times heavily emotional, such as “Turkey and the 
US: A Partnership Rediscovered”.99 
From Turkey’s perspective, the revival of strategic relations with the US 
implied several potential advantages. Consequently, the Turks expected more 
active US assistance in a number of areas:  
• support in the campaign against PKK terrorism;  
• the promise of increased exports to American markets;  
• the removal of obstacles to military transfers to Turkey;  
• US backing of the Turkish command of Afghan peacekeepers and the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project;  
• support for further IMF loans; and  
• support for Turkey’s foreign policy on issues such as Cyprus, the ESDP 
and EU membership.  
                                                          
98 US Department of State (2002), “Grossman: Change in the Value of Enduring 
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Another repeated theme in the Turkish arguments was that (in contrast to the 
Europeans) the US had always been more supportive and sensitive to 
Turkey’s demands on most of the contentious issues and thus a reliable 
partner. As a result, after the events of 11 September, the US-Turkish 
relations that were characterised as a ‘strategic partnership’ by President Bill 
Clinton in 1999 deepened further.100 In this regard, Prime Minister Ecevit’s 
visit to Washington from 14 to 19 January was a climax and provided an 
important occasion to cement the strategic partnership.101 
In principle, it is hard to ignore that US-Turkish relations converge to a large 
extent. It was this convergence of interests and shared strategic vision that 
formed the basis of some common policies on various issues and regions, 
such as the Balkans and the Caucasus. Nevertheless, one should not 
underestimate the limitations that force us to take a more cautious stance. To 
begin with, growing references to Turkey’s renewed strategic importance in 
the wake of the 11 September attacks inevitably reproduces the basic nature 
of US-Turkish relations, which has been heavily dominated by security 
issues. Because there are mutual security-related concerns on several issues 
and regions, this is understandable. But as in the past, this situation leaves 
Turkey dependent on shifting US priorities. Since it remains the passive 
receiver of the external conditions in this partnership, Turkey is deprived of 
the ability to direct this partnership according to its own agenda and 
priorities. 
After 11 September, however, there were serious attempts to diversify the 
relationship and give it a more solid standing. Given that US foreign policy is 
going to be largely driven by an objective of ‘security first’ and some 
underlying problems in relations persist, it remains to be seen whether a 
major step towards diversification can be realised. Among others, the most 
attractive attempt towards diversification was the proposal to increase trade 
between Turkey and the US. The idea of increasing economic ties with the 
US is not new and has in fact been on the agenda since the Gulf war. To 
compensate Turkey’s losses in the war, there was a discussion about how the 
US could help Turkey. The president of the country at that time, Mr Turgut 
Ozal, pointed out that “We don’t want direct financial aid, what we need is 
more trade with the US. For this, the US should abolish textile quotas and 
other barriers to trade.” Yet once the war was over, Turkey’s demands were 
forgotten and Turkey was left alone to deal with its economic problems. 
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Later, following Prime Minister Ecevit’s visit to Washington in January 
2002, the strengthening of Turkish-American trade and the economic 
dimension to the strategic partnership were once again on the agenda.102 At a 
press conference in Washington, Mr Ecevit said the outcome of his efforts 
deserved the highest praise: “Adding economic partnership to [the] political 
and military alliance with the US is an event that deserves ten marks”.103 
Towards this end, a Turkish-American Economic Partnership Commission 
was established to handle all economic and trade-related issues between 
Turkey and the US.104 The Commission had its first meeting in Ankara in 
February 2002.105 Yet, the conclusions of these meetings fell short of Turkish 
expectations. In addition, the plan to establish Qualified Industrial Zones 
(QIZs) was criticised as the US preferred a quick-fix solution and tried to 
incorporate Turkey into the existing QIZ between Israel and the US.106 This 
small example is indicative of the fact that the Bush administration was not 
ready to take the painful step and seek legislation to establish closer, direct 
economic relations with Turkey owing to Congressional opposition. 
Therefore, in assessing US-Turkish relations, it should be noted that US 
foreign policies can shift easily through the different factors that affect US 
policy-making, such as lobbying, Congress and internal American debates. 
At the moment, there are many supporters of Turkey in the Bush 
administration, but this cannot be taken for granted and there is still strong 
opposition within Congress against Turkey.107 The expectation of full, 
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unqualified American support for all the issues previously mentioned is 
therefore over-optimistic, as demonstrated by the developments so far. 
Despite the convergence on priorities at a strategic level, there may be 
divergence at the practical level. In addressing certain tangible issues, the 
approaches may not always be agreeable and even when these overlap, one 
should not overlook a fundamental characteristic of this relationship: the 
concerns of Turkey and the US are guided by entirely different sets of 
foreign policy priorities (a global hegemony versus a regional power). 
Therefore, there may always be diverging, even conflicting, interests and 
priorities on certain issues. Over-activism as observed in the current US 
foreign policy in the new era is likely to amplify this problem. 
Although terrorism may be a common concern to Europe and America, there 
is a difference of opinion as to how to deal with it. A similar reasoning 
applies to US-Turkish relations. Turks repeatedly like to argue that the US 
war against terrorism is a policy parallel to that of Turkey’s. As Turkish 
Ambassador to the US Osman Faruk Logoglu underlined, “We are at the 
forefront of the war, as a friend, as an ally and in reciprocation for the US 
understanding of our own fight against terrorism”.108 But in reality, it soon 
became clear that there are some fundamental differences. The controversy 
over the military operation against Iraq illustrates the perils of Turkey’s geo-
strategic position. 
Turkey’s geographical location is its main asset, but at the same time, it has 
also produced Turkey’s greatest headache: Iraq. In an effort to root out the 
sources of international terrorism, the US shifted its focus to the so-called 
‘rogue states’; President Bush took this one step further by declaring Iraq, 
Iran and North Korea as an ‘axis of evil’. Even before this speech, extending 
military operations against Iraq was on the US agenda. Following 
developments such as the supposed Iraq-al Qaeda links, the anthrax cases 
and the dispute over UN arms inspections in the country, Iraq became the 
next target for the US fight against terrorism. This development inevitably 
brought Turkey to the forefront again, owing to its strategic value in any 
future war against Iraq. 
Nevertheless, Turkey strongly opposed a war against Iraq. Before 11 
September, the Turkish government had been trying to normalise relations 
with Iraq (despite US opposition) in order to compensate for economic losses 
that had resulted from the UN-imposed embargo on Iraq. Therefore, the 
determination of the US to intervene in Iraq was an unwelcome development. 
Yet the real problem lies elsewhere. There is a fear that the operations 
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against Iraq and the turmoil created by post-Saddam political developments 
may have serious repercussions for Turkish security. Turkey is worried that 
the war against Iraq could result in the break up of Iraq and the establishment 
of a Kurdish state in the north. Such a possibility would, from the Turkish 
perspective, encourage Kurdish separatist elements within Turkey. For this 
reason, Turkey’s main priority has been to avoid an operation against Iraq. 
When war became inevitable, Turkey argued that Iraq should remain one 
nation. Their nightmare is that the Turkish army could be forced to occupy 
Northern Iraq to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state 
there, which would affect post-Saddam political developments in Iraq. Such 
a policy may not be compatible with the US agenda in Iraq and Turkish-
American interests could move towards sharpened divergence.  
Indeed, some Turkish analysts have persuasively argued that managing 
divergence and reaching a common position on the Iraq issue could be the 
‘test case’ for the Turkish-American partnership. Reporting on the optimism 
following Prime Minister Ecevit’s Washington visit, Cengiz Candar is 
blatantly critical: “Turkey’s protection by America on ‘political and 
economic platforms’ depends to a large extent [on] Turkey’s ability to act in 
tune with America on the issue of Iraq. I mean, as Turkey, you would oppose 
an American operation in Iraq; but at the same time you would become a 
‘strategic partner’ with the US, and you would rely on US ‘economic 
assistance’ to Turkey unreservedly. That will not happen…Cannot 
happen…Saddam is the ‘gist’ of the calculations on Turkish-American 
relations and ‘strategic partnership’”.109 Moreover, everything comes with a 
certain price. It is noted that the deepening of the strategic partnership and 
the generous support Turkey receives from the US administration ironically 
intensifies Turkey’s dependence on the US, with the effect that the burden of 
being a ‘strategic ally’ limits Turkey’s room for manoeuvre.110 Given the 
obvious difference of position towards Iraq, however, that situation only adds 
to the complexity of Turkey’s uncomfortable partnership with the US. 
Finally but importantly, one should also bear in mind that Turkey’s 
willingness to engage in active policies on several fronts is simultaneously 
likely to lead to conflicts of priorities and resources. Its wish to enhance 
relations with Europe, while moving towards a deepened ‘strategic 
partnership’ with the US and engaging in a proactive policy in Eurasia, could 
be increasingly difficult to reconcile. Perhaps, as was discussed in the 
previous section, the debate over whether to choose between membership in 
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the European Union and strategic partnership with the US was just an early 
indicator of the dilemmas of a multidimensional foreign policy. 
An end to the cycle of economic crises? 
In this section we consider the impact of post-11 September developments on 
Turkey’s domestic economic problems. Since early 2001, Turkey has been 
hit by a severe economic crisis. The crisis devastated the industrial sector, 
lowered living standards, raised unemployment and jeopardised Turkey’s 
international financial solvency.111 In dealing with the crisis, Turkey received 
a significant amount of IMF credits that have amounted to more than $30 
billion. American support was crucial for Turkey to obtain this IMF aid. 
Because Turkey emerged as a critical ally and the ‘best model’ for Islamic 
countries in the new era (from an American perspective), Turkey had to be 
supported economically. In this way the US could not only assure Turkey’s 
cooperation but also send a strong message that it would not abandon a US 
ally and Muslim country when it is in need. The remarks by US 
Congressman Robert Wexler, are quite telling: “An economic collapse in 
Turkey would be disastrous for America…America has got to treat the 
economy of Turkey as if it is the economy of New Jersey”.112 
Although the Turkish side repeatedly claims that the IMF credits were 
provided to Turkey without any political concessions, there is a perception 
(both at home and abroad) that without the war in Afghanistan and Turkish 
support in the campaign against terrorism, the IMF would have never given 
such a huge amount of money to Turkey. According to some comparative 
analogies, Turkey could have had a catastrophe similar to what happened in 
Argentina.113 As quoted above, Turkish Economic Minister Dervis (who took 
over the Turkish economy in March 2001) and Prime Minister Ecevit have 
made a strong link between Turkey’s support for the international fight 
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against terrorism and the economic assistance offered to Turkey.114 
Similarly, representatives of the Turkish private sector were more than 
willing to agree with this point on strategic grounds. According to the 
Chairman of the Turkish-US Business Council, Akin Öngör, if Americans 
ignore Turkey and fail to support it economically, they would not be able to 
go to bed in safety.115 
Whatever the exact motives were behind the IMF decisions, the fact is that 
with IMF help Turkey was able to control the economy in the short term and 
avert a catastrophe. Yet, in the long term this situation may have some 
negative consequences. As long as the economic and political systems 
remain decayed and structural problems are not remedied, the injection of 
foreign capital into the economy is bound to have a short-term effect. There 
is growing speculation by financial analysts that Turkey’s total debts, which 
now exceed its gross national product, may create serious problems in 
servicing and repayment.116 
When assessing the performance of an economy and the issue of foreign 
assistance, perhaps the amount of foreign investment flowing into a country 
is more important than the amount of direct aid it receives. In this respect, 
Turkey does not have a promising picture. According to a recent report 
prepared by the UN Conference on Trade and Development, between 1998 
and 2000 Turkey ranked 122nd among 137 countries in terms of foreign 
capital inflow.117 The reasons why foreign investors did not prefer Turkey 
were mainly its macroeconomic instability, widespread corruption and the 
complex nature of the transactions that needed to be fulfilled. As a result, 
Turkey later decided to take steps to overhaul its foreign investment rules, as 
part of its IMF-backed reform process.118 Another study reveals the other 
side of the coin: the amount of Turkish capital that is invested abroad, 
especially in Switzerland and Luxembourg, is estimated to be $70 billion. 
Most of this money left Turkey after the economic crises for the purpose of 
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securing the money abroad, since domestic investors no longer appear to 
have sufficient confidence to invest in the Turkish economy.119 
Here is the real paradox of Turkey: with a new crisis in the region, Turks 
think that the country has become strategically important. Yet, in political 
and economical terms it is considered to be a risky place to invest, because 
its economic system is not stable and possible conflicts in the region pose 
threats to the country. If everyone had been convinced that an operation 
against Iraq was inevitable, and if the deputy prime minister of the country 
maintained that the operation could destabilise the whole region, then one 
wonders how international and domestic investors would be convinced that it 
is reasonable to invest in Turkey? 
Moreover, the belief that ‘they cannot ignore us – they have to help us 
economically because we are strategically important!’ is not a good one. 
Such a view could hinder domestic determination and the ability to solve the 
country’s problems on its own. Further, it could result in a less serious 
approach to economic reforms and in turn, diminish the self-discipline 
necessary for economic transformation. Therefore, how Turkey will be able 
to solve the vicious cycle of economic crises remains an open question. 
These economic problems limit the country’s ability to act independently in 
its foreign policy, as was observed in discussions about the operation against 
Iraq. In a recent television broadcast by the American Fox-News channel, 
Dick Morris, an advisor to former President Clinton claimed that “Turkey 
has to support us, because the owner of Turkey is the IMF, and the IMF has 
already paid Turkey for this service,” generating severe annoyance among 
many Turks and at least one American analyst.120  
This ‘dependency’ applies to other cases as well. Many American analysts 
notably did not hesitate to refer to American support for further aid to Turkey 
from the IMF and argued for the relevance of the ‘dependent alliance’ 
between Turkey and the US. For instance, in a recent article Daniel Nelson 
presents the case that, “Turkey needs America and the US needs Turkey. 
Aside from a Republican administration in Washington, Turkey hears only 
criticism of its human rights record, and sees ongoing exclusion from 
Europe. Without Washington, $10 billion in further IMF loans would have 
been impossible, and the image of an Argentina catastrophe would loom. 
Without Washington, Athens’ place in the EU would mean intensified 
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pressures to back away from the Turkish Republic in Cyprus. America has 
been a better friend [to Turkey] than any alternative.”121  
Nevertheless, there is a fundamental contradiction in the interplay between 
economics and strategic importance in the new era. The increasing strategic 
importance and the requirements of the new activism stemming from it, in 
fact, do not coincide with the needs of the Turkish economy. Whereas 
Turkey is undergoing a severe economic crisis and experiencing a shortage 
of capital, the new engagements as part of a Turkish contribution to the 
international fight against terrorism are no doubt costly and require a solid 
economic backing. For instance, although Turkey was more than willing to 
contribute actively and assume the command of the ISAF in Afghanistan, the 
financial burden of this operation delayed the negotiations.122 For a long 
time, Ankara’s worries about the financial repercussions of Turkish 
contributions could not be addressed by the US or the UK. Turkey’s repeated 
demands for Western funding of the ISAF fell on deaf ears for a long time. It 
was reported that Washington was reluctant to provide extra financial 
support for Ankara on ISAF because billions of dollars in IMF loans had 
already been provided to Turkey to help its recovery from the financial 
crisis.123 There were even some speculations that Turkey might have given 
up its quest for ISAF leadership, based on financial and other 
considerations.124 After prolonged discussions, in the end it was only through 
American assurances that Turkey was able to accept leadership of the 
force.125 Similarly, because Turkey is keen on power projection beyond its 
borders to sustain its military engagements abroad, there is a willingness to 
spend further on military procurement in the aftermath of 11 September. For 
example, one of the biggest Turkish defence projects came to realisation with 
Turkey successfully concluding negotiations for the purchase of four 
AWACS (early warning aircraft) from Boeing. The financial cost of that 
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project to Turkey is expected to be around $1.1 billion.126 One has to wait 
and see how it will be possible to reconcile the strategic calculations that 
require heavy military spending with the current needs of the Turkish 
economy. 
Before concluding this section, it must be underlined that the interplay 
between Turkey’s economy and its strategic importance is problematic in 
other aspects. Turkey’s over-emphasis on its geo-strategic position and its 
value to the West and its determination to transform this into tangible 
economic benefits may have worked in times of crisis. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that such a policy could also turn out to be self-defeating in 
the long term. One cannot take the geo-strategic value granted; it may change 
over time and depend on the situation under consideration. Therefore, if 
Turkey is serious about solving its economic problems, it has to focus on 
structural remedies, rather than conjectural, external developments. More 
importantly, using its political-military contributions to Western security to 
gain economic leverage may diminish the trust between Turkey and its allies, 
adversely affecting relations in the long term. 
Conclusion 
In light of the activities observed so far, the dominant view is that post-11 
September events have contributed to Turkey’s strategic importance and thus 
have helped to reshape Turkey’s relations with the US and Europe, as well as 
relations with Turkey’s neighbouring countries. As expressed by Foreign 
Minister Cem, “The unfortunate events of 11 September 2001 and ensuing 
developments have confirmed and consolidated some fundamental 
preferences of the Turkish foreign policy. Besides, they have boosted 
Turkey’s strategic importance”.127  
According to these arguments these events and international reactions may 
have even stimulated the long-delayed redefinition of Turkey’s role in the 
post-cold war world. An excellent example of these arguments is noted in 
Wihbey and Kilicarslan (2001): “What is required in the current 
circumstance is for Turkey to seize the strategic initiative, with bold political 
leadership that articulates Turkey’s national security aspirations within the 
new regional context. An historic window of opportunity exists for Turks, 
with Western support and encouragement, to emerge from their bunker-
mentality and assert themselves in shaping a positive historical trend outside 
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their borders…Turkey is ready…What remains is for the West, and 
specifically the US, to help Turkey mobilize its potential.”128 
Although it is generally true that Turkey’s international standing has been 
visibly enhanced, a more cautious approach is needed to assess the post-11 
September developments on Turkish foreign policy. This paper argues that 
the best way to view the Turkish role is in the context of a regional power. 
Turks have ambitious and at times, over-exaggerated expectations of their 
country’s international position; but in reality, Turkey is mainly acting as a 
pivotal power, as best observed in the discussions regarding the Turkish role 
in Afghanistan and Turkey’s relations with Central Asia and the Caucuses. 
For example, on the one hand Turkey is trying to lead the ISAF, but on the 
other hand, it is asking the US to pay its costs and provide Turkey with the 
necessary transport, intelligence and logistic facilities. This kind of dilemma 
is exactly what the country faces as a pivotal state, which highlights the 
mismatch between Turkey’s capabilities and its foreign policy vision. It has 
to be recognised that, as things currently stand, the gap between Turkey’s 
capabilities and its expectations is difficult to bridge in the short run.  
As a result, Turkey’s ability to be an independent actor, initiating its own 
projects, is severely limited by, or depends upon, the degree to which it is 
successful in balancing its own priorities with external factors. In other 
words, Turkey could act in cooperation with other global and regional 
powers, and mobilise their support in areas of converging interests. In this 
way, Turkey can both advance its own interests and contribute to the agenda 
of its partners. But the extent to which Turkey’s interests diverge from those 
of its partners may make it increasingly difficult to follow an independent 
course of action. If this approach is chosen, any growing divergences may 
run the risk of becoming confrontations. This point (which many advocates 
of Turkey’s strategic importance fail to see) must be the basis of any 
assessment of Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, Turkey needs to engage 
seriously in a comprehensive and in-depth debate about its role in the world 
and in the region, the resources at its disposal, the foreign policy it envisages 
and its priorities. The responses to these questions are of vital importance for 
the successful resolution of not only the foreign policy issues faced by the 
country but its domestic problems as well. Such a debate should leave aside 
the influence of short-term, conjectural developments and focus more on 
setting long-term, structural priorities.  
This segues into our next observation regarding the post-11 September 
debate on Turkey’s strategic importance. The arguments raised for Turkey’s 
enhanced strategic importance are very similar to those employed at the 
beginning of the 1990s, following the Gulf war and the collapse of the 
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former Soviet Union. Yet remembering that the euphoria of the 1990s 
remained largely unrealised and diverted the country’s attention away from 
more important policy objectives, there is a valid argument that it is high 
time for Turkey to see the facts in a more realistic manner. First, the foreign 
policy issues that are on Turkey’s agenda will evolve according to the actual 
realities of the issue under consideration, rather than altered strategic 
conditions. It is true that the increased strategic value of the country may 
have positive effects on its international standing, but on contentious issues 
such as relations with Europe or America, the underlying sources of 
cooperation or divergence will not vanish. Therefore it would be wrong for 
Turkey to capitalise on its strategic importance and downplay the necessary 
steps it needs to take in its foreign and security policies. 
Second, the need for a more realistic vision in Turkish foreign policy has 
domestic implications. Whatever model it follows in its foreign policy or 
priorities – including EU membership, leadership in Eurasia or strategic 
partnership with the US – Turkey’s international performance will depend 
above all on its ability to solve problems internally, and reach economic and 
political harmony. In this regard, a rational assessment of the country’s 
international role would help to avoid unnecessary external adventures and 
enable Turkey to direct its attention to the necessary domestic 
transformation.  
The economic, political and diplomatic problems facing the country are 
fundamental; they cannot be solved through a simple redefinition of Turkey’s 
strategic role in the new context. Engaging in ambitious external projects or 
relying on the tempting idea of Turkey’s indispensability to its Western 
partners could diminish the urgency for reform and take the focus of the 
country away from economic and political modernisation. Economic 
reforms, democratisation and human rights issues would receive less 
attention compared with the life-and-death problems of national sovereignty 
and national security.  
Therefore a choice is being forced upon Turkey. It can aspire to become a so-
called ‘stable’ regional or pivotal actor willing to project power beyond its 
borders and thus maintain the current political culture (which is dominated 
by military and security considerations). Alternatively, it can choose to 
become an ordinary, but ‘democratic’ and self-sufficient state, by focusing 
on the necessary economic and political changes needed to reform its 
systems. 
The latter choice is definitely not an easy task. Although Turkey’s 
geographic location offers many advantages, it is also a source of problems 
for the country. Whether one likes it or not, this volatile region is 
characterised by several potential and actual crises. For instance, two of the 
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states that belong to the so-called ‘axis of evil’ are Turkey’s neighbours. Any 
development in the surrounding region forces Turkey to become involved in 
one way or another. This reality overarches life in Turkey. Although Turkey 
cannot escape this reality, it can choose to act in a rational manner with a 
long-term perspective – based on carefully elaborated priorities – instead of 
propaganda, conjectural calculations or short-term gains. 
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Introduction 
François Heisbourg 
he written presentations of our panellists – Roberto Menotti (Research 
Fellow, Aspen Institute Italia), Dana Allin (Senior Fellow, IISS, 
London) and Yuri Fedorov (Deputy Director of the Institute for 
Applied International Studies, Moscow) – were completed by a number of 
remarks, having been urged by the Chairman to dwell on the following 
issues: 
• the nature of the EU’s strategic interests and notably the importance of 
distant contingencies – such as Korea and Kashmir – as compared with 
Europe’s ‘near abroad’; 
• the impact of the difference in strategic cultures between the EU and the 
US (as well as within the EU itself); and 
• the long-term evolution of EU-US strategic relations. 
Thus Roberto Menotti underscored the importance of the security strategy 
text by Javier Solana (High Representative for the EU’s common foreign and 
security policy – CFSP) in helping the Europeans ‘think strategically’ even 
if, in his views, such a document could have been prepared earlier. But he 
also emphasised the need to not ‘start backwards’: the immediate focus 
should be on the ark-of-crisis rather than on Korea. He further noted that the 
current state of the debate could divide the Europeans rather than unite them.  
For his part, Dana Allin noted that there would be little time in Washington 
for a grand strategic debate with the Europeans. He considered that 
America’s extreme strategic risk-aversion (‘zero tolerance’), leading to 
preventive warfare, was one of the root causes of the transatlantic problems, 
along with the gut feeling in Europe that the US is the prime target of 
ongoing threats, rather than Europe. He also saw the differences among 
strategic cultures within Europe as being divisive. 
Yuri Fedorov made the point that the current nature of strategic threats – 
notably the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – plays to 
US strengths, thus increasing the significance of the defence gap between the 
US and Europe (particularly in research and development and space 
applications). He noted that there was an element of paradox in Europe’s 
evolution: while the EU has been integrating, when faced with real-world 
crises it has tended to split in strategic terms. He also re-emphasised his 
written analysis of the ‘Americanisation’ of Russian foreign policy, driven in 
part by the similarity of security concerns between Moscow and Washington. 
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As a prelude to the debate among participants, a senior EU official was 
prompted to make several remarks, as summarised below: 
• The genesis of the Solana paper lies to a large extent in Europe’s sense 
of failure in the Iraqi crisis. Indeed, strategic cultures tend to be formed 
from crisis to crisis. Although a strategic culture will not in itself change 
as a result of one single paper, such conceptual work can help. 
• One of the characteristics of the current document is that it is one of the 
first EU texts to be threat-driven. Given the size and scale of the 
European Union, it is appropriate that the text should emphasise issues 
such as Kashmir and Korea, because this is a way of thinking ahead and 
of preparing for a more active Europe. 
• ‘Effective multilateralism’ is a good formula for Europe. 
The first round of the debate revealed several divides: 
• Some agreed with the proposition that the EU should define its strategic 
interests globally, while others put forward regional priorities, in the ark-
of-crisis and Wider Europe. There were diverging views expressed about 
the Commission’s Wider Europe Communication, wherein one 
participant underscored its “mediocrity” while another highlighted its 
“quality”, urging for its integration into Javier Solana’s forthcoming 
document. In the words of one participant, we should be “enlarging our 
vision as we enlarge the Union”. 
• There was some disagreement about the ‘Americanisation’ of Russian 
foreign policy. One participant noted that in practice, Russia tended to 
operate along European lines, with region-specific policies and 
importance given to soft-power tools; hence, inter alia the importance of 
the Wider Europe Communication. 
• The US-EU relationship elicited strong views (rather than outright 
disagreement). If one analyst considered that the “Is-it-for-real?” 
question could be taken to mean “different from NATO”, another expert 
hailing from a staunchly Atlanticist country noted that the US appeared 
to be trying to play the Europeans off against each other in the case of 
the incipient NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF has become a 
direct challenge to the EU’s Rapid Response Force (ERRF), since the 
US (despite its non-participation in the NRF) insists on reserving to 
NATO first refusal rights concerning the use of the NRF. Furthermore, 
the latter now has essentially the same force volume as the ERRF, thus 
potentially locking the cream of Europe’s forces out of the EU. 
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• One participant raised the prospect of a US-EU debate on the legitimacy 
of the use of force. The desirability of such a dialogue drew little 
controversy.  
In their reactions to these remarks, the panellists made a number of points: 
• Dana Allin noted that indeed, the US ‘wedge’ strategy vis-à-vis the EU 
had not stopped. 
• Yuri Fedorov observed that there is a division in Russia between Euro-
centric and US-centric circles. But President Vladimir Putin had tended 
to choose the latter. Furthermore, the threat of international terrorism – 
which a number of participants agreed should be dealt with as a strategic 
threat, along the lines of the Solana document – brought together 
countries as disparate as Israel, India, the US and Russia, with elements 
of a possible coalition between these four countries. 
• Roberto Menotti, reacting to the ‘global versus regional’ debate, noted 
that the EU is not a global, hard-power strategic actor – so starting with 
the huge region extending from North Africa to Central Asia made 
sense. 
In the subsequent round of debate, there was an exchange concerning the 
meaning of ‘threat prevention’ as used in the Solana security strategy: did 
this encompass preventive military action or was this more specifically tied 
to actions related to the enforcement of international obligations in the 
framework of ‘effective multilateralism’? On this score, an EU expert 
recalled the mention of ‘coercive action’ (as a last resort) in the texts of the 
European Council meeting at Thessaloniki, which should be given due 
consideration alongside the Solana security strategy. With regard to the 
scope of the EU’s strategic concerns, he further added that, “We have to 
think afar because our interests are afar”. 
As the debate returned to the issue of the NRF, one analyst reminded the 
audience that the NRF was in part a US response to an initiative by Prime 
Ministers Tony Blair and Jose Maria Aznar, while another recalled that five 
out of the six high readiness units rotating every six months in the NRF are 
also in the ERRF force catalogue (while the sixth is Turkish). But this drew 
the retort that this prospect aggravated the situation, since the US wants to 
have first call on these resources. 
In his closing remarks, Yuri Fedorov raised the question of whether 
“multilateralism can be effective”, suggesting that history does not provide 
many positive examples in this field. Dana Allin, while noting the 
importance of a sense of “loss of alliance” in the US, observed that the 
Europeans are still closer to the US in terms of their world view than Russia 
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or India. Nevertheless he also suggested that waiting for a “regime change” 
in Washington would not be a sensible way out for the Europeans. Roberto 
Menotti’s statement that US actions would be crucial in shaping European 
policies did not come as a surprise. Indeed, in the Chairman’s words, Javier 
Solana’s document was no doubt threat-driven, but European policies – in 
some contrast to recent US attitudes – are also “friend-driven”, and this 
juxtaposition of motives is not simple to manage. 
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‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe: 
A Russian View 
Yuri E. Fedorov 
 
Europe is paralysed. The diplomatic catastrophe of 
the Iraq conflict has left it uncertain [as to] which 
way to turn, which demons to exorcise. It would be 
futile to conceal this identity crisis. Even the 
marvellous success of monetary unification cannot 
make us forget the intellectual breakdown of the 
largest economic union of the world. 
Andre Gluksmann1 
Introduction 
Andre Gluksmann’s view as quoted above is perhaps a little exaggerated as a 
reaction to the political and conceptual crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations, 
fuelled by the Iraqi war. The European Union is not paralysed, of course. Yet 
if the identity crisis affecting Europe and the strategic uncertainty produced 
by it are not overcome, then it is hardly possible to wait for the formation of 
a coherent, effective vision and policy of European security.  
The strategic uncertainty of European security  
Since the beginning of the Iraqi crisis of 2002–03 and especially after the 
American and British intervention in Iraq in March–April 2003, the 
questions posed about the future of the transatlantic security institutions 
erected at the time of the cold war, the prospects for a common European 
foreign and defence policy and a European security strategy have grown ever 
louder. These questions are essential but they remain unanswered.  
The current uncertainty is in many respects a result of the divisions among 
NATO member states on the war in Iraq. In addition to transatlantic 
differences, a boundary line between European states has emerged with 
respect to basic strategic issues. The split has been called a division between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. This very expression is in fact a shorthand, 
                                                          
1 See Andre Gluksmann, “West versus West”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 
28 April 2003. 
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simplistic, and in many respects, an incorrect description of a much more 
complicated set of developments in European international relations.  
Yet many believe that the war in Iraq was not the basic cause of these 
divisions but has accelerated and fuelled the decline of Western security and 
defence unity – including the identity crisis in European security – which 
began after the end of the cold war. In this light, the formation of a set of 
bilateral security relations between the US and the member states of Europe 
is often seen as more important than the presumptive disintegration of 
multilateral institutions, the first of these being the North Atlantic alliance. 
Dr Jonathan Eyal, the Director of Studies at the Royal United Services 
Institute, observed that, 
The old transatlantic community is being slowly dismantled by 
both sides, giving way to ad hoc bilateral military links between 
Washington and some Europeans…When the dust settles over 
Iraq, it will become clear that the dispute between Europeans 
and Americans has merely accelerated a process of decay in 
their relations, which began slowly and almost imperceptibly, 
with the collapse of communism.2 
If this vision is true, the development of a sustainable and coherent European 
security strategy is hardly possible because of the split among European 
nations with respect to fighting terrorism, handling ‘rogue states’ and similar 
issues. At the same time, there is also a theory that growing globalisation is 
leading, in the end, to deeper defence and security cooperation among the 
advanced democracies of the West. In this light, the principal question arises 
as to whether the current crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations is a tactical, short-
term phenomenon or whether the community of democratic nations is 
fundamentally dividing with respect to primary international security issues.  
The 2003 crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations is of significant importance not 
only for the family of advanced democratic nations but also for Russia. The 
crisis has called into question certain Russian conceptual views and has 
compelled Moscow to make some difficult strategic choices.  
Three models of European security 
To assess the possibility and the character of European security strategy, it is 
important to outline the probable structures of security relations within 
Europe and between Europe and the US. Three basic models of these 
relations may be useful to analyse the future of European security. 
                                                          
2 Jonathan Eyal (2003), “Battle of the Atlantic”, The World Today, Vol. 59, No. 
3, March, p. 6. 
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The restoration of transatlantic defence and security solidarity 
The first model presumes that growing globalisation and interdependence 
will lead in the final analysis to a restoration of transatlantic solidarity in 
defence and security areas. Such a development is possible if common 
perceptions of threats and a common strategy for preventing such threats are 
formed by the US and Europe, which means that sooner or later Europeans 
will have to share the same basic attitudes as current American strategic 
thinking. In the framework of this model, NATO would return to its former 
role as the central defence and security institution of the West; however, a 
deep transformation of the North Atlantic alliance would be necessary. 
Along with keeping its traditional function of defence of the North-Atlantic 
area, NATO would require new missions and effective capabilities to fight 
terrorism, prevent WMD proliferation, implement peace missions and to 
handle – or even correct – dangerous regimes that lie south of Europe. 
European armed forces and military institutions would continue to emerge as 
an additional resource to NATO. A limited cooperation between Russia and 
NATO is also possible with respect to fighting new threats.  
NATO’s decline and the rise of European defence and security 
institutions 
The next model of European security development presumes a further 
decline of the transatlantic defence and security structures and the 
development of Europe as a relatively independent locus of power that is 
able to defend itself against a variety of traditional and new threats. In this 
scenario, Europe would also have a role in maintaining peace and stability in 
the wider European area, such as the Balkans and the Black Sea regions, as 
well as in the neighbouring areas of the Mediterranean and the Near East.  
The implementation of this scenario is possible if: 
• transatlantic differences grow in security doctrines, concepts and 
strategies; 
• European nations are able to develop common threat perceptions and 
strategic doctrines; 
• the EU security and defence institutions are effective enough; and 
• European member states are able to increase their defence expenditures 
and build armed forces that are equipped with high-technology weapons 
and C4ISR systems (control, command, computers, communications, 
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance) comparable with those of 
the US.  
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In this scenario, Russia could turn into a constructive partner for Europe, in 
fighting some of the new threats and could also be a source of some 
advanced military technologies. At the same time, Russia may choose the US 
as a more promising security partner, bearing in mind the growing 
similarities in Russian and American security outlooks and the common 
security concerns related to developments in the Far East.  
The decline of the transatlantic and European security identities and 
the formation of ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ 
The third scenario postulates the further development of the trends in Euro-
Atlantic relations that appeared at the time of Iraqi war. These include: 
• the growing differences in threat perceptions, security concepts and 
interests between, on the one hand, the US and a particular group of 
European nations, and on the other hand, between two groups of 
European member states; 
• the decline (but not crash) of NATO and EU security institutions owing 
to the split between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe; and 
• the formation of a set of bilateral security and defence relations between 
the US and some European countries in the form of ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ or in other, more stable and institutionalised forms. 
For Russia, such a development creates the problem of choosing a strategic 
partner. It may be either the US (which seems most probable at the moment) 
or a group of European member states that in one way or another would be in 
opposition to the US.  
‘Old’ and ‘new’ Europe: The roots of division 
The ability of Europeans and Americans to form common threat perceptions, 
security concepts and doctrines as well as the ability of Europeans 
themselves to develop and maintain a security identity are key factors in the 
future of European security. To assess the probability of these developments 
taking place, one needs to outline the roots of the centrifugal processes that 
were fuelled by the Iraqi war.  
In fact, the divisions produced by the war occurred for a variety of reasons. 
France, whose political elites and public are still strongly affected by 
traditional Gaullist views, might have been concerned by the possibility that 
a successful war in Iraq would strengthen the American position in global 
geopolitics to the prejudice of French international interests. Some German 
political elites might have shared similar concerns. Yet the negative attitude 
in Germany towards the British and American intervention in Iraq was 
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mostly the result of Germany’s domestic political situation and the 
dependence of the German social-democratic government upon an anti-
American and antiwar sentiment, typical of a left-wing European political 
mindset. Nevertheless, the support of the British-American operation in Iraq 
by a number of European member states may have, to some extent, resulted 
from a desire to strengthen their own international profiles, against a 
background of worsening French-American and German-American relations.  
These are, however, only some of the reasons that fuelled the controversies 
in Euro-Atlantic relations on the eve of and during the war in Iraq. The 
controversies also resulted from the difference in threat perceptions.  
Since 11 September 2001, Americans perceive the threats related to 
international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and WMD proliferation far 
more dramatically than Europeans. Although these differences in perceptions 
have contributed to the crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations, they cannot fully 
explain it. Furthermore, such differences, albeit visible, are not fundamental; 
a few months before the intervention in Iraq, approximately half of 
Europeans were seriously concerned by the rise of international terrorism, 
Islamic fundamentalism, WMD proliferation and developments in the Arab-
Israeli conflict (see Table 1). The only considerable distinction between 
American and European threat perceptions was related to China.  
Table 1. Comparison of the threat perceptions held by the US public and the 
European public in 2002 (in percentages) 
Per cent that answered 
“critical” (US) or “extremely 
important” (Europe) 
 
 
Types of Threat 
US Europe Difference in public opinion 
International terrorism 91 64 27 
Iraq developing WMD 86 57 29 
Arab-Israeli conflict 67 42 25 
Islamic fundamentalism 61 47 14 
Immigration 60 37 23 
China as a world power 56 18 38 
Global warming 46 49 - 3 
Political turmoil in Russia 27 14 13 
Sources: Martin Ortega (2002), Iraq: A European Point of View, Occasional Paper No. 
40, p. 10, December, The EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, cited in the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshal Fund of the US (2002), 
“Comparing American & European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy”, 
Worldviews Survey 2002, p. 9, September, CCFR/GMF, Chicago. 
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At the same time Europeans were very worried that the war in Iraq might 
lead to mass human loss, especially among the Iraqi civilian population, and 
that even if British and American forces were to defeat Saddam’s regular 
armies, an intense guerrilla war would be inevitable. Further, there was 
concern that the power struggle among the Iraqi factions would prevent a 
post-war settlement. Also, the antiwar attitudes typical of many Europeans – 
as well as some Americans – resulted from some analytical assessments that 
the intervention in Iraq would lead to a deep destabilisation in the Middle 
East and ignite a powerful wave of Islamic terrorism that would deluge both 
Europe and the US. As a result, by the end of 2002 and the beginning of 
2003, some 75 to 90% of the population in the UK, Poland, the Netherlands 
and Turkey (countries that traditionally support American policy), were 
against the war in Iraq.3 The victorious, short-term war and the failure of the 
catastrophic forecasts have neutralised the effects of these views and 
concerns in Euro-Atlantic relations. Yet the relations have not been fully 
restored; antiwar and anti-American feelings still exist in Europe. 
The transatlantic crisis is also a result of the distinctions between ‘American’ 
and ‘European’ strategic cultures. In contrast to the US, the existence of an 
outer threat is a natural and customary element of a political entity in Europe, 
which has been formed by ages of political history. This attitude in Europe 
may make the perception of the threats related to international terrorism 
appear less dramatic than in America. Moreover, since the painful First 
World War, a visible trend towards the political settlement of conflicts has 
developed in European democracies. In particular, the ‘strategy of 
appeasement’ that permits a compromise with aggressive totalitarian regimes 
in order to prevent war began to play a noticeable, but not dominating role in 
European political thinking. In addition, there is the idea that the most 
effective way to assure international security is to strengthen legal norms and 
to build strong, multilateral international institutions able to provide their 
execution. Also, the ‘strategy of engaging’ dangerous states and regimes into 
international efforts and institutions to promote a new set of motivations has 
acquired a special importance. This strategy seeks to prove to rogue states 
that cooperation and the refusal of aggressive intentions are more fruitful 
than confrontation. Many among the European political elites and the 
European public believe that the use of military power cannot destroy the 
roots of threats, which are related to the growth of extremist movements in 
the Islamic world. Many in Europe also believe that these threats are 
generated by social inequality and poverty. That is why economic assistance 
and building a more equitable and just social order are seen as more effective 
                                                          
3 Philip H. Gordon (2003), “The Crisis in the Alliance”, Iraq Memo No. 11, The 
Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 24 February (retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20030224.htm). 
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tools of preventing terrorism than the use of force, which may serve to 
consolidate extremist forces and enlarge their social and political bases.  
In the wake of the terrorist assault of 11 September, some principal and most 
probably irreversible changes have taken place in the American strategic 
mindset. The current American administration and a large part of the 
American political domain are convinced that the threats of terrorism are too 
high and acute, and that political methods of preventing these are not 
effective enough. The threat of or actual use of force is seen as necessary, 
and in many cases it is viewed as the only way to fight terrorist networks or 
the states that support terrorism, encroach upon the territories of other 
countries and proliferate WMD. The strategic philosophy of the Bush 
administration presumes that multilateral institutions such as the UN or 
NATO can play a useful role in maintaining international security yet they 
are too bureaucratic, too slow and less effective than ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ or unilateral actions. Sometimes, the European orientation towards 
political solutions and multilateralism is seen by the US as an indication of 
European ‘fatigue’ and opportunism.  
The opponents of the current American approach believe that the US policy 
may endanger the very idea of collective governance of global economic and 
political developments. This argument is weighty because there are no 
guarantees that, despite being the most powerful nation, the US will still be 
able to assure international security and provide stable global economic and 
political order when acting unilaterally.  
The differences in strategic views and attitudes between Europe and the US 
result not only from the diversity of their political philosophies but also from 
the visible gap in their military power. With the exception of France and the 
UK, European countries are not able to implement large-scale military 
operations outside of Europe. The creation of a united European force is 
proceeding too slowly. The adaptation of the existing armed forces of 
European member states to the new geo-strategic landscape needs large 
financial resources; however, European member states are not ready to 
allocate such resources to modernise their military machines in accordance 
with the emerging revolution in military affairs or to equip them with modern 
weapons and other technologies. Yet without an increase in defence spending 
and greater cooperation in military areas, including the development and 
production of weapons and C4ISR systems, it is difficult (if even possible) to 
wait for a coherent European foreign, security and defence policy.  
The gap between American and European military power is highlighted by 
Europe’s lag behind the US in per capita defence expenditures (see Table 2). 
The total number of military personnel among the European NATO member 
 EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY | 161 
 
states is estimated to be about 2.3 million, which equates to 1 million more 
individuals in uniform than the total of the American armed forces.4  
Table 2. The defence expenditures of the US and European NATO member 
states, in billion of constant $US in 1999 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  
European NATO member states a 
Defence expenditures 154.4 156.7 148.3 135.6 126.0 
R&D expenditures 10.5 9.9 9.2 9.2 9.2 
Procurement 29.7 31.1 29.6 29.3 29.6 
  
United States b 
Defence expenditures 281.2  276.6 278.4 281.6 284.5 
R&D expenditures 37.9 37.8 38.3 37.9 39.3 
Procurement 46.6 47.2 52.2 55.2 61.2 
a Includes Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
b The budget of the US Department of Defense. 
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2001), The Military Balance 
2001–2002, p. 35, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Meanwhile, in 1997–2001 the gap in total defence expenditures between the 
US and Europe increased from about $127 billion up to almost $159 billion. 
The gap in funding military research and development is of special 
importance. It predetermines the lag in creating key high-technology weapon 
systems, including high-precision targeting and delivery means, and C4ISR 
systems (mostly space-based). For instance, during the last 10–15 years, the 
US has spent about $11 billion per year on space military programmes. 
Europe’s expenditures, in comparison, are unlikely to reach the sum of $1 
billion in the near future.5 The current American plans presume that by 2007, 
US defence expenditures will reach a total of $450 billion, while military 
research and development expenditures will reach $58 billion.6 
                                                          
4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002), The Military Balance 
2002-2003, p. 332, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2000), “European military 
satellites”, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 6, Issue 10, p. 2, December. 
6 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002), The Military Balance 
2002–2003, p. 241, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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The gap in military capabilities between Europe and the US has two 
consequences. First, the accent on using political means of conflict 
prevention and settlement may maintain Europe’s international influence, 
while the priority placed on its military force will lead to the growth of the 
American influence as the only power able to implement military operations 
all over the globe. Second, given that they are inferior to the US in terms of 
military power, most European countries are interested in maintaining their 
military cooperation with the US in order to save their own resources.  
Thus, there is a strong body of evidence that the rise of controversies in 
Euro-Atlantic relations, fuelled by the Iraqi war, was in fact a manifestation 
of serious contradictions in security concepts, interests and strategies among 
advanced democratic nations. This conclusion makes a restoration of 
transatlantic solidarity in defence and security areas highly unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. At the same time, European elites realise quite well that 
the demise of NATO would be very painful for Europe. Washington would 
also like to keep the North Atlantic alliance, although not as the central 
element of the US national security strategy. 
The split in Europe, together with the failure of French and German attempts 
to form an effective opposition to US policy, make the formation of an 
efficient European independent defence and security policy rather doubtful. 
In this light, current transatlantic security institutions will remain and 
European security institutions will continue to develop, but the role of these 
institutions will be uncertain and perhaps decline until the advanced 
democratic nations of the North Atlantic area develop common strategic 
attitudes either within transatlantic or European frameworks. Bilateral 
security institutions between the US and Europe will develop, however these 
will not be an effective substitute for multilateral structures. 
The ‘split’ in Europe: What does it mean for Russia? 
For Russia, the ‘split’ in Europe poses a number of challenges, both 
conceptual and political. Conceptually, before the Iraqi war Europe was 
basically seen in Russia as an integrating unit. Many believe that economic 
integration is followed inevitably by an integration of foreign, security and 
defence policies. In this general framework, two opposing concepts have 
developed.  
The first concept views the integration in Europe as an essential part of the 
integration of an overall community of advanced democratic nations, which 
also includes the US and Japan. Russia, as adherents of this vision believe, 
should cooperate with the nations of the North Atlantic area if it wants to 
remain an influential international actor.  
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The second concept presumes that since the end of the cold war, Europe has 
been turning into an integrated locus of power, which is independent of the 
US, and furthermore, even opposes it. This concept was one of the 
fundamental elements of the so-called ‘multipolar’ concept developed in 
Russia by former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugeny 
Primakov and his confederates from bureaucracy and academia. They 
insisted that Russia can and should play on potential, deepening 
controversies between the US and Europe in order to maintain its own 
international profile, despite Russia’s degrading economic and military 
capabilities.  
Although these two concepts are contradictory, both concepts presume that 
economic integration is followed by political and military integration. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe has called this basic 
thesis into question. Politically, Russian foreign policy has been challenged 
by a problem of choice: whether to support the US and the UK or to try to 
use the differences between ‘old’ Europe and the US to improve Russia’s 
international position. The Primakovian intellectual and political heritage, 
coloured by strong anti-American attitudes, has spurred Russia towards 
supporting the French/German opposition to the American-led intervention 
in Iraq. The split between the US and ‘old’ Europe has been perceived as the 
first practical evidence of the emerging ‘multipolar’ world. In February 2003, 
Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said quite clearly that, 
Russia, France and Germany recently presented a common 
approach to the settlement of the situation in Iraq. Many observers 
view this initiative as a new phenomenon in world politics, the 
significance of which goes beyond the Iraqi crisis…These 
developments reflect an emerging multipolar order.7 
The combination of the failure of Russian-French-German attempts to stop 
the US and British intervention in Iraq, the quick victory of anti-Saddam 
coalition and the strategic uncertainty about European defence and security 
policies have demonstrated the futility of the multipolar strategy. After the 
intense yet rather short crisis in US-Russian relations in spring 2003, 
Russia’s foreign policy has once again acquired a visible tendency towards 
closer cooperation with the US. Russia’s support of UNSC Resolution 1483 
was a clear indication of this trend. As for Europe, Russia’s approach to 
relations with the key European actors in the security domain will most 
probably depend on the ability of Europe to establish a coherent security 
strategy. 
                                                          
7Igor Ivanov, “America must not return to cold war attitudes”, The Financial 
Times, 13 February 2003. 
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Conclusion 
A vague European security identity is counterproductive to establishing an 
effective European security policy. Growing globalisation includes the 
formation of global threats such as the rise of political and religious 
extremism, international terrorism, WMD and missile proliferation and other 
threats typical of the beginning of the 21st century. To fight these threats, a 
closer cooperation among advanced democratic nations is needed, which 
combines all responsible forces and states, including Russia.  
 
 | 165 
European Security Strategy: Is it for real? 
Roberto Menotti 
his paper starts by offering a short answer to the direct question in the 
title that has been given for this series of ESF papers: it may be a 
qualified ‘yes’, since the document presented by High Representative 
for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) Javier Solana, last June 
constitutes a real effort and indeed a real step forward – but the security 
strategy is still, at best, on paper. The Solana document marks important 
progress mainly because it is probably setting in motion a dynamic that is 
badly needed if the EU is to become a more effective security provider. This 
dynamic features a ‘top-down’ approach to security requirements, i.e. 
proceeding from a definition of basic interests and goals, to the identification 
of threats and risks, to the formulation of a set of coordinated policies and 
thus a security strategy for the EU. 
What we can call the ‘bottom-up’ approach is equally necessary, but not 
sufficient. As we have seen since late 1998 (St. Malo), and even after the 
acceleration of 1999 (post-Kosovo), an EU focus on ‘capabilities first’ is not 
leading to rapid increases in usable military (or military-civilian) 
instruments. We are not looking at a total failure, but what has been achieved 
is clearly not enough and the persistent deficiencies are hampering the goals 
officially stated in key CFSP and European security defence policy (ESDP) 
documents. 
Having already identified common shortfalls, working to develop certain 
common or collective capabilities may be a good way to force more 
discipline on individual EU members in order to rationalise the use of scarce 
resources and gradually elaborate a unified doctrine on how these resources 
will be employed. Yet this incremental approach should not continue 
indefinitely, as ultimately, military planners require political guidance, just as 
public opinion demands to know where the taxpayer’s money is going. In 
other words, the critical questions that must be answered are: the EU is 
seeking to develop such military capabilities to do what? Why? Where? On 
whose behalf and under whose political control would such capabilities be 
employed? 
Of course, there were from the beginning – and there still are – very good 
political reasons to concentrate on capabilities and leave aside the thorny 
questions of EU ‘autonomy’ vis-à-vis NATO. But at the same time there is 
an equally strong argument to be made that the EU needs to get its act 
together (in a literal sense) by agreeing on two related commitments. First, 
the EU needs the political will to move forward in a collective framework on 
T 
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security and defence. Second, the EU needs a steadfast solidarity among EU 
members when under pressure, particularly during crisis conditions.  
The first commitment to adopt the collective framework is indispensable, 
with regard to arms procurement for example, or more generally in the 
planning for likely contingencies. Progress will come only if the expectation 
is that, unless otherwise decided, Europeans will act together on major 
security issues.  
As for the second commitment, the lack of solidarity was made most 
painfully evident by the open and acrimonious divisions on the Iraqi crisis in 
the latter part of 2002 and the first three months of 2003. Any semblance of a 
common EU foreign and security policy on the issue was totally eclipsed in 
the months preceding the British-American operation against Saddam 
Hussein. 
One essential task that the Solana paper can accomplish is to prompt the EU 
to take the initiative and re-launch a transatlantic dialogue based on 
European goals and priorities (which are not necessarily divergent from 
established NATO policies but are not necessarily identical either). American 
goals are pretty well-known – there is an argument to be made that these are 
not always as coherent and consistently pursued as many believe – while the 
‘aggregate’ European attitude is mostly reactive. Thus, the US administration 
sets the tone and the framework; individual European governments position 
themselves as they see fit; and finally, at some point, a residual EU position 
emerges, essentially as a minimum common denominator. Such an 
arrangement is not sustainable or rational to the extent that we are serious 
about making the EU into a true strategic partner of NATO, or even more 
importantly, of the US. 
It is difficult to believe that an official document, per se, is enough to 
radically change the course of the complex structural factors behind current 
transatlantic frictions or to overcome them. Yet, adopting an official security 
strategy raises the stakes and, potentially, builds a consensus around a new 
transatlantic deal – less automatic than in the past but equally fundamental 
for our security. And one of the main purposes of the whole exercise is 
precisely to ease the transition from the old Atlanticism to a vastly updated 
transatlantic framework in which the EU takes a higher profile. 
The good things 
First of all, in its current form, the Solana document offers a useful and 
accurate (albeit brief) description of how we got here. This summary is 
essential in order to discuss where to go from here and what to do next. 
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The climate in which the paper was produced is actually described with 
precision, including: the post-cold war opportunities coupled with new 
dangers of local conflicts; actual violence in the Balkans (i.e. on European 
soil); an increasing need for troop (and police) deployments in sometimes 
distant places; and the realisation of a potential combination of ‘new threats’ 
(international and catastrophic terrorism), WMD proliferation, failed states 
and organised crime. The transatlantic context is also described, citing not 
only US preponderance in most dimensions of power and influence, but also 
American (as well as European) vulnerability and the consequent 
requirement of sustained multilateral cooperation in order to achieve more 
effective international governance. 
Along with all of the dimensions of risk and threat, the paper is in practice a 
‘wake-up call’ designed to counter a sense of complacency among 
Europeans. Indeed, complacency and introversion seem to be the underlying 
concerns – and rightly so. But this has the interesting effect of bringing the 
stated EU approach much closer to that of official US policy than it has 
appeared so far. 
Undoubtedly, as has been widely noted, there are elements of convergence in 
the Solana document with recent US policy statements, as well as with 
established NATO policies (about which Lord Robertson has been quick to 
remark in recent speeches). 
The three main points in the document are: 
• that international terrorism is recognised as a strategic threat to Europe 
(as well as to the US and others); 
• that a broader European contribution to global security and stability is 
called for and more specifically there is a “need to develop a strategic 
culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust 
intervention”; and 
• that the worst-case scenario is identified as consisting of a combination 
or linkage of the three main ‘new threats’ discussed in the paper: 
“Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to 
maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction and 
the failure of state systems – we could be confronted with a very radical 
threat indeed”; this statement is remarkably similar to the expressions 
adopted in the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 and 
several other US administration statements. 
Beyond the specific wording, the points above are not particularly surprising 
or even contested in policy circles, but if fully adopted by the European 
Council they may contribute to a smoother transatlantic discussion on issues 
that are by their very nature controversial, such as counterterrorism 
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operations, counter-proliferation policies and particularly ‘pre-emptive 
strikes’ on potential sources of threat, which are discussed later. 
Indeed, since the American security role is inevitably a point of reference for 
the evolving European security strategy, it is instructive to read the whole 
Solana draft in parallel with the US National Security Strategy. Nevertheless, 
we should not exaggerate the similarities; unlike the US Security Strategy, 
the Solana document is not intended primarily as the endpoint of a policy 
review process, but instead as the starting point of a relatively slow policy 
production process. In other words, there is not much in terms of existing or 
past security policies on which Solana’s team can build. There are disparate, 
though sometimes overlapping, national policies and traditions, as well as 
precious but limited EU experience in peacekeeping missions, but no 
common strategic culture. In fact, the development of a shared strategic 
culture is precisely one of the central functions that the document and its 
future versions can perform. If it does, it will have been ‘for real’ so to speak. 
It is fitting that the European Security Forum has chosen to discuss the merits 
of the EU strategy paper almost exactly two years after the terrorist attacks 
that significantly accelerated a shift in US foreign policy, but which certainly 
have not changed everything, as some were led to believe in the heat of 
events. The Solana document explicitly takes on board some of the lessons of 
11 September 2001. It reflects many of the concerns raised by the collective 
shock of the terrorist attacks, by depicting a world of potentially radical 
threats that, frankly, most Europeans and many Americans did not perceive 
or did not take very seriously before 11 September. 
Stating that international terrorism is a ‘strategic threat’ means recognising 
that this phenomenon has been underestimated in security planning, while 
the focus so far has been on (mostly domestic) law enforcement and 
intelligence efforts (often uncoordinated even among close allies). We could 
add that the risks of transnational terrorist networks have been raised in the 
context of specific regional conflicts that have a potential to produce a 
terrorist ‘spin-off’, including the volatile situation of the Western Balkans. 
But the notion that there is such a thing as ‘international terrorism’ as a 
distinctive threat is a new construct for Europeans. 
Therefore, Solana’s draft document amounts to a deliberate effort to raise the 
level of alert to a newly discovered threat, whose magnitude may still be 
insufficiently appreciated not only at the common EU level but also at the 
public level of individual countries – especially when it comes to actually 
committing additional resources. 
This state of affairs can be termed a ‘Venus paradox’ – to borrow the black 
and white distinction proposed by Robert Kagan; Venus (Europe) feels 
secure, but is in fact not secure. At best, it is less secure than most people 
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believe. At worst, it suffers from a dangerous misperception, the illusion of 
security under a rather outdated transatlantic umbrella. The picture drawn by 
Mr Solana is truly one of a complacent and introverted Europe that needs to 
overcome its Venus syndrome and fully take on a global role.  
It is important to note that, in identifying potential threats, the document 
actively contributes to the development of a ‘European narrative’ on security 
affairs. The emphasis placed on the Balkan crises of the early 1990s is telling 
in this respect: this experience has been formative for the EU and most of the 
concepts adopted in the Solana document are drawn from there. These 
concepts include the spillover potential of local crises, the overlap of 
humanitarian and broader political concerns in a given violent crisis, the 
various options in the field of crisis management and international 
intervention, and the central role of prevention and early engagement (now 
merged in the somewhat odd concept of ‘pre-emptive engagement’). 
The limitations and possible improvements  
Since the EU Security Strategy is a work in progress, discussing the Solana 
draft is an integral part of the dynamic that this paper alluded to at the 
beginning. An official document concentrates the mind, and details can 
obviously be extremely important to the overall message that is sent and the 
policy direction that is delineated.  
Before commenting on the drafting process, the sequence of items and in one 
area, the precise wording, it should be noted that the document is being 
evaluated on the assumption that one of its tasks should be to present, in a 
relatively reader-friendly fashion, the rationale and motivations for a 
common EU security policy and to offer a ‘vision’, both to European citizens 
and to the rest of the world. In summary, this is not only a technical product, 
but also a public statement that should reach a wide audience and provide a 
framework for future debates. 
One general comment is that the threat assessment sounds a bit vague at 
times, possibly because the definition of what the EU wants in the world, and 
what it is ready to stand for, is not spelled out – beyond stating a 
commitment to cooperation, openness, legitimacy and legality. For instance, 
when assessing the impact of ‘regional conflicts’, the first two cases cited are 
Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula. The document asserts that these conflicts 
“impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer 
to home, above all in the Middle East”. The potential implications of this 
statement should deserve more careful consideration, since it is not 
immediately evident that Kashmir or Korea are – or should be – perceived as 
directly affecting any major EU interest. Even the Middle East, taken as a 
whole, is a somewhat vague reference.  
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The strategy could benefit from a more detailed geopolitical vision, i.e. a 
willingness to fully adopt a regional perspective to differentiate among levels 
of threat. This need for differentiation is especially clear in the case of what 
is usually called the ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Balkans to the 
eastern Mediterranean, and from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia. The 
reference to this vast region in the paper is concentrated in the section on 
“Extending the Zone of Security around Europe”, where it is specified that 
“our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the 
EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close 
and cooperative relations”. 
Here is where geography becomes a key point: a major nuclear crisis in 
Korea may pose less immediate risk to the EU than a political assassination 
in the Western Balkans, a contested election in North Africa or a relatively 
minor border dispute in the Caucasus. It would also be useful to distinguish 
between major confrontations (India-Pakistan being one case in point), 
prolonged violent clashes on a local level (such as Chechnya) and military-
diplomatic standoffs that nonetheless carry great risks of escalation (such as 
Korea or Taiwan). Such distinctions could be introduced without falling into 
the trap of writing down a long laundry list. 
In making such critical remarks, we should not lose sight, however, of the 
central aim of the document: to raise the awareness of the interconnection of 
rather disparate phenomena, often generating far away from the physical 
territory of the EU. In many ways, the greatest danger against which Mr 
Solana is guarding is neglect, since neglecting a local or nascent source of 
instability leads to deterioration or even contagion – particularly in the cases 
of state failures and organised crime. 
The focus of the Solana paper is therefore a triad of new threats, defined as 
“more diverse, less visible and less predictable” than large-scale aggression, 
such as international terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states and 
organised crime. 
There is a missing link with regard to the sponsors of terrorist activities, most 
notably state sponsors – in other words, rogue states. As will be seen, the 
same can be said of WMD, as in both cases Mr Solana does not make the 
connection between specific types of regimes and specifically threatening 
international behaviours (either directly or pursued by offering assistance and 
support to non-state actors). More generally, international terrorism is by 
definition a phenomenon that involves a wide web of complicity, including 
those at the political level. The Afghan regime was not removed in the 
aftermath of 11 September because it was a failed state, but because it came 
to be recognised as a key seedbed of international terrorism. 
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The proliferation of WMD is indicated as “the single most important threat to 
peace and security among nations”, with the specific risk of a WMD arms 
race in the Middle East and the spread of missile technology cited as 
immediate European problems. In practice, three distinct kinds of threats are 
conflated here: the first is the effect of the use of WMDs that are not aimed at 
an EU country (either accidental or deliberate); the second is a direct attack 
by a state against an EU country; the third kind of threat is an attack carried 
out by a terrorist group (a non-state actor). The latter is described as the most 
worrisome scenario because “in such cases, deterrence would fail”, which 
seems to imply that in the previous two cases deterrence would work. 
The issue of deterrence is important per se, as well as in the context of the 
strengthening of treaty regimes: if enhanced or new regimes are needed, it is 
important to know whether deterrence should be an integral part of them and 
what role it could play. In addition, if deterrence is not viewed as reliable, 
more emphasis should probably be placed on defensive measures, including 
missile defence systems. 
More generally, it may be good to keep the distinctions between the various 
aspects of the WMD threat, since these probably require different policies. 
Some issues could be tackled through a package approach, but others could 
require specific measures, ranging from technical assistance to maintain or 
dismantle weapon systems, to legally binding rules on inspections and 
transparency, and from tighter export control regimes to intelligence 
capabilities and (offensive) military instruments. 
There is also a practical need to manage the proliferation of WMD once it 
has already taken place to a significant degree – as witnessed in the recent 
cases of India, Pakistan and North Korea or the older problem of Israel. This 
reality calls for a strategy of proliferation-management beyond counter-
proliferation. 
Under the heading “Failed States and Organised Crime”, the paper makes a 
connection between “bad governance, civil conflict and the easy availability 
of small arms”, on the one hand, and a weakening of state institutions on the 
other. The latter in turn leads to the rise of criminal elements with a 
transnational/international projection. With respect to other risks and threats, 
it may be necessary to distinguish among levels of danger: Montenegro or 
Albania may be more of a ‘threat’ in terms of criminal activities than 
Somalia, Liberia or Afghanistan. Weak states closer to home are probably a 
more immediate concern for public opinion (as well as for parliaments and 
important pressure groups), than more distant failing or failed states where 
brutal conflicts are underway. Again, geographical differentiation may 
deserve more consistent attention. 
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A central issue definitely requiring more clarity is the use of the expression 
‘pre-emptive engagement’. Given the frequent usage of the term ‘pre-
emption’ in the media (especially after the publication of the US National 
Security Strategy in September 2002), often interchangeably with 
‘prevention’, an excessive focus on a single word may be beyond the point. 
Yet, the concept of pre-emptive action (including, of course, coercive action) 
is just too relevant and too controversial to be left hanging. In any case, the 
EU strategy should not try to paper over the issue by introducing even more 
confusion than already exists in this field.  
Preventing a threat or an event from materialising practically means that the 
threat does not come into existence, precisely because it is ‘stopped’ or 
eliminated before it reaches a certain threshold. In other words, it is kept at 
the level of risk or potential threat. Pre-empting a threat, however, means (at 
least according to most American English and British English dictionaries) 
something different: it refers to a particular action or intervention that 
eradicates a threat; even more specifically (according to the Oxford English 
reference dictionary), to pre-empt means to “prevent (an attack) by disabling 
an enemy”. The noun pre-emption is accordingly defined (at least in the 
military sphere) as “the action or strategy of making a pre-emptive attack”.  
This basic distinction should form the basis for a clarification in the strategy 
paper. In particular, it seems inappropriate to logically argue for a policy of 
‘pre-emptive engagement’ (itself an interesting neologism) starting with the 
premise that “trade and development policies can be powerful tools for 
promoting reform…contributing to better governance through assistance 
programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures [and] should be an 
important element in a European Union security strategy”, and then it follow 
it immediately with the statement that “pre-emptive engagement can avoid 
serious problems in the future”. 
Why not use the well-tested word ‘prevention’, with its soft power 
connotation? Why not confine ‘pre-emption’ to the exercise of hard, coercive 
power? 
Instead, the confusion is compounded by the subsequent paragraph, which 
calls for a toughening of EU conditional policy by referring to “a number of 
countries [that] have placed themselves outside the bounds of international 
society”; in the event that these countries continue their behaviour, “they 
should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their 
relationship with the European Union”. Although there is no mention of 
coercive measures here, the tone suggests a very assertive approach. And the 
countries that inevitably come to mind are those otherwise indicated as 
‘rogue states’ – precisely the natural target of (real) pre-emptive action, 
particularly with regard to WMD proliferation and terrorist activities. 
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In summary, various interpretations are possible and are all perfectly 
legitimate, but these issues are just too serious and complex to allow 
confusion on terminology. A solid consensus on fundamentals cannot be 
constructed when times get tough, so it will have to be achieved in advance 
of the next crisis. 
The larger challenges ahead 
At a different level, one has to recognise that there is a daunting security 
agenda for the 21st century, characterised by risks and threats that can 
‘mutate’ unexpectedly, as well as move geographically. Technological, 
socio-demographic and environmental trends may converge to produce 
crucial changes in the strategic landscape, in ways that no security strategy 
can fully anticipate. 
Unfortunately, the EU countries have missed an opportunity that presented 
itself around the 1999–2000 period, to accelerate the development of a 
coherent, albeit fairly limited, security strategy. The security agenda of that 
period was pretty well-defined and, just as importantly, there was a broad 
agreement among the key governments on the most pressing priorities: 
enhanced crisis management and robust peacekeeping/peace-making 
capabilities to be applied in Europe’s immediate periphery (with the logical 
corollary of effective political decision-making and unity of operational 
command). It would have been natural to start from there and then perhaps 
aim higher as capabilities would develop over time – in parallel with a 
political/strategic vision for ‘greater Europe’. In the immediate aftermath of 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the momentum existed for taking the ESDP concept a step 
further, from a wish list of assets to a transformational instrument benefiting 
all EU members without detriment to NATO’s role (as the latter remained 
centred on collective defence against higher-level threats). 
Instead, what happened was a slow start, characterised by uneven progress, 
with the ready-made Petersburg Tasks adopted as benchmarks but little 
ability to fully implement both NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) 
and the EU’s own Headline Goal, while the Berlin Plus agreement was 
finalised only in late 2002. As we know all too well, this phase was followed 
by the shock of the events of 11 September and in turn by the badly divisive 
debate over Iraq.  
Throughout all of this, an EU foreign and security policy seemed to recede 
into the background, reduced to just another double acronym – CFSP/ESDP 
– which to this day remains obscure and irrelevant to the vast majority of 
European citizens. Even worse, the lack of mutual trust on security issues 
that permeated the intra-EU discussion ‘contaminated’ NATO, while the 
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uncertainty about the alliance’s future (and about US foreign policy under 
the new administration) contributed to slowing down the crucial decisions to 
be made at the EU level. A vicious circle was almost created instead of the 
often-invoked ‘synergy’. 
Of course, the events of 11 September would have occurred with or without 
an effective ESDP and the Iraqi crisis would have probably produced a 
serious rift under any circumstance. Yet, the habit of close cooperation and 
solidarity that the post-Kosovo climate might have produced within the EU 
had the potential to break new ground (and positively affect the debate on the 
future of transatlantic relations towards a more balanced and mature Euro-
American link). 
One may well conclude that it was simply impossible for things to happen 
more rapidly than they have in the field of European security and defence. 
After all, CFSP itself is a very young creature and the EU as a living 
experiment in hyper-integration is very recent by any historical standard. The 
fact remains that, in retrospect, the period from mid-1999 to September 2001 
strikes one as having been a window of opportunity, almost the proverbial 
quiet before the storm. 
The end result is that today’s world looks populated by shadowy threats, 
often de-territorialized and against which any society must feel somewhat 
vulnerable and at times even powerless. At the same time, Europe’s key ally 
– the US – has developed a world view that is not, at least in the short term, 
conducive to the nuanced arrangements and the gradual, steady advances 
required by the maturation of an EU security strategy. On the contrary, 
American policies tend (sometimes deliberately, sometimes accidentally) to 
fragment the EU front and force the toughest decisions on individual 
European governments. Difficult missions have come to determine uneasy 
coalitions just when the EU needs some time to become an effective coalition 
itself and define its own long-term missions. 
The very simplified picture drawn in this paper is not intended to look at an 
idealised past (a ‘missed window of opportunity’) with longing and regret, 
but rather to sketch some key problems we will continue to face in the future: 
how to consolidate the role of the EU as the main stabiliser in the area of the 
long ‘arc of instability’ that lies to the immediate southeast of its current 
frontier, while simultaneously tackling a whole set of global phenomena that 
are now – rightly – high on the agenda. 
From both a functional and a regional perspective, it would have been more 
effective for the EU to take over from NATO the tasks of military-civilian 
crisis management, especially in greater Europe, while gradually upgrading 
European capabilities to project military-civilian forces anywhere they may 
be needed. This transition is happening in any case, but is perceived to be 
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much less relevant than it was just three years ago, because the mutation of 
threats has dramatically accelerated. The progressive accumulation of 
experience, self-confidence and credibility that comes with carrying out 
successful, limited missions close to home is now almost dwarfed by the 
colossal task of fighting a global terrorist network potentially armed with 
WMDs, which acts in collusion with rogue states and takes advantage of 
failed states and criminal connections. A global horizon requires a new 
mindset and this is especially demanding for a group that has grown 
accustomed to working in either regional or sectoral frameworks and is 
having to painfully improve its collective decision-making mechanisms. 
These growing pressures worsen the already serious resource crunch (elite 
and special forces are especially overstretched, as are peacekeepers and 
policemen, as it remains difficult to carry them to their destination, support 
them while in place, keep them safe and bring them back). Each national 
government tends to work in a protracted ‘emergency mode’ instead of 
favouring long-term planning and close coordination. If the genuinely global 
nature of various emerging threats is putting a great strain on the operational 
capabilities and the prevailing mindset of the US military apparatus 
(including its intelligence component and the links with domestic law 
enforcement agencies), it is self-evident that the EU will have a very long 
way to go. Thus the challenges are certainly ‘for real’. 
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America: No Time for Strategic Thinking 
An American View 
Dana H. Allin 
ecurity strategy should be about underlying principles and the long 
term, but there are times when the contingencies of the historical 
moment crowd out the possibility. This is what the debacle of post-war 
Iraq has done to any immediate hope of reconciling transatlantic differences 
over security strategy. It has done so in two ways. First, the stunning mystery 
of Iraq’s undiscovered weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has cast a 
fundamental – even epistemological – cloud over the intelligence problem 
that is at the heart of any workable strategy of pre-emption. Second, the 
security quagmire that post-war Iraq looks like becoming is likely for the 
foreseeable future to restrain America’s appetite for large-scale military 
action against ‘rogue’ WMD threats. This development is not necessarily a 
happy one – there are threats of a magnitude that require action and against 
which military intervention could be the only effective action. But it looks 
like the reality at present. 
This context makes it difficult to judge whether the evolution of European 
thinking on security strategy – as reflected in ‘A Secure Europe in a Better 
World’, by High Representative for the EU’s common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP) Javier Solana – will go far enough to meet American concerns 
at least halfway. What we can say is that for the better part of a decade, the 
major European powers and the European Union as a whole have been 
developing a more robust concept of the role of military force in an overall 
grand strategy.1 Yet a transatlantic consensus remains elusive. Things could 
change with another major terrorist attack, a ripening of nuclear crises in Iran 
or North Korea or even a dramatic improvement in Iraq’s security and 
governance. But for the time being, American concerns will be singularly 
driven by its current difficulties. 
Intelligence and commitment 
The obligatory opening to any discussion about the missing Iraqi biological, 
chemical and nuclear programmes is that it is still too early to tell: the 
evidence could yet be uncovered. And although it is indeed too early to tell, 
                                                          
1 The evolution of some countries, such as Germany, is obviously more dramatic 
than that of others – notably Britain and France – as they were not very timid 
about the use of force in the first place. 
S 
 EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY | 177 
 
it is getting later and later. This view is summed up by Francis Fukuyama, no 
political foe of the Bush administration, who has observed that,  
After three months in which the US has had every conceivable 
opportunity to threaten, bribe and cajole Iraqi scientists 
involved in the WMD programme to reveal their whereabouts, 
not a single one has done so. On the contrary, they have all 
stuck to the official line from before the war, that these 
weapons once existed but were disposed of sometime after the 
first UN inspectors arrived back in 1991. We have to confront 
the possibility that they are telling the truth.2 
Mr Fukuyama goes on to say that accusations against the Bush 
administration are misguided, because it was not just the Bush administration 
that claimed Iraq was developing these weapons. The assessment was 
general: it included the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the 
Clinton administration, independent experts and the intelligence communities 
of nations that had supported the war as well as those that had opposed it. 
The assessment was based on the fact that the Iraqis had ambitious chemical, 
biological and nuclear programmes before the first Gulf war, that they clearly 
made an effort to continue them after the war and that they systematically 
lied about what was going on throughout the whole UNSCOM period. The 
assessment also relied to a greater or lesser extent on the reasonable 
proposition that if they were lying so systematically, they must have had 
something to lie about. 
Mr Fukuyama is too easy on a Bush administration that painted the threat in 
the direst terms to justify a war about which many friends of America had 
good reason to be wary. Even accepting what was then the consensus view 
on Iraqi programmes, it was reasonable to argue, as former UK Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook did argue in his resignation speech before the House 
of Commons, that “Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the 
commonly understood sense of the term – namely a credible devise capable 
of being delivered against a strategic city target”.3 Whatever the good 
reasons were for deposing Saddam Hussein – and they were many – the 
credibility of the administration’s case about the specific threat posed by 
Iraq’s programmes will affect the reception accorded to future American 
arguments for pre-emptive action.  
This consequence is worrying precisely because Mr Fukuyama is correct in a 
larger sense: while the Bush administration should be held accountable for its 
                                                          
2 Francis Fukuyama, “The Real Intelligence Failure”, The Wall Street Journal, 5 
August 2002.  
3 Robin Cook’s resignation speech, 18 March 2003. 
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hype and exaggerations, this should not divert us from the looming problem 
of a terrorist-WMD nexus or the difficulty of obtaining politically actionable 
intelligence. What we thought we knew about Iraq was ‘politically 
actionable’ in the US Congress and the UK House of Commons, but not in 
the UN Security Council, NATO or the court of world opinion. It is easy to 
imagine cases where the threat would be graver and more immediate, yet the 
intelligence would even less conclusive and less convincing. 
And whatever the final judgment is about this particular case, the larger 
problem is undeniable. In the new strategic context after 11 September 2001, 
the Bush administration (and the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair) 
did make a compelling argument that proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction among outlaw regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s was no longer 
tolerable. This conclusion was not because of any particular evidence of a 
substantial link between Iraq’s regime and al-Qaeda. Rather, it was because 
of the clearly documented determination of al-Qaeda to acquire WMD and 
the prospective logic of its eventually approaching other sworn enemies of 
America and the West for this purpose.4 
One could even take the view that the truth about Iraq didn’t matter, i.e. ‘if it 
walks like a duck and talks like a duck’, then the international community 
has no choice but to ‘treat it like a duck’. In the case of Iraq, for more than a 
decade the regime of Saddam Hussein flawlessly played the part of a serial 
and unreformable violator of UN demands that it dismantle its WMD 
programmes. If it turns out to have been, at least in the final years, just a 
bizarre bit of totalitarian play-acting – well, at least the example will have 
been set for other rogue regimes about the costs of failing to fulfil UN 
Chapter 7 demands on WMD fully, transparently and to the letter. 
Sadly, perhaps, things can never be so simple, for the strategic demands of 
actually taking on these rogue regimes involve strategic (not just legal or 
moral) judgments about whether war is wise or necessary at a given point in 
time. Whether the problem is defined as the repeated violations of UN 
Chapter 7 demands, as an immediate strategic-level threat, or, for that matter, 
as a massive humanitarian outrage, the solution will often require a regime 
change.5 (The assumption here is that coercive diplomacy has failed, as it 
                                                          
4 The objection that Islamic fundamentalists and secular Ba’thists were 
ideologically incompatible was really no more reassuring that the suggestion that 
Nazi Germany and Communist Russia could never have cooperated. 
5 Walter Slocombe, in a paper delivered to the European Security Forum on the 
eve of the Iraq war, made a persuasive case why this must be so for the WMD 
threat. Here it is simply added that the major Western interventions of recent 
years, which were less controversial than Iraq, involved regime changes. This 
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often will.) And regime change carries the obvious obligation of follow-up 
state- or nation-building. Here is the second way in which Iraq has clouded 
the possibility for transatlantic consensus on security strategy. As Morton 
Abramowitz, a long-time advocate of sustained US engagement in nation-
building has argued: 
Bush has probably achieved, inadvertently, what he 
campaigned for: getting the United States out of nation-
building…He has done this by embarking on nation-building 
unprecedented since World War II and in a land that we do not 
know well and that does not play to our strengths. And it was 
done, it is now clear, with little effective planning and with 
largely unexamined notions of what can be accomplished.6 
One may add to this point the real possibility that the invasion of Iraq will 
end up making the Islamist-terrorism problem less, not more, manageable 
(this opinion is not ventured from a position of having opposed the war – at 
least not as a matter of principle). And it is important to add that, since 
premature withdrawal from Iraq would be a disaster for the US, one has to 
believe that the alternative of staying can yield some measure of success. But 
it is also clear that the best of intentions can produce strategic blunders. 
Paper tiger? 
America, in short, will be distracted. This reality overshadows the question 
of how the US may react to a more robust European security strategy. In any 
event, is such a strategy at hand? It certainly is on paper, and while paper 
products are easy to deride, it is important that the Solana document is well-
written, straight-forward, clear and direct in dealing with the most 
compelling security threats of the early 21st century. These are all qualities 
that some Americans are quick to judge as alien to European strategic 
culture. Nevertheless European strategic culture is evolving and it has done 
so since the early failures in the Balkans. Ideas matter, as do their expression 
and reception by EU ministers. Yet this is not a document that is confined to 
the so-called ‘Venus’ or other international relations theories. 
It sets clear benchmarks against which the European Union may soon be 
judged: “Those who are unwilling to follow the norms of the international 
community should understand that there is a price to be paid, including their 
relationship with the European Union” (p. 10). Much favourable commentary 
                                                                                                                                   
was absolutely the case for Afghanistan and the net effect in the Balkans. Nation-
building responsibilities followed. 
6 Morton Abramowitz, “After Iraq, Shrinking Horizons”, The Washington Post, 
31 July 2003. 
180 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
has noted that the European Union appears to be taking this line seriously in 
its attitude towards Iran’s nuclear programme.7 American confidence in 
Europe as a security partner could be greatly affected by whether the EU 
carries this tougher Iran policy through to its logical conclusion. Likewise, 
where the Solana document says that “We need to develop a strategic culture 
that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (p. 13), 
there is every reason to expect that the conjunction of outlaw regimes, WMD 
and terrorism could soon put that strategic readiness to the test. 
If the promise of this document is fulfilled, it would constitute a serious 
challenge to the United States, and may actually coax the Americans back 
into a strategic posture that emphasises global cooperation and a sensible mix 
of hard and soft power. But much will depend, as suggested at the outset, on 
historical and political contingencies. If a Democratic administration is 
elected in 2004, it would probably be receptive to such a development in 
Europe. So too may a second-term Bush administration that is chastened by 
its difficulties in Iraq. It is also possible, however, that these difficulties will 
just embitter the American public and elites, and keep the administration on 
ideological overdrive. 
Inflexible European attitudes could aggravate the problem. The Solana paper 
is perfectly reasonable in arguing that: “strengthening the United Nations, 
equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a 
European priority” (p. 9). But Europeans also need to recognise the special 
challenge of hard cases. If France, for example, beguiled by its vision of a 
multipolar webbing to restrain American power, adopts a rigid formula 
towards force and legitimacy, one fears a vicious cycle of competing 
transatlantic ideologues. A view that only the UN Security Council can 
confer legitimacy on military action could be as counterproductive as the 
right-wing American aversion to all things UN – and just as unnecessary. 
France and Europe did not take a dogmatic attitude towards the UN-based 
legitimacy for the Kosovo war. A similar pragmatism is called for in 
addressing threats of a character unforeseen by the drafters of the UN 
Charter. 
                                                          
7 See for example Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane (2003), “The European 
Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning from Failure”, Survival, 45, No. 3, 
pp. 179–180, Autumn. 
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Introduction 
François Heisbourg 
e were fortunate in having ahead of the meeting three thoughtful, 
broad-spectrum papers from which to work. All three of the 
authors of the papers were asked by the Chairman to pronounce 
on the validity of the ‘Greater Middle East’ (GME) concept. Michael 
Stürmer, who made the first presentation, commented that there is a certain 
unity to the region, notably in terms of the problems it shares. In referring to 
his paper, he warned against the American tendency to see democracy as a 
panacea, as it takes a very long time indeed to establish democracy in 
cultural terms. In the interval, the Americans should make sure that they 
really want what they say they want. He also warned against a face-value 
approach to the GME: there is more than one truth behind what one sees. In 
looking at the EU’s or NATO’s action in the region, he underscored the 
absence of any clear military role in the Middle East, apart, possibly, from 
the kind of monitoring that occurs in the Sinai. 
Steve Simon noted that his paper had a somewhat more optimistic tone than 
that he wished to convey. He underlined the massive labour supply overhang 
as a general feature in the GME and that this fact alone made it impossible to 
be optimistic. He defended the view that democracy should be the priority, 
albeit one for the long term: it should be encouraged from the outside, but it 
cannot be imposed. Concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions, he feared that this 
could prove to be an ultimate source of division rather than of unity between 
the EU and the US. This situation is all the more worrying given the stakes – 
it is not for nothing that Saudi Arabia has in the past acquired MRBMs 
(missiles) from China or that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has bought 
nuclear-capable aircraft that have the ability of striking Tehran. On Israeli-
Palestinian relations, Mr Simon considered that the EU and the US will have 
to ensure that an eventual Palestinian state will not implode upon its creation. 
Irina Zvygelskaya was diffident vis-à-vis the GME category. Indeed, an 
analysis by sub-regions demonstrated that democratisation was not 
universally hopeless. In particular, non-Arab states such as Turkey or 
Kazakhstan offered greater scope for optimism than a state such as Egypt. 
Similarly, although militant Islam is present everywhere, it is not as great a 
threat in Central Asia as elsewhere in the GME. In referring to her paper, she 
expressed special concern about the Islamisation of Iraq as a result of US 
intervention. 
Walter Slocombe was our fourth speaker, recently returned from Iraq, where 
he served in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as de facto Minister 
of Defence. He underscored the huge price the US was still paying for the 
W
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events of 1991, when Saddam Hussein was allowed to crush the Shi’ite 
intifada. Although considering that there was a reasonable chance of success 
of the US policy in Iraq, he also noted that this is the first time that members 
of the international community are trying to build a liberal regime and a 
market economy in a continued state of war. Against the adversaries on the 
ground – most notably those Baathist insurgents who revealingly call 
themselves the ‘Party of Return’, the US could play on a number of 
strengths, including the interests of certain groups such as the Kurds, the Shia 
and women. This enterprise is made more difficult by the fact that no local 
equivalent of Nelson Mandela or even of Hamid Qarzai in Afghanistan has 
emerged. 
In the opening round of the debate, one British participant recently returned 
from duty in southern Iraq observed that Baghdad (and its problems) was not 
Iraq as a whole. Nevertheless, he criticised the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of 
the US to post-war reconstruction in a complex country; unlike Mr 
Slocombe, he had not learned how to wear a helmet but had learned how not 
to wear one. Broadening the spectrum, another participant suggested that one 
of the reasons we use the expression ‘GME’ is because we fear that if 
something goes wrong in one part of the region, things will go wrong in 
other parts – it may be worthwhile thinking the other way around. 
Yet another participant considered the GME as a useful organising principle, 
with five key words: democratisation (as an objective); al-Qaeda; Baghdad 
(arguing, unlike Mr Slocombe, that maybe we shouldn’t have gone in); 
Tehran (is the prospect of use of force on or off the table?); and Jerusalem 
(should the Geneva Accords be endorsed by the Quartet?). As a response, 
there was no dispute with one panellist’s contention that it was too late to 
argue about whether the war in Iraq was right or wrong, even if the fact 
remained that no WMD had been found to date and a firm Baathist link with 
al-Qaeda had not been established. Nor was there any disagreement 
concerning the strains between the CPA’s action in the centre and the 
situation in the provinces. Similarly, although there was a strong preference 
for a cooperative solution with Iran, no one on the panel suggested that force 
should be entirely and explicitly removed as an option. Yet there was no 
unanimity on the Geneva Accords: for one panellist, it was unrealistic to talk 
about the return to the 1967 Green Line while ignoring the central issue of 
the Palestinians’ commitment to deal with terrorism; however, another 
panellist thought that the Geneva Accords were better than giving the power 
of veto to the terrorists. 
A French participant noted that all of the worst features pointed out by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on the Middle East 
were related to the lack of democracy; hence, we should not be so conflicted 
about how democratisation occurs. As for Iran, the non-proliferation regime 
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would implode if countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not believe in 
the long-term and successful commitment of the US and the EU in handling 
the Iranian nuclear issue. 
Democratisation – a key word mentioned by one panellist – encapsulated 
much of the subsequent flow of discussion, on the themes of transparency, 
human rights, participation, minority rights and individual property. Indeed, 
as in the second round of the debate, the discussion of democratisation 
revolved around the question of what kind of model(s) should be followed. 
This question drew the general response from the panel that there was no 
single model that should be followed, given that there was a broad variety of 
them that could fit in with the keywords given previously. In all cases, 
however, the role of civil society and non-governmental organisations could 
not be overemphasised. On a hopeful note, one panellist remarked that 
pressures for change in the Middle East were translating into more liberal 
conditions in some places, notably in Morocco (with the reform of the Code 
de la Famille). It was noted by one participant that we should not simply be 
talking about Tehran, Baghdad or Jerusalem: Sanaa, Rabat or Tripoli were 
equally deserving of attention. 
In closing, it is worth recalling a general point made early in the discussion 
by one of the authors, that one of the peculiar difficulties in the GME is 
understanding what feasible mission the US now has in mind in Iraq. The 
suggestion made by one of the panellists, that the 1925 Iraqi Constitution 
(minus the monarchy) would be a satisfactory outcome to the crisis, might 
have been a way of responding to that remark. It remains to be seen whether 
such an aim is (still) achievable and whether it will produce the sort of 
democratisation that the American promoters of regime change had in mind 
when they embarked on the road of Baghdad. 
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What Strategy for the Greater Middle East? 
A European View 
Michael Stürmer 
What is the situation? 
What challenges do we face? 
And what is it that we have to do? 
What is the situation? 
Will the West, after having won the cold war, meet its fate in the Greater 
Middle East? After an ominous start in Iraq, all bets are open and the fallout 
has not yet been fully assessed – let alone the debris cleared out of the way – 
while more conflicts beckon. The Atlantic, in recent months, has been 
stormier than ever and the trans-Atlantic rift runs right across Europe. Europe 
is in disarray not only over its economic core business and the euro but also 
over its role in the world. This crisis happens at a critical juncture when the 
draft Constitutional Treaty aims at the deepening of ties between member 
states, while the widening of Europe’s borders is already far advanced. Never 
was Euro-rhetoric so far away from Euro-reality.  
The Greater Middle East (GME) is a post cold war concept that comprises 
the cauldron of crises from the Caspian to the Nile and from Cyprus to the 
Persian Gulf, as well as the strategic idea of dealing comprehensively with 
the region. In spite of all its conflicts and contradictions, the GME has to be 
seen in its interdependence. It is the playing field of the new Great Game 
between the US and Russia, with the Europeans unsure of where they stand 
on many issues – such as the recent war in Iraq. But it is an unforgiving 
strategic landscape that promises to provide the world with most of its crises, 
possibly major wars over terrorism and WMD, energy and supply routes, and 
issues of access and transit.  
The list of possible differences between the West and Russia is long – almost 
as long as the list of differences within the West itself, which could be 
summed up by Shakespeare in the phrase, “It will make us or mar us”. The 
most recent addition is Georgia after former President Eduard 
Schevardnadze, which has been contested between the US and Russia since 
the country was put back on the map in 1991. Or take Turkey as another 
example: for those who want Turkey in the EU, notably Washington, the 
recent terrorist acts provide ample argument for accession. For those who 
want to preserve the cultural unity of Europe and its cohesion in time of 
crisis, Turkey‘s accession, with or without terrorist acts, is impossible.  
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The case of Iran being en route to nuclear weapons is another example: 
European foreign ministers, in a well orchestrated good-cop/bad-cop routine 
with the US, received assurances in Tehran that all suspect nuclear research 
and development would be ‘suspended’. They had asked for ‘cessation’ but 
had to settle for significantly less. Meanwhile the US provided the military 
pressure from nearby Iraq, without which the Europeans would have returned 
empty-handed. Maybe the Europeans learned something from this experience 
about the relationship between deterrence and détente in the modern age or 
maybe not. If not, the phrase used by André Glucksmann in the title of his 
recent book, L’Ouest contre l’Ouest, is a real possibility, and not just a 
philosopher’s speculation.1 The Iranian crisis is by no means over and the 
military option, as John Bolton said at a recent conference on weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), “remains on the table”. If Iraq is any guide to the 
future, the cohesion of the West is at risk. It will need a shared sense of 
danger, direction, balance and fingerspitzengefühl – in short, the rare 
commodity called statecraft. 
The conflict between Israel and Palestine is another item on the list where the 
relationship between the Europeans and Americans could, if there is another 
peace process, easily fall apart. The Europeans have some influence with the 
Palestinian Authority and the Americans some influence with Israeli Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon. Neither, however, can dictate or control. The Road 
Map was, and still is, an attempt to coordinate carrots and sticks. But the test 
will come when guarantees have to be given, troops deployed and controls 
applied.  
There are other serious differences, but none are more important than those 
on WMD, their platforms and the methods to deal with offenders. Yet there 
are also conflicts over oil, gas, access routes and shipping lanes. Meanwhile, 
Iraq continues to provide the mother of all West-West crises. 
What challenges do we face?  
Is the Greater Middle East on the verge of moral and political 
transformation? After Saddam Hussein, Iraq points in one direction. At the 
same time, Morocco under the enlightened and Koran-legitimised reforms of 
King Mohammed VI, points to another. Algeria, on the eve of next spring’s 
presidential elections, aims at yet another direction. Imported transformation, 
home-grown transformation or post-traumatic transformation – the winds of 
change are blowing across the fertile crescent of the Arab world, and they do 
not stop at the gates of Turkey en route to Europe or at those of Iran en route 
to a new, post-revolutionary equilibrium.  
                                                          
1 See Andre Glucksmann (2003), L’Ouest contre l’Ouest, Plon: Paris. 
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Whether or not these transformations will be peaceful and how they interact 
with each other and with the outside world is impossible to predict; however 
it is of great, in fact strategic importance for the West, Europe and North 
America alike. It would not be wise to assume that Islamic countries are unfit 
for peaceful change and democracy – nor should it be taken for granted that 
the ride now beginning will be anything but rough and risky.  
“An arc of fire” is how Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kwan Yew 
described Europe’s southern and south-eastern neighbourhood. In their time, 
the British called it the Middle East, overseen by the Middle East Command 
in Cairo, Egypt, before they were forced to transfer their ancient holdings 
‘East of Suez’ to Uncle Sam. The Americans, after the fall of the Soviet 
Empire, have thrown their own coordinates across the region, in economic, 
political and military terms. Their influence is backed by the US Central 
Command, situated in Bahrain, along with the Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean and the Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean underlining their 
capacity to project air and sea power.  
The Greater Middle East. The GME is much more than 280 million Arabs, 
the Holy sites of Islam, the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict, a dramatic shortage 
of water, enormous and continuing environmental degradation, sand dunes, 
rocks in abundance, dates, camels, oil (for the last 100 years or so), and the 
princes’ luxury and the masses’ plight. There are also 70 million Turks in a 
multi-ethnic state, roughly the same number of Iranians (also in a multi-
ethnic state) and the state of Israel – with 5 million Jewish Israelis and 1 
million Arabs carrying Israeli passports. In this context, it should not be 
forgotten that the majority of Muslims live to the east of Tehran in Central 
and South-East Asia, and as far away as China.  
The GME region has a very long collective memory, where the conquests of 
King David or the heavenly ascent of the Prophet Mohammed are like 
yesterday’s events. It has no organising principle, no economic integration, 
no system of arms control, let alone collective defence. The Arabs and the 
Iranians can agree on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being the common 
cause – but on nothing else. Meanwhile, the Turks, not friends of the Arabs 
since many centuries, are in a silent alliance with Israel, on topics from 
tourism to air space, the upgrading of ageing US warplanes, the organisation 
of air force manoeuvres and the squeezing of Syria. At the same time, Egypt 
and Jordan are trying to balance their cold peace with the Jewish state against 
the countervailing pressure from the Islamic underground and the mosques. 
The Saudis are, for the time being, the centre and the turntable of the Arab 
world, at least the Sunni part of it. Nevertheless, in the US they are 
increasingly being seen as – to quote Laurent Murawiec (formerly at the 
Rand Corporation and since then at the Hudson Institute) from a leaked 
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statement before the US Senate – “the kernel of evil”.2 Since the events of 11 
September 2001, US intelligence services, especially the National Security 
Agency (NSA) and the White House have shown them the instruments;3 the 
Pentagon has moved the vast installations of the Prince Sultan Airfield to 
Qatar and the Department of Energy is doing everything to reduce US 
dependence on Saudi (or for that matter OPEC) oil. 
The Saudi regime remains dependent on US support, but the princes also 
recognise that, after Osama Bin Laden’s declaration of war against ‘Zionists 
and crusaders spoiling the sacred land of Islam’, their involvement with US 
power is potentially a kiss of death, which they cannot avoid. The Saudi 
princes, notwithstanding the strict standards of their particular brand of 
Islam, are the vigilant defenders of the ultra-puritan and joy-averse Wahabite 
faith at home, but are not above conspicuous consumption – from women to 
booze – in the London West End, in Geneva or in the sunny Riviera resorts 
of the idle rich. Although the per capita income of the Saudi population rose 
to a staggering $24,000 in 1974, at the time of the first oil shock, population 
growth and a fall in oil prices have reduced it to a mere $7,000. This amount 
still puts the Saudis into a much better category than most of their neighbours 
(Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are the only countries far ahead of 
them in terms of per capita income). 
The steep decline in real income is an ominous indicator of conflicts to 
emerge and uncertainties to explode. Next spring, for the first time, local 
councils will be elected in a democratic way. Yet the regime is slowly 
running out of the resources to buy peace at home. Moreover, the Saudi 
bourgeoisie has produced 15 of the 20 hijackers involved in the attacks of 11 
September 2001, and the royals are suspected of funding Islamic charities 
that pass on the money to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups – in fact, they 
seem to be paying protection money to their mortal enemies in hopes of 
avoiding their wrath and diverting it towards infidels and Jews. Thus, they 
undermine the same America that is of vital importance to their survival. It is 
obvious that the Bush Administration will withdraw its hand from the regime 
as the importance of oil from the region is reduced. 
Poverty is not the first thought that springs to mind when Westerners think of 
Arab potentates who are running countries like family firms or military 
dictatorships, or as a combination of the two. But the vast majority of the 
people are – literally – dirt poor, lacking in education and living in squalor. 
The 2002 UN Development Programme report, written by two Arab authors, 
was a devastating account of backwardness, illiteracy, ignorance of the 
                                                          
2 See Laurent Murawiec (2003), La Guerre d’après, Paris: Albin Michel. 
3 See, for example, the article “A King’s Ransom”, by Seymour Hersch in The 
New Yorker, October 2001. 
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modern world and distance to the resources of the information age.4 This 
deplorable state of affairs is largely because of the dictatorial character of 
most Arab regimes, the misallocation of resources, the exclusive pre-
eminence of religious education and, above all, the suppression of women in 
many areas, including their exclusion from professional pursuits in most 
Arab countries. This report is another variation upon the extensive work on 
the Arab civilisation by Bernard Lewis: Arab society was, once upon a time, 
a beacon of scholarship, trade, culture and the martial arts by comparison 
with Europe in the Dark Ages, but is now in limbo. What went wrong?  
Whether in education, knowledge, internet penetration or GDP per capita – 
the Arab world is in a poor state. Asian Tiger countries send their children to 
school for ten years, girls and boys alike, whereas the average Arab child 
attends less than five years. There is a dramatic knowledge gap between the 
Arabs and the rest of the world. Knowledge attainment is generally poor, for 
women even more so than for men. In terms of the enjoyment of overall 
access to services for human development, cultural diversity or links to 
global state-of-the-art improvements during the last decade – much less than 
half the population express satisfaction. Internet penetration is 30% in the 
UAE and further declines in Bahrain, Qatar Lebanon and Jordan. Saudi 
Arabia registers internet use by some 5% of population, Sudan and Iraq nil, 
and all the others are in between. One of the reasons (or so the Israelis 
suspect) most Arab regimes have no interest in peace between Israel and 
Palestine is the fear of cultural and democratic spillover, first from Israelis to 
Palestinians and from there to the rest of the Arab world.  
The GME is not a system but a geo-strategic concept. Notwithstanding the 
many conflicts and contradictions among the various regional players it 
resembles one of those 1960s works of art called a ‘mobile’. If you touch it 
in any one point, everything else begins to move and sometimes swings out 
of control. Moreover, the GME does not exist in isolation but sells its oil to 
the world, taking in large amounts of US dollars. Demographic pressure and 
political oppression combine to produce large scale emigration, especially to 
Europe, where France is home to approximately 6 million Muslims and 
Germany is home to 2.5 million Turks, one-third of them Kurds. Since the 
early 1990s, apocalyptic terrorism is another export commodity to the entire 
globe, with terrorists like Osama bin Laden fighting their wars against Arab 
regimes on American soil and trying to force the US to remove its protection 
from local rulers in Egypt, Saudi-Arabia and other countries.  
                                                          
4 See United Nations Development Programme (2002), Arab Human 
Development Report, UN, New York. 
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Some countries, however, are more important than others in the GME owing 
to population, oil, radicalism, strategic location and internal strife – more 
specifically Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Palestine.  
Saudi Arabia is foremost among these as the pre-eminent Arab country 
because of location, its oil wealth and the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. 
But its golden towers rest on proverbial clay feet. The country is under 
pressure from outside and from within. Externally, the US views the 
kingdom as the financier of international terrorism, where the absence of 
political debate and participation creates vast frustration among the 
bourgeoisie and forces all opposition under the cloak of religious fanaticism. 
Moreover, the contrast between the strictness of Wahabism at home and the 
luxury displayed by the princes abroad cannot fail to raise serious concerns. 
Army officers, now that the oil wealth has to be shared with ever-growing 
masses and real income is dwindling, feel underpaid. Reforms from above, 
which the regent is considering, are slow to materialise; no debate is allowed 
nor is any direction pointed out. Perhaps the strongest indication that the star 
of the House of Saud is sinking is the fact that the US has been moving all 
military installations out of the country to nearby bases and seeks to reduce 
traditional dependence on Saudi oil.  
Iraq. Once the seat of the biblical Garden of Eden, Iraq is today and will be 
for a long time to come the centrepiece of the Fertile Crescent. If Iraq does 
not find internal peace through compromise or separation, and if the Allies 
withdraw before law and order are established and an orderly transfer of 
sovereignty is possible – the Franco-German couple are pressing for an early 
transfer of sovereignty, meaning in so many words ‘Yankee go home’ – a 
large scale Lebanon will ensue, bringing ethnic and religious strife, power 
struggles, massacres all over the place and repercussions throughout the 
entire region. The outside world has parted ways at the donors’ conference in 
Madrid: the US collected large contributions, but France wanted its debt paid 
and Germany refused to forego its $4.4 billion of outstanding debt – though 
with zero chance of ever getting a penny back. Meanwhile, chances for a 
reconstructed Iraq are growing, notwithstanding the daily carnage.  
Iran. The country is in a similar situation as Germany was in at the turn of 
the 20th century: too big for balance and too small for hegemony. It has no 
friends and only difficult neighbours. With the Arabs, there is nothing to 
unite the two sides but the trumped-up Jerusalem issue and the radical 
opposition to the existence of Israel. The war in Iraq has eliminated the 
Saddam Hussein threat – but for how long remains to be seen and it is to be 
doubted that Tehran sees much reassurance in the US presence. From the 
long war with Iraq and from the experience of the two last Gulf wars, the 
mullahs seem to have concluded that, in order to become invulnerable, they 
need a nuclear capability. There seems to be hardly any nuclear debate inside 
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the country, nor are questions being asked about the consequences for 
neighbouring countries. Between Iran and the outside world the nuclear 
weapons issue has moved to the top of the agenda.  
The October mission of the three foreign ministers from Germany, France 
and UK looked, on the face of it, like a well-considered and consulted ‘good-
cop/bad-cop’ policy, with the Americans providing the sticks and the 
Europeans the carrots. In the concluding statement, the Iranian side promised 
to ‘suspend’ – not cease – the uranium enrichment process, while the 
Europeans indicated that they cannot wait to do business. The European 
differences with the US are only papered-over for the time being, as 
Washington wants intrusive inspections and definitive results, while the 
Iranians continue to procrastinate. The Europeans want to keep the issue out 
of the UN Security Council, but the US, not unlike Israel, wants maximum 
pressure. The mullahs, who to offer the best sources of intelligence to Israel 
and the US, are on the way to nuclear weapons for long range missiles, 
which stem back to North Korean help. If this materialises, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be nothing but a scrap of paper and 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey could start thinking about their 
own nuclear deterrent. The West, however, has a dilemma. The short term 
strategy to stop Iran on its way to nuclear weapons falls in the way of the 
long-term strategy that would wait for demographic change to do its work. 
Iran’s student population today is probably the most pro-American crowd in 
the world – but they are also largely unemployed, frustrated and resentful. 
Among the young generation only one in three has the slightest chance of 
finding a paying job. This situation creates pressure on the regime to open 
and to modernise, yet such an opening can only be facilitated through the 
technology and capital investment of the West.  
Is there a magic formula to bring peace and stability to the troubled lands of 
the Greater Middle East? The US seems to have decided that for the time 
being nothing can replace the role of the Central Command as a balancer 
from beyond the sea. In fact, it is the US that keeps all the uneasy balances of 
the Middle East under control. But, as Richard Haas warned all of us in his 
1997 analysis, the US is a ‘reluctant sheriff’, and imperial overstretch is 
looming large.5 Moreover, the close ties between the US and the state of 
Israel makes Washington a difficult ally for its friends and dependents 
around the Middle East, and what looks like a guarantee of security may well 
be the kiss of death.  
The European Union. Can the Europeans project enough stability into the 
region to protect themselves from spillover effects? Turkey’s eventual EU 
                                                          
5 See Richard Haas (1998), The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the 
Cold War, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. 
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membership, which has been promised since the free trade Association 
Agreement of 1963, is being advertised by the US as the panacea. But 
nobody can gauge the effects this would have on Turkey’s social and 
economic structures, nor is there much willingness among Europeans to open 
the door to ever more poor people from foreign lands. In addition, an ever-
wider EU can also be an even more unmanageable system. The best concept 
may still be found in the European Economic Space (EES), which now 
consists of only Norway, Iceland and Finland, or in the Greater Europe 
concept – which, however, is sadly lacking in reality. Should NATO pick up 
the pieces, as the New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman recently 
suggested, in full earnest, when referring to Iraq, Turkey and Israel? That is 
most unlikely. 
What can be done and what must be done, however, is to revive the best of 
the various approaches that have been tried since the end of the cold war, 
from the Madrid process for Middle East peace to the Barcelona Process for 
Mediterranean development, from the Road Map to the stabilisation of Iraq 
under US tutelage. A comprehensive system of arms control, especially 
WMD, must aim at halting the arms race among all the major players in the 
region. First and most importantly, however, is the objective of helping to 
establish peace in the Holy Land. But in the long run, the second UN 
Development Programme report on the Arab world,6 just published, is 
probably right in saying that key to the improvement of the Greater Middle 
East, its endemic poverty, its demographic explosion and its dictatorial 
politics is investment in education, the empowerment of women, and, 
concurrently, a slow and measured process of political participation.  
What is it that we have to do? 
In a recent study, Geoffrey Kemp, who is among the foremost American 
experts on the Greater Middle East (although not of the ‘Europeans are from 
Venus and Americans are from Mars’ school) gave some healthy advice to 
European governments: “Europe must stop fretting about the dominant role 
of the United States in the Middle East and start asserting European interests 
in Europe’s backyard. Towards this end, confrontation with Washington is 
not required. Rather, closer and more equitable transatlantic cooperation on 
matters of vital importance to all three regions will benefit everybody.”7 
                                                          
6 See United Nations Development Programme (2003), Arab Human 
Development Report, UN, New York. 
7 See Geoffrey Kemp (2003-04), “Europe’s Middle East Challenges”, The 
Washington Quarterly, Winter, pp. 163–177. 
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For many years, perhaps decades to come, the Greater Middle East will 
remain the cauldron of crises, competing and interacting with the Indian-
Pakistani nuclear and religious standoff and with the Far Eastern struggle for 
mastery. There is no escape from this set of post-cold war threats. The West, 
if not hanging tough and keeping together, will probably split and fail.  
First of all, it is important to share the intelligence as well as the broader 
analysis. If the overall picture differs dramatically, strategy is bound to 
diverge and conflict is likely to arise – to the point of blockade and failure – 
as witnessed by the recent Iraqi crisis. It should be noted that it was not so 
much a change in the grand strategy that caused the rift, but that Western 
nations, especially France and Germany, stumbled upon it almost by 
accident, i.e. electoral convenience and intra-European power play.  
Secondly, we should make use of the different experience, strength and 
expertise that the US, Canada and the various European countries bring to 
the rendezvous, including soft powers, hard powers, distance and closeness, 
to achieve a maximum of influence and formative power.  
Thirdly, we need to make practical use of those differing formations, 
experiences and approaches, not only the good-cop/bad-cop routine vis-á-vis 
Iran but even more so when it comes to mixing the proverbial carrots and 
sticks. The EU has a great reputation for the cornucopia it seems to be 
wielding, while the US ability to use brute force inspires compromise and 
reticence. The two approaches, normally regarded as Venus and Mars, need 
not exclude each other but, if applied gently, consistently and regularly, 
make a successful formula. Of course, fairness in dividing the benefits of 
trade and investment is essential.  
Fourthly, we must make sure that what we pray for is what is in our best 
interest. In American ears, the democracy sermon sounds like the winning 
formula. But it is rare to hear the same pious wishes from Israel or among the 
more intimately involved European countries. They would be content with 
governments halfway between Turkey’s democracy and Egypt’s 
authoritarianism. ‘Osama for President’ is a battle cry the Europeans hear 
when Arab democracy is mentioned while Americans tend to believe that 
democracy more or less US-style must surely be the panacea for the woes of 
the Greater Middle East. It is important to try to settle for a pragmatic, 
reasonable, open-ended compromise. It was Samuel Huntington, of The 
Clash of Civilizations fame, who warned the US against imposing its value 
system on far away nations that have a different narrative and follow 
different stars. Modesty and pragmatism may be the better part of valour.8  
                                                          
8 See Samuel P. Huntingdon (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster Inc. 
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It is also relevant to look at whom one calls a ‘friend’. If in doubt, criteria 
should be found for long-term engagement or, possibly, disengagement. 
Some advice on this point for the Saudis is: if you have such friends, you do 
not need enemies. Nevertheless, their oil-policies and their domestic power 
play regulate the price of the most strategic resource the world’s oil 
economies need. We must not forget, before Western oil reserves have been 
exhausted, that there is only one oil market in the world, largely dominated 
by OPEC (more especially by the Saudis) and that it is very inflexible.  
Further, we need to make sure that strategic objectives are broadly 
understood and widely shared. NATO’s strategic guidelines of the 1991-
vintage had already included strategic minerals – meaning oil – and access 
routes. But that meant nothing in particular in terms of force rebuilding and 
transformation: the next Middle Eastern crisis came like a thief in the night.  
Adding to the diplomatic toolbox, having enough escalation dominance is 
crucial to prevail in any test of strength, be it crisis management or be it a 
full-blown confrontation. No European nation has sufficient means to do so; 
not even the European security and defence policy (ESDP) would make 
much difference. It takes NATO and NATO’s assets, including its 
headquarters, to bring home the more robust points.  
It is ironic that Europeans, who are closer to the Islamic arc of fire than the 
US, seem to be far less worried about general insecurity and instability 
coming from the region than about practical administrative, economic and 
social issues arising from the southern and eastern neighbourhood. This need 
not be a source of weakness, or a reason for a public display of antagonism 
but on the contrary a source of strength, suggesting complementary 
approaches and different ways of making use of naturalised citizens from 
southern shores, such as Turks and Iranians in Germany, and Arabs in 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.  
Finally yet importantly: we must make sure that NATO remains the 
centrepiece of Atlantic security and a supplier of stability for the Greater 
Middle East. It is within NATO that both the analysis and the strategy can be 
shared. No separate European expedition would have sufficient deterrent 
effect and escalation dominance to suppress warlords and wars throughout 
the Near Eastern arc of fire. Moreover, as the nature of the threat is in most 
cases global, the response must also be organised along the lines of the old J. 
P. Morgan motto: ‘Global reach, local touch’.  
Author’s note: Among the vast and ever growing body of literature, see also 
these specific references: “A Survey of Islam and the West”, The Economist, 13 
September 2003 and Shireen Hunter (1998), The Future of Islam and the West, 
Clash of Civilisations or Peaceful Coexistence, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) Publications, CSIS, Washington, D.C. 
 | 195 
A Grand Strategy for the Middle East 
An American View 
Steven Simon 
he Middle East is undergoing a long-term political, economic and 
demographic crisis. Over the next 12 years, the total population of the 
Middle East will grow by 32%. Despite declining fertility rates in 
some countries (Iran, Egypt and Tunisia), demographic momentum will 
continue to yield high growth. Moreover, 50% of Arabs and 54% of Iranians 
are under the age of 20; over 60% are under 30. In high-income OECD 
countries, the percentage of the population under 20 is 25%.1 Though most 
Arabs and Iranians can read and write the quality of their education is not 
good enough to shape them into a labour force capable of competing in an 
increasingly competitive global market. It is, however, good enough to make 
unskilled labour an unacceptable alternative. As can be inferred from the 
population growth figures, the Middle East has the fastest growing labour 
force in the world: 3.4% each year between 1990 and 1998. Some countries, 
such as Syria at 4.8%, Algeria at 4.9% or Yemen at 5.6%, face potentially 
serious problems. (For comparative purposes, the US labour force has been 
growing at 0.04% and the EU’s at 0.08%.) Unemployment in the region is 
between 12% and 35%, depending on the country. If total fertility rates 
decline more sharply than expected, population growth will eventually slow 
too, thereby taking some of the pressure off labour markets – in theory. In 
practice, however, fertility rates will decline only if women are better 
educated, which implies that they will then be joining males in the labour 
force to produce a net increase in the number of young people looking for 
non-existent jobs. In such circumstances, labour market equilibrium must 
yield either higher unemployment or lower wages.2 On average, real wages 
in the region have remained unchanged for 30 years. 
On the demand side, GDP growth has lagged behind the rest of the world for 
at least two decades. The region has in effect disengaged from the global 
economy. While over the past 20 years OECD economies grew by 1.4% per 
                                                          
1 See the International Labour Organisation Bureau of Statistics (retrievable from 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/). The 30 OECD member countries have populations of 
individuals under 20 that comprise 27.5% of the total population. Alternately, in 
the high-income OECD countries (which exclude the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey) the under-20 population stands at 24.9% 
of the total population.  
2 The rigid labour market regulation typical of Middle Eastern countries can 
produce equilibria at higher unemployment and lower wage levels.  
T 
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year, East Asia’s (excluding Japan) by 5.8% per year and Latin America’s by 
1%, the Middle East has not grown at all. Real wages and labour productivity 
are unchanged. Adding to the region’s miseries has been the extremely rapid 
urbanisation in countries that are unable to pay for the infrastructural 
improvements needed to keep cities from collapsing under the weight of 
internal immigration. 
There is general consensus on how this parlous state was reached. Rent-
seeking behaviour by distributive states militated against transparency and 
accountability and in favour of corruption and unsustainable subsidies. States 
occupied increasingly large shares of national economies, became employers 
of last resort and adopted import-substitution policies. In some countries, 
military procurement added to dead weight losses. All these factors have 
discouraged foreign direct investment. Such policies and practices are 
difficult to reverse.3 
Against this socio-economic background, it is unsurprising that the United 
States has come to be seen as an enemy, either because it supports national 
governments that have presided over this decline, or because it has laid siege 
to regional regimes and undermined their ability to improve living 
conditions. Perceptions of U.S. policy toward Iraq and Palestine, as well as 
of the conduct of the war on terrorism, have contributed to the United States’ 
disastrous standing in the region. Public opinion surveys conducted by the 
Pew Foundation and Zogby International offer a vivid statistical picture of 
this disaster. 
The Pew Global Attitudes Project survey released in June 2003 found that 
“the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim 
world”.4 Only 27% of Moroccans, 15% of Lebanese and Turks, 13% of 
Indonesians, 12% of Pakistanis, and 1% of Jordanians and Palestinians had a 
favourable view of the US. (These numbers are broadly consistent with 
recent surveys of other countries in the region. Just 6% of the Egyptian 
public has a favourable impression of the US, while more than half the 
population has “very negative” views, according to a 2002 Pew study.) As a 
result primarily of the invasion of Iraq, the erosion has accelerated. 
                                                          
3 Nor is the IMF agenda, the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, (export-led 
growth, flexible labour market, deregulation, market prices for domestic 
consumption) necessarily appropriate to states that (a) have no particular 
advantage in non-oil commodities and no skilled labour, or (b) where subsidies 
are crucial to civic order and regime survival. 
4 “Views of a Changing World 2003, How Global Publics View: War in Iraq; 
Democracy; Islam and Governance; Globalization”, The Pew Global Attitudes 
Project, The Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (retrievable from 
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185).  
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Compared with Pew 2002 results, the 2003 returns show a marked drop: the 
Lebanese and Turkish figures declined by 50%, the Indonesian figure 
dropped 62% and the Jordanian figure fell 96%. Moreover, the antipathy has 
spread beyond the Middle East to other Muslim countries: the percentage of 
Nigerians who held positive views of the US plummeted from 71% to 38%, 
and in Indonesia the figure fell from 60% to 13%. 
With this sudden decline has come a change in the nature of such public 
opposition to America. For many years, Muslims in the Middle East and 
elsewhere distinguished between their disapproval of US policies and their 
feelings about the American people. Whatever their government might have 
done, Americans were admired for their wealth, can-do attitude, popular 
culture, devotion to democracy and technological achievements. But the 
statistical spread between opposition to Washington’s policies and negative 
attitudes towards the American people has narrowed considerably, and in 
many countries a crucial line has been crossed: Americans are increasingly 
despised as a people. For example, between 2002 and 2003, the number of 
Pakistanis holding positive views about American fell from 39% to 16%, and 
for Jordanians it fell from 54% to 18%. These sentiments are fed by the 
spreading belief throughout the Muslim world that the US poses a serious 
threat to Islam. In seven of the eight Muslim populations surveyed, 50% or 
more believed in that specific American threat; only Nigeria, where 42% 
shared this belief, was the figure below the half-way line. Remarkably, 
significant majorities in seven of the eight Muslim populations – with a near 
majority in Morocco – worried about a potential US military threat to their 
own countries. 
Thus, popular opinion is increasingly receptive to the Jihadist dogma that 
America is the enemy. Muslims also feel the need for a powerful figure to 
defend them. In six of the populations studied, the Pew research found that 
40% or more had confidence that Osama bin Laden would do the right thing 
in world affairs – with a majority of Jordanians (56%) and Palestinians 
(72%) placing their trust in his leadership. 
The discourse in major daily newspapers published in the region (including 
Qatar, a key host for US military forces in the Gulf) present US policy in 
terms of the supposedly decisive role that Jews play in determining 
America’s aggressive or exploitative actions in the region. The broad point is 
that America’s approach to the reason for its policies – the pursuit of any 
‘grand strategy’ – will be received with scepticism at best, or hostility. 
Attacks against the UN and the Red Cross, as well as British, Italian and 
Bulgarian forces in Iraq, and the British Consul General in Istanbul show that 
countries perceived to be connected to the American presence in the region 
are liable to be tarred with the same brush. 
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Against this dismal background, a grand strategy towards the Middle East 
must attempt more or less simultaneously to integrate the region into the 
global economy, promote democratisation, stave off the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, stabilise local military balances and neutralise terrorists 
while redressing negative attitudes about the US and its partners. Concurrent 
with these daunting, long-term tasks, there is a Palestinian state to be created 
and nurtured, Iraqi insurgency to be defeated and an Iraqi state to be 
reconstituted. George Bernard Shaw remarked that marriage in the context of 
daily life amounted to “a battle in the midst of a war”. Incubating these two 
states while coping with the broader demands of a Middle East strategy will 
seem much the same to policy-makers. 
Democratisation. If any of these elements of a strategy has priority, it must 
be democratisation. This is a project, of course, not a panacea. It has been 
observed that democracy is a cure for just one ailment – tyranny – and that 
there are both poor and illiberal democracies. The future may also hold 
Islamist, anti-Western democracies. Nevertheless, democracies predicated on 
rule of law entail accountability and a degree of transparency that reduce the 
opportunity for corruption and misallocation of resources, while giving 
people a stake in decision-making. Thus democratisation would serve two 
vital purposes. First, it would improve economic performance and provide a 
better climate for investment, thereby reducing the labour supply overhang 
that poses such a severe threat to stability. Second, it would give frustrated, 
even alienated, publics a sense of empowerment at home that would reduce 
their resentment of powers abroad.  
A commitment to democratisation would also have to encompass a 
commitment to bringing women into the workplace in countries where they 
are now excluded from the economic sphere. The faster this happens, the 
faster fertility rates will fall. Cultural barriers to the integration of women 
will naturally be reinforced by the economic threat these new entrants into 
the job market will pose to the hordes of unemployed young men already 
propping up walls in Middle Eastern cities. This is one reason, among many, 
that the overall programme of democratisation will have to proceed slowly.  
Another reason for proceeding slowly is that the distributive economies 
typical of some of these states undercut the incentives of the state and of 
society to adopt democracy. Yet another reason is the ubiquity of Islamist 
oppositions, whose commitment to Western-style democracy is unclear and 
who therefore cannot win the trust of reform-minded regime players essential 
to the pact-making that must precede the emergence of democracy. The Bush 
administration’s Middle East Partnership Initiative is well adapted to these 
constraints and focused on key objectives: the empowerment of women, 
support for civil society and enhancement of education. The EU has been 
pursuing these objectives for a number of years, though at a somewhat more 
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modest level. The potential synergy and results of combined US-EU 
initiatives in these areas could, in fact, serve our shared interests well.  
These programmes, however, are not enough. Pressure on governments to 
open up political space is essential. Here, too, the West must think in terms 
of the long run. We cannot afford to precipitate crises with regional 
governments or withdraw support entirely when these relationships serve 
other important interests and there is no acceptable near-term alternative to 
existing arrangements. The administration’s symbolic punishment of the 
Mubarak government in Egypt for hounding the sociologist Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim represents the sort of signal that we should be sending more broadly. 
Trade and aid. Financial assistance will remain necessary for most of the 
states in the region. The Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA), until a large part was re-allocated for use in Iraq, 
represented an interesting departure from an approach that had steadily lost 
credibility – and congressional support – between the mid-1980s and the end 
of the last decade. The inspiration was a Victorian dedication to the 
deserving poor, except in this case the poor are countries whose attempts, 
however feeble, to implement Washington Consensus rules made them 
deserving of help. The virtues of this approach were the enthusiasm it 
generated among Congressional appropriators and the smaller chance that the 
money would be wasted by recipients. The problem is that it punishes the 
undeserving poor; states that have not – and may never – meet the standard 
of economic reform that access to MCA money is intended to facilitate. Yet 
these failing states are precisely the ones that pose the urgent threat to 
Western interests. A successful strategy will have to allocate funds to the 
feckless poor as well as the righteous poor. 
Aid is not the whole story. Trade is a far better way to help these societies 
perform better. Assistance tends to perpetuate the structures that hinder 
democratisation and hobble growth. Trade would take the funds from 
corrupt, favour-dispensing regimes and put it in the hands of a commercial 
middle class, empowering civil society and helping to create the conditions 
for democratic transition. The United States has finally adopted this policy 
towards the Pakistani textile industry and – as a policy, if not a political 
matter – made pursuit of free trade arrangements an important part of its 
foreign policy. This is another area where the harmonisation of US and EU 
policies can pay real dividends. 
Maintain the regional military balance in the Persian Gulf. It will take years 
before Iraq emerges as a military power in the region – one hopes with 
exclusively conventional capabilities. Similarly, Iran will not emerge from its 
own economic weakness and political confusion for years. Nonetheless, the 
prospects for Iraq’s regeneration and Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons 
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are real enough. An over-the-horizon military presence, combined with 
forward-deployed US air force units in Qatar, a fleet headquartered in 
Bahrain and ground force equipment in Kuwait, will be needed to reassure 
the states on the Arab side of the Gulf, while injecting some caution into a 
nervous Iran and Iraq. The US – and its allies – will want to keep their forces 
available, but out of sight, to avoid inflaming public opinion. 
Stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Few of the regional states are 
interested in a nuclear capability; most support non-proliferation goals. 
Although Iran has apparently experimented with uranium enrichment and 
would like to develop a production capacity, Tehran has not likely concluded 
that actual nuclear weapons are necessary or desirable. This will depend on 
the trajectory of Iraq’s development in the coming years, perceptions of the 
threat posed by the US and the potential diplomatic and economic costs of 
proliferation if the US and Europe are united in their determination to block 
it. The US and its allies have at least some control over all three factors. A 
grand strategy for the Middle East would entail coordinated, firm exercise of 
this control. Unfortunately, exercising this control will demand a greater 
level of inter-alliance respect and cooperation than is currently on tap. 
Combat terrorism. Whether or not terrorism has root causes susceptible to 
Western efforts to deal with them, terrorists will have to be rooted out. As al-
Qaeda has evolved from a relatively small group of Egyptian revolutionaries 
and Saudi mystics into a widely shared ideology, this is going to be 
increasingly difficult. The presence of these insurgents in Saudi Arabia and 
other countries in the region will force the US and the UK to foster close ties 
to regimes whose politics spurred the insurrection in the first place. Although 
this enforced dependence cannot be avoided entirely, a grand strategy would 
require that it be balanced by nuanced pressure on autocratic regimes and 
transmitted ‘in the clear’. The balance is extremely delicate and the risk of 
making this worse will be high. 
Find a way to talk to opposition movements. It is said that a monologue is 
one person talking to himself; a dialogue is two people talking to themselves. 
Recognising the problems inherent in dialogue, the US in particular needs to 
explain itself better to the young, regional, technocratic elite. During a period 
when US credibility is at all-time low, this will not be easy. Yet a grand 
strategy for the region demands that the US – and its allies – be perceived as 
partners in the advancement of its people, rather than predators or clumsy 
hegemons, or worse, religious adversaries. What Fouad Ajami called the 
belligerence and self-pity of contemporary Arab discourse will get in the 
way, but we will have to forge ahead with some sort of dialogue despite this. 
The religious expression of opposition language poses an even more 
daunting challenge. Despite the religious window-dressing of American 
rhetoric, US policy is governed by secular concerns. Europe, of course, has 
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expunged religion from the public sphere and private piety is on the wane. 
Engaging with the self-consciously religious language of the only truly 
organised and credible oppositions in the region will not be easy. But 
governments must try. 
Palestine and Iraq. Palestine is not the source of America’s problems in the 
region, but it must be part of the solution. A coherent grand strategy would 
demand more robust US involvement. The disincentives are strong. The 
parties remain far apart, the two societies are fatigued but not wrung out, 
politics in both camps remain stagnant and the Bush administration is 
unlikely to take risks before a potentially close US election. But Washington 
must be seen to push for conditions that will favour a successful Palestinian 
state: territorial contiguity and borders close to the 1967 Green Line, with 
sensible adjustments. Failure to do so will pose not only near-term 
diplomatic costs, but lead to longer-term liabilities in the form of a stunted, 
violent Palestinian state that is a source of instability in the region and 
beyond. Similarly, the US – and its allies – must get Iraq right. The centre of 
gravity in the region is shifting from the West (Egypt and Syria) to the East. 
Politics in Iran are turbulent and arguably democratic; in Saudi Arabia, 
Crown Prince Abdullah talks about elections (and must cope with an 
insurgency); in several of the smaller littoral states, genuine participatory 
democracy is beginning to replace the sham practices of an earlier time. The 
evolution of Iraq will have an enormous impact on these trends. If the state 
fails or reverts to a dictatorship, these exciting developments may fade; if it 
succeeds, a regeneration of the region is dimly possible. 
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What Strategy 
for the Greater Middle East? 
A Russian View 
Irina Zvyagelskaya 
n answer to the question of whether a common strategy for the 
Greater Middle East is possible is closely associated with how we 
understand the term ‘Greater’ and what regions or subregions are 
included into this macro-region. There is an impression that despite the 
differences in details many researchers are nowadays inclined to consider the 
Middle East as a territory extending from North Africa to Pakistan and 
including the Persian Gulf, Palestine, Central Asia and the Caucasus. If one 
is to proceed from this definition, the subregions just listed differ 
significantly from each other by the vicissitudes of historical fate, the level of 
socio-political and economic development, the specificity of ethno-
confessional makeup and the degree of the involvement of external forces. At 
the same time it is commonly supposed that this new Middle East reproduces 
common security challenges and threats. Given that the area has a high 
concentration of despotic regimes and failed states, it is the site of politically 
radical and militant Islam, terrorism and conflicts. Several countries in the 
region also produce and supply drugs. To this one may add the danger of 
further violation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and of WMD falling 
into the hands of irresponsible extremist groupings.  
There is no reason to regard the challenges mentioned above and threats 
arising in different parts of the new Middle East as identical or uniform for 
the entire macro-region. A gradual transformation of societies generating 
these threats is underway – a fact that changes, if not their essence, then at 
least the particular features of their manifestation. In this connection there is 
no common strategy to combat these threats, nor can there be, though a use 
of similar instruments cannot be excluded. 
This paper attempts to present the Russian approach to the main security 
issues in two subregions of the Greater Middle East – Central Asia and 
Palestine.  
Central Asia 
In comparison with the traditional Middle East, Central Asia ranks much 
higher on the list of Russian foreign policy priorities. The transparency of 
borders, constant migration flows and the contacts that had been formed back 
in Soviet times made Russia much more dependent on the evolution of the 
A 
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situation in the states of Central Asia than had ever been expected. Central 
Asia has become a region independently generating threats and challenges to 
Russia’s security and simultaneously a transit corridor for threats coming 
from forces outside its borders. Among them is the growth of extremism in 
the form of militant Islamism, drugs and arms trafficking, the disputed 
border issues, tense relations between individual countries, the degradation 
of the environment and others. These threats do not simply affect Russia, but 
spread to its territory, intertwining with the Russian domestic security 
challenges and fostering their intensification.  
Over the past years, Moscow has determined its role as a guarantor of the 
region’s security and its defender from external threats. These interests 
induce Russia to pursue a ‘costly’ policy. Because of the growth of 
extremism and terrorism, Russia tried to share the burden of responsibility 
for security with China (in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, SCO) and then virtually acquiesced to the American military 
presence. 
The greater part of Russian politicians and experts agree that in the short 
term, US action in many aspects meets the demands of strengthening security 
in Central Asia and in this respect can only be welcomed by Russia. These 
activities are, in particular: 
• setting up an interim government and taking measures to stabilise the 
situation in Afghanistan;  
• deterring extremism in Central Asia by demonstrating a military 
presence; 
• diminishing the channels of foreign assistance to radical Islamists; and 
• assisting the states of the region and their economies. 
At the same time, in the long term it is not quite clear what the consequences 
of changing the geopolitical balance in the region will be. The growing 
geopolitical importance of Central Asia among the priorities of other states 
may cause difficulties in Russia’s relations with them. Thus in case relations 
between the US and China deteriorate, the American presence in the region 
can become a factor of tension in relations between Russia and China. The 
American presence may also create problems in relations between Russia and 
Iran. Though the large-scale destabilisation of the situation and the outbreak 
of violence in Central Asia seem improbable, one cannot completely exclude 
a negative scenario. The US is unlikely to interfere in regional affairs or 
protect a particular regime, and will probably curtail its presence in Central 
Asia. In this case, Russia’s responsibility for the establishment of stability 
and its involvement in Central Asian affairs could increase many times over 
and require huge resources and efforts on Moscow’s part.  
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A threat most often referred to is militant Islamism. The Islamic radicalism 
in Central Asia has emerged chiefly under the influence of domestic and not 
external reasons. In the poorest states, a massive restructuring of the 
economy – de-industrialisation attended by the growth of the comparative 
importance of the trade and service sector – has resulted from the increase of 
negative economic tendencies soon after independence. The social welfare 
sphere has suffered an especially heavy blow. Problems in connection with 
the payment of pensions and allowances, with the maintenance of the system 
of education and public health services, and an extremely low level of public 
safety have promoted the trends to return to traditional practices. Working in 
the same direction have been such factors as corruption and nepotism in the 
highest bodies of power, infringement of legality and the weakness of law-
enforcement agencies. The people, feeling defenceless, have naturally clung 
to traditional structures regulating personal and public life. From here greater 
attention has been directed towards religion, which was, under certain 
circumstances, expressed in borrowing the recipes for a just reorganisation of 
society within the framework of political Islam.  
The above mentioned features of current development of Central Asian 
societies have created a breeding-ground for the emergence of extremist 
Islamic organisations there (e.g. Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan). Outside assistance and support on the part of international 
Islamic foundations and certain governments of Muslim states is playing an 
important, but nevertheless secondary role. The productivity of this support, 
which includes financial aid, the training of militants and the export of 
ideology (the latter quite often at variance with the local tradition), is 
conditioned by the existence of contradictions, discontent and frustration in 
the region. In its turn, such support rapidly becomes an instrument of 
mobilisation, creating an opportunity for protest sentiments to be more 
swiftly released. 
Given the American presence, in the long term this trend may prove 
ineffective from the standpoint of maintaining stability. This result may 
happen if the West too actively engages in the introduction of Western 
standards of democracy, market economy and human rights. Still, it must be 
admitted that the Americans are beginning to understand the counter-
productivity of such approaches in the cultures of traditional Oriental 
societies, in which respect for the supreme authority is ingrained.  
American support, promoting the legitimisation of the Central Asian regimes 
and their consolidation, could simultaneously engender among them a 
temptation to use tougher methods towards the opposition, represented 
largely by the Islamists.  
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Meanwhile, political Islam in Central Asia is far from being homogeneous 
politically. Coexisting within its context are both those moderate Islamists 
who are ready to cooperate with secular regimes in the name of national 
interests and the champions of a radical approach that is gaining in strength.  
The main vulnerability of the official US approach, which is shared by 
neither Russia nor the European states, consists of shifting the accent to 
methods of military, forceful pressure, which do not leave political Islam the 
right to self-expression (it is certainly not just a question of either the 
terrorists or the extremists). In the Central Asian region there is an ever 
greater need for using the methods of political influence upon the radicals, 
isolating them within the framework of political Islam itself, along with the 
methods of military pressure where these are necessary.  
In the long term, the American military presence per se can become a 
powerful, irritating factor, stimulating the manifestations of radical and 
above all, Islamic opposition, which will represent an especially serious 
challenge to Russia’s security. Although the situation in Central Asia has 
nothing in common with that in Iraq, one cannot disregard the fact that the 
American military campaign and its military presence in the country have 
been encouraging re-Islamisation of the two states ruled by secular Baathist 
regimes, namely, Iraq and Syria. 
In Central Asia as a whole, Russia (while developing cooperation in the 
security domain with the West along with China), is increasingly prepared to 
act independently, safeguarding its interests through bilateral and multilateral 
military-political and military-technical cooperation with the states in the 
region.  
Palestine 
The situation in the zone of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not a priority for 
Russian policy. At the same time, as the negative tendencies developing 
there increasingly spillover the limits of the region, Russia also feels the 
frustrating impact of the Middle Eastern factor.  
The crisis of expectations associated with the peace process has fostered a 
radicalisation of the Palestinian society, which is less and less ready to accept 
a compromise variant of settlement with Israel. Even representatives of Fatah 
(Arafat’s organisation) have declared that the peace process was a conspiracy 
against the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.  
The per capita income of Palestinians has decreased by 20% in comparison 
with 1993 (before the conclusion of the Oslo agreements). Meanwhile, a 
significant growth of unemployment has been observed, the freedom of 
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movement has been restricted. The construction of Israeli settlements has 
continued and the number of Israeli settlers in the region has doubled.  
At the same time, the Palestinian authorities haven’t demonstrated any 
efficiency or ability to resolve socio-economic issues. Corruption, the 
absence of professionalism and the haphazard process of decision-making 
have resulted in a situation where social problems have largely been given 
over to the tender mercies of Islamist organisations – Hamas, Islamic Jihad 
and so forth. These have been raising funds for the Palestinian poor, 
organising the education of the youth and have naturally pursued a 
corresponding ideological indoctrination of the population. The political role 
of Islamist organisations traditionally calling for a ‘jihad’ against Jews has 
clearly been growing. Thus the ethno-territorial and ethno-political conflict 
underlying the Palestinian problem has gradually acquired an ethno-
confessional dimension as well. Basically, a confrontation on inter-
confessional grounds was not peculiar to the Palestinian-Israeli differences. 
Among the Palestinians themselves there are Christians and the main 
Palestinian organisations were represented by secular nationalists who did 
not use religious slogans as an instrument of military-political struggle in a 
practical manner. Nowadays, even young Fatah fighters have been gambling 
with terrorist methods under Islamic slogans, having created their own 
military formation of al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. 
The Russian interests in the Middle East are being formed under the 
influence of various factors. First, there is the demonstration effect that the 
events in Palestine have had. For the Muslim world, the Palestinians are a 
symbol of fighting against the humiliations suffered by Muslims. It is in this 
context that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is used by Islamic radicals calling 
for war against the infidels. The talk about the ‘Palestinisation’ of the 
Chechen conflict started after the appearance of Chechen women as 
terrorists, though this comparison is incorrect. These two conflicts are of a 
completely different nature; death as a human bomb is not in Chechen 
traditions – Chechen men will not offer themselves in such a manner. 
Attempts at such an imitation, however, testify that things happening in the 
traditional Middle East are ever more affecting the security of Russia proper. 
It is not ruled out that both the Palestinian radicals and the Chechen terrorists 
at times receive funding from the same sources. Second, the Russian 
Federation is compelled to take into consideration the presence of a 
significant number of Russian citizens in Israel. This factor cannot help but 
influence Russia’s policies, as the leadership of the Russian Federation (RF) 
is anxious over their security, which under the conditions of the ongoing 
conflict, is constantly jeopardised. Third, the Israeli support for the Russian 
policy in Chechnya is also playing its role, especially against the background 
of constant criticism and resentment of any RF actions in this republic on the 
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part of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), quite 
often viewed in Russia as evidence of double standards and attempts towards 
the appeasement of Islamic extremists.  
Given this connection, Russia has an interest in promoting the speediest 
settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the process, the direct parties 
to the conflict nowadays perceive the RF as an honest broker. On the one 
hand, it has retained its traditionally close ties with the Palestinians and the 
Arab states. On the other hand, it has wide-ranging relations with Israel, 
which believes that the Russian Federation is confronted with similar 
problems of struggle against terrorism. Nevertheless, Russia has neither the 
ambitions nor the resources to assume an active, independent role in 
promoting the process of settlement. It is ready to work within the 
framework of the efforts of the Quartet, advancing the Road Map for peace.  
Conclusions 
It seems that attempts to construct a new or expanding Middle East have 
been dictated by political reasons. An automatic incorporation of the states of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus into the traditional Middle East may have 
only initially reflected a certain reality expressed in the quest for a national 
identity and in the attempts to revive connections with coreligionists and 
ethnically related peoples. But later on, these concepts came to occupy a 
special place in the system and structure of international relations, linking an 
opportunity of accelerated development mainly with the expansion of ties 
with the West. The question of whether the Greater Middle East is united by 
common security challenges also seems rather contentious. For example, the 
hierarchy of reasons for the radicalisation of political Islam and the growth of 
extremism in Palestine and in Central Asia are different. Various external 
forces have different foreign-policy priorities in these regions and, 
accordingly, their assessments of the intensity and danger of these threats 
also differ seriously. Such a conclusion means that the instruments and 
methods of combating the existing threats are not universal and, 
consequently, one may hardly calculate on a single strategy for the new 
Middle East. In each specific case, an approach of its own should be 
developed and only under such circumstances can its efficiency be ensured. 
Such an approach will require a coordinated effort, leaving enough room for 
manoeuvre by each of the parties interested in the stability of the Greater 
Middle East. 
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